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This book provides a multidisciplinary examination of the critical issues and 
challenges associated with the EU’s initiative to build a Security Union, particularly 
in relation to common policies adopted at the Member State level aimed at 
countering terrorism and crime. It delves into EU efforts to support cross-border 
investigations, the exchange of information and international cooperation, taking 
stock of the effects on freedom and privacy. 
The various contributions offer key research findings, which contributed to the 
European Commission’s 2017 Comprehensive Assessment of EU Security 
Policy. They identify and explore the main constitutional dilemmas facing the 
Security Union concerning EU standards enshrined in the Lisbon Treaty and the 
commitments undertaken in the context of the EU Better Regulation agenda. 
Hence, this timely examination of EU security policies sheds light on their 
effectiveness, proportionality, fundamental rights and societal implications. 
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FOREWORD 
his book is the result of a policy meeting organised by CEPS on 12 May 
2017 under the title “Reappraising EU Security Policy: Effectiveness, 
rule of law and rights in countering terrorism and crime”. Bringing 
together EU policy-makers and academics, it provided an opportunity to 
exchange perspectives that proved useful to the Comprehensive Assessment 
that the European Commission has recently concluded in the field of security 
policy and which I promised to conduct upon becoming the first 
Commissioner for the Security Union in September 2016. 
The interconnected and cross-border threats that we collectively face 
mean that the security of one Member State is the security of all Member 
States. The case for EU action to support Member States in the daily 
challenges they face in fighting terrorism, countering radicalisation and 
violent extremism, combating organised crime and responding to the 
growing threats posed by cybercrime, is unanswerable. This was what was 
in President Jean-Claude Juncker’s mind when he created the post I have the 
privilege to occupy – the urgent need to build an effective and sustainable 
Security Union.  
The Juncker Commission is structured in a way that breaks down 
traditional silos between different EU policy areas, and the Security Union is 
no exception to this approach. I draw on a cross-cutting Task Force covering 
more than 30 Commission Directorates-General and the European External 
Action Service. 
The Commission’s action essentially takes place on two fronts: First, it 
is closing down the space in which terrorists and criminals operate and 
denying them the means – money, munitions and movement. That includes 
working on the prevention of terrorism, and working to counter 
radicalisation. Second is building our resilience, strengthening our 
information systems by closing information gaps and making them more 
joined up, and strengthening critical infrastructure, particularly our 
transport, energy and cyber security, which are too often targeted by 
terrorists and criminals. 
T 
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To increase the transparency of EU action on security, a progress report 
on the implementation of the Security Union is published every month. 
Earlier this year, the Commission published a Comprehensive Assessment 
of EU Security Policy. The assessment was carried out after a thorough 
dialogue with think tanks, industry, academics, the European Parliament 
and others. I thank those who were able to contribute, and those like CEPS 
who continue to contribute with independent research to the debate on EU 
security policy. 
Overall, the review showed that Member States now clearly recognise 
that the EU can and should play an active role in security, with a step change 
in Member States’ engagement at the European level; it also identified some 
challenges and gaps. 
Since early 2015 the terrorist threat has increased markedly in Europe 
and the EU has responded by adapting its priorities and increasing the pace 
of work. Interoperability is at the top of the list of priorities of this 
Commission. Improving the access to and sharing of information is at the 
heart of our efforts to strengthen security in the EU. Identity fraud is a 
growing problem – particularly with returning terrorist fighters. We have 
several EU databases that contain valuable information but which were 
developed separately and do not communicate with each other.  
We need to ensure that our border guards and police, our immigration 
officers, our customs and judicial authorities have the necessary information 
at their disposal to protect our external borders, lead the fight against 
terrorism and organised crime and better protect our citizens. It is essential 
to ensure that individuals can only be registered under one identity and that 
law enforcement and border staff on the ground have the ability to search 
across all databases biometrically as well as alphanumerically. 
The Commission set up a High-Level Expert Group on Information 
Systems and Interoperability to identify and propose solutions to addressing 
shortcomings and information gaps caused by the complexity and 
fragmentation of our information systems at the European level. The group 
produced its final report in May 2017 and the Commission moved rapidly to 
present proposals to amend the information systems concerned, and to 
introduce the three operational dimensions of interoperability:  
• a European search portal,  
• a shared biometric matching service, and  
• a common identity repository. 
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The conclusions adopted by the Council on 9 June 2017 on the way 
forward to improve this information exchange and ensure interoperability 
of EU information systems prove that this is a shared priority at the highest 
political level.  
London Bridge, Manchester, Westminster, Stockholm, Berlin, Nice and 
Brussels: What these terrorist attacks all have in common, apart from the 
often crude methods used, is the alarming speed at which some of the 
individuals involved became radicalised. 
There is a clear and urgent need to act and do more to counter 
radicalisation. Fortunately, we have laid a solid foundation in our work over 
the last two years. The Commission launched the EU Internet Forum in 2015, 
to bring together EU interior ministers, high-level representatives of major 
Internet companies, Europol, the EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator and 
the European Parliament. 
In July 2016, an EU Internet Referral Unit was set up at Europol to 
ensure the swift removal of violent content online. It plays an important role 
in reducing accessibility to terrorist content online and it has referred over 
24,000 pieces of content to Internet companies and enjoys an over 90% take-
down rate. It directly supports the goals of the Forum, because we believe 
that a public and private partnership, which is voluntary and based on 
mutual trust, is the best way forward in this fight. 
Through these cooperative platforms, Internet companies have agreed 
to step up their action against terrorist content online. For instance, a 
‘database of hashes’, a platform to flag terrorist online content in order to 
ensure its irreversible removal, was developed by the Internet industry in 
close cooperation with the Commission. It was launched in March 2017.  
There is a great deal more to do, with Internet companies needing to 
shoulder a greater share of the responsibility for keeping the Internet safe 
and free of hate speech and terrorist propaganda. The Commission also 
announced its new Civil Society Empowerment Programme, which, with 
support from the Internet companies, will enable credible voices across the 
EU to be amplified online.  
In the Radicalisation Awareness Network, we have created an 
operational network of grassroots actors, civil society and researchers.  The 
Commission has established a High-Level Expert Group on Radicalisation 
to build stronger links between this work and policy-makers in national 
administrations. The group will provide advice and expertise on counter-
radicalisation work at the EU level, including priority areas such as prison 
radicalisation, returning foreign terrorist fighters and the Internet.  
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As our economies become more interconnected and digitalised, they 
are also more vulnerable and exposed to cyber threats. Attacks – whether 
state-sponsored, from a terrorist background or resulting from the 
exploitation of vulnerabilities due to human error – have the potential to 
result in the disruption of the supply of essential services. The Wannacry and 
NotPetya cyberattacks were only reminders of this. British hospitals, 
German railways and Spanish telecoms were among the victims. Cybercrime 
is a threat that no Member State can tackle on its own, which has an economic 
and fundamental rights impact that we cannot afford to neglect. 
Fighting cybercrime effectively requires more active cooperation 
across communities, from law enforcement to cybersecurity authorities and 
particularly from the private sector, which owns and operates more than 
90% of the infrastructure. Europol’s European Cybercrime Centre plays a 
key role in supporting cross-sectorial and international cooperation. 
We need to improve criminal justice in cyberspace, focusing on cross-
border access to electronic evidence. We also need to reflect on the role of 
encryption in criminal investigations.  
Instruments and tools like the Schengen Information System, the 
European Arrest Warrant or mutual legal assistance support national 
authorities in collecting and exchanging information and evidence, allowing 
coordinated operational action, and help them to bring offenders to justice. 
Frameworks for cooperation, such as the EU Policy Cycle for organised and 
serious international crime, help national authorities define common 
operational priorities. EU agencies in justice and home affairs have become 
central actors in their fields – such as Europol or Eurojust and their roles with 
the European Arrest Warrant and the European Investigation Order (EIO). 
On 8 June 2017 the Council supported the swift implementation of a 
number of practical measures to improve cooperation among judicial 
authorities and with service providers. These include the creation of an 
electronic and user-friendly version of the EIO, the creation of single points 
of contact within the authorities of Member States and service providers to 
facilitate cooperation, the streamlining of service providers’ policies on 
procedures and conditions to request access, and the standardisation of 
forms used by Member States to request access to e-Evidence, among others.  
Security, freedom and rights continue to be intimately intertwined. 
Compliance with fundamental rights is a key characteristic of EU security 
policy, in line with our Treaty obligations, and the overall EU set-up makes 
fundamental rights compliance an inherent aspect of our collective policy-
making. The challenge is to address the security threat without stoking the 
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fear, which is exactly what the terrorists want, and without compromising 
the values we are here to defend: openness, tolerance and freedom. 
These are all elements of the foundations of a genuine and effective 
Security Union. This should be the framework within which we cooperate 
closely on the basis of solidarity, mutual assistance and in full respect of each 
other’s national competences, while also acknowledging that in today’s more 
connected and more global world, the security of one Member State is the 
security of all. 
Julian King 
Commissioner for the Security Union 
European Commission
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INTRODUCTION 
SERGIO CARRERA AND VALSAMIS MITSILEGAS 
his collective book is the result of a policy workshop co-organised by 
CEPS and the Task Force on Security Union at the Directorate-General 
for Migration and Home Affairs (DG Home) of the European 
Commission on 12 May 2017 in Brussels. The event aimed at bringing 
together a selection of EU policy-makers and academics, and contributions 
to an evidence-based and informed assessment of EU security policy. It 
gathered a group of leading scholars who have played a key role in EU- and 
nationally-funded research projects in the social sciences and humanities 
covering themes of relevance to the Security Union. 
The closed-door event provided a unique opportunity for the exchange 
of perspectives and interdisciplinary knowledge with Commission officials. 
It fed into the “Comprehensive Assessment of EU Security Policy” that DG 
Home (the Task Force on the Security Union) conducted in the field of 
security policy, which was published on 26 July 2017.1  
The Comprehensive Assessment is one of the main outputs of the 
creation, in 2016, of a specific European Commission portfolio for the 
Security Union supported by a task force drawing on the expertise of all 
relevant Commission services as well as the European External Action 
Service, and led by Commissioner Julian King.  
Engaging in participative roundtable panels, the attendants of the 
policy workshop were invited to identify key issues and gaps in existing EU 
security policy instruments in relation to the following three issues or 
‘challenges’:  
 cross-border criminal and judicial investigations and judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters;  
                                                     
1 See European Commission, Comprehensive Assessment of EU Security Policy, 
Commission Staff Working Document, SWD(2017) 278 final, Brussels, 26.7.2017. The 
Comprehensive Assessment was published together with the Commission 
Communication, “Ninth Progress Report towards an Effective and Genuine Security 
Union, COM(2017) 407 final, Brussels, 26.7.2017. 
T 
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 the use of information systems, including the issue of interoperability 
of EU databases; and 
 international cooperation.  
The detailed programme of the event is presented in the annex of this book. 
The event was structured around the above-mentioned three challenges, 
which dealt with the specific issues and questions outlined below. 
Challenge 1. Cross-border criminal investigations 
Coordinated actions in cross-border criminal and judicial investigations and 
proceedings constitute a central component of the EU security agenda. EU 
cooperation on extradition and the gathering of evidence (through European 
Investigation Orders), as well as joint investigation teams coordinated by EU 
agencies represent illustrative examples. To what extent have these tools 
been used and have they been ‘effective’? What should be improved? Also, 
the expansive use of electronic communications and an intelligence-driven 
(‘preventive justice’) policing approach to law enforcement raise issues 
related to criminal justice systems and to the fundamental rights of defence 
and fair trial. 
Challenge 2. Information exchange 
The effectiveness of information tools for law enforcement purposes is a 
priority of the EU security agenda and a key challenge, provoking questions 
not only about access, but also about their actual use by law enforcement 
agencies. As part of this priority, the goal of full interoperability of EU 
databases or information exchange systems (e.g. the Schengen Information 
System II, Visa Information System, Eurodac and Prüm Treaty) is another 
concern. However, is ‘more data’ the most efficient answer in view of current 
experience and future trends? What are the issues raised by the increasing 
use of EU information systems, and the development of biometric 
technologies, for law enforcement purposes in light of the principles of 
proportionality, necessity and the fundamental rights of data protection and 
privacy?  
Challenge 3. International cooperation  
International cooperation is an additional component of growing relevance 
for the EU Security Union. Cooperation with third countries through 
information exchange aims at reinforcing EU security. In the area of criminal 
investigations and judicial proceedings, the EU relies on specific agreements 
with countries covering access, tools for the exchange of information (e.g. 
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passenger name records and the Terrorist Finance Tracking Programme) and 
treaties on mutual legal assistance. Yet, in an era of increasingly 
dematerialised exchanges and reliance on electronic information and IT 
communication, access to data and evidence entails a number of dilemmas 
related to such issues as conflict of laws, jurisdiction and EU data protection 
legislation. 
In discussing these matters, particular attention was paid to the 
effectiveness, proportionality, fundamental rights and societal implications 
of EU security policies and instruments based on independent academic 
research and knowledge in social sciences and humanities. The contribution 
of the policy workshop was expressly acknowledged by the European 
Commission Staff Working Document (Part 2) accompanying the 
Comprehensive Assessment, which also included a short transcript of the 
minutes of the meeting.2  
The policy workshop fell within the scope of the SOURCE research 
project, a network of excellence funded by the Seventh Framework Research 
Programme (FP7) of the European Commission with the aim of creating a 
robust and sustainable virtual centre of excellence capable of exploring and 
advancing societal issues in security research and development.3 
The structure of the book follows the main themes and questions 
covered during the policy workshop. Part I deals with cross-border criminal 
investigations and the notion of ‘preventive justice’ in the context of the 
Security Union. Part II continues the journey with a set of contributions 
addressing EU information exchange and international cooperation. Part III 
presents a synthesis of the main findings emerging across the various 
contributions making up the volume and advances suggestions aimed at 
constitutionalising the Security Union. 
 
                                                     
2 See Part 2/2 in European Commission, SWD(2017) 278 final (2017), op. cit. Refer to p. 5 
and pp. 164-167 of the document. 
3 For more information about the SOURCE project, refer to http://societalsecurity.net/. 
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1. THE SECURITY UNION AS A PARADIGM OF 
PREVENTIVE JUSTICE: CHALLENGES FOR 
CITIZENSHIP, FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 
AND THE RULE OF LAW 
VALSAMIS MITSILEGAS 
1.1 Introduction 
Security has been at the heart of European integration, in one way or another, 
since the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty. A series of terrorist attacks 
in the 2000s, including 9/11, 7/7 and the Madrid bombings, have been 
followed by a plethora of responses by the EU legislator, with EU 
intervention being justified as emergency law and pushing boundaries in 
criminal law and the constitutional systems of the Union and its Member 
States. This pattern of EU response has been replicated after successive 
terrorist incidents, resulting in a patchwork of measures adopted swiftly, 
without detailed justification or impact assessment and resembling at times 
kneejerk reactions or quick fixes to complex issues, while presenting 
significant challenges to fundamental rights and the rule of law in Europe.  
In recent years, the development of a European security strategy and 
the publication of regular reports on the Security Union could be framed as 
an attempt to present a more strategic response. However, the way in which 
Security Union reports are presented entails the risk of the Union pursuing 
relentlessly and uncritically a security agenda without due consideration for 
the protection of fundamental rights and the rule of law. The aim of this 
contribution is to distil the main features of the emergence of the EU security 
agenda in recent years, and to outline the issues for fundamental rights and 
the rule of law. A central element of the argument will be that the EU has 
embraced a paradigmatic change from repression to prevention, with the 
Security Union being viewed essentially as a Union of preventive justice.  
This chapter will highlight that in this process, a number of boundaries 
have been blurred:  
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 the boundaries between migration and security, security and foreign 
policy, and internal security and militarisation;  
 the boundaries between internal and external security, and EU 
criminal law and external relations;  
 the boundaries between public and private prevention, and the 
increasing role of the private sector in the EU security model; and  
 the boundaries between suspicion and generalised surveillance, 
embracing surveillance of everyday, perfectly legitimate activities by 
all of us.  
By highlighting these parameters of the EU preventive justice paradigm, the 
chapter will conclude by flagging up the profound challenges this paradigm 
poses for fundamental rights and the rule of law. The contribution will urge 
a rethink of the Security Union to place fundamental values of the Union at 
the heart of the European security strategy. 
1.2 The EU and preventive justice 
Preventive justice is understood here as the exercise of state power in order 
to prevent future acts that are deemed to constitute security threats. There 
are three main shifts in the preventive justice paradigm: a shift from an 
investigation of acts that have taken place to an emphasis on suspicion; a 
shift from targeted action to generalised surveillance; and, underpinning 
both, a temporal shift from the past to the future. Preventive justice is thus 
forward rather than backward looking – it aims to prevent potential threats 
rather than punish past acts, and in this manner it introduces a system of 
justice based on the creation of suspect individuals through ongoing risk 
assessment.1  
This model of preventive justice has been a key post-9/11 response by 
the US, linked with the evolution of a highly securitised, emergency agenda2 
and has been largely transposed into EU law since. Preventive justice can 
take the form of the state’s intervention in the field of criminal law, by 
                                                     
1 See V. Mitsilegas, EU Criminal Law After Lisbon, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2016, ch. 9. 
2 See inter alia D. Cole, “The Difference Prevention Makes: Regulating Preventive 
Justice”, Criminal Law and Philosophy, Vol. 9, No. 3, 2014; B. Ackerman, Before the Next 
Attack, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2006; and J. Waldron, Torture, Terror and 
Trade-Offs, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. 
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extending the scope of criminal law to gradually remove the link between 
criminalisation and prosecution on the one hand, and the commission of 
concrete acts on the other,3 thus leading to what scholars have called the 
“criminal law of the enemy”4 and placing criminal justice within the 
framework of the “preventive state”,5 transforming criminal law into 
“security law”.6 The considerable extension in the criminalisation of 
terrorism – as evidenced clearly in the recent amendment of the EU 
substantive criminal law on terrorism to address the phenomenon of ‘foreign 
fighters’ – is a key example. But preventive justice can also extend – under 
the guise of the term ‘border security’ – to extensive monitoring of mobility 
via the use of immigration control for security purposes7 and can also take 
the form of generalised, pre-emptive surveillance.8  
The development of a number of EU databases, the widening of access 
to these databases (including immigration databases) to security authorities, 
and the introduction of systems of generalised surveillance under data 
retention and regulatory frameworks on passenger name records (PNR) are 
                                                     
3 See A. Ashworth and L. Zedner, Preventive Justice, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2014. 
4 Also referred to as ‘Feindstrafrecht’ – see inter alia G. Jakobs, “Feindstrafrecht?- Eine 
Untersuchung zu den Bedinungen von Rechtlichkeit”, HRRS 8/9, 2006, p. 289 et seq. 
5 See inter alia P.-A. Albrecht, “La Politique Criminelle dans L’État de Prévention”, 
Déviance et Société, Vol. 21, 1997, p. 123 et seq. 
6 See U. Sieber, “Der Paradigmenwechsel vomStrafrecht zum Sicherheitrecht”, Max-
Planck-Institut fur auslandisches und internationals Strafrecht, which also appeared in 
K. Tiedemann, U. Sieber, H. Satzger, C. Burchard and D. Brodowski (eds), Die Verfassung 
moderner Strafrechtpflege Erinnerung an Joachim Vogel, Baden-Baden: Nomos 
Verlagsgesellschaft, 2016, pp. 351-372. 
7 D. Bigo and E. Guild (eds), Controlling Frontiers, Farnham: Ashgate, 2005; V. Mitsilegas, 
“Human Rights, Terrorism and the Quest for ‘Border Security’”, in M. Pedrazzi, I. 
Viarengo and A. Lang (eds), Individual Guarantees in the European Judicial Area in Criminal 
Matters, Brussels: Bruylant, 2011, pp. 85-112; and V. Mitsilegas, “Immigration Control in 
an Era of Globalisation: Deflecting Foreigners, Weakening Citizens Strengthening the 
State”, Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, Vol. 19, No. 1, 2012, pp. 3-60.  
8 D. Lyon, Surveillance Society: Monitoring Everyday Life, Maidenhead: Open University 
Press, 2001; K.D. Haggerty and R.V. Ericson, “The Surveillant Assemblage”, British 
Journal of Sociology, Vol. 51, No. 4, 2000, p. 605 et seq.; L. Amoore and M. de Goede (eds), 
Risk and the War on Terror, London: Routledge, 2008; V. Mitsilegas, “The Transformation 
of Privacy in an Era of Pre-Emptive Surveillance”, Tilburg Law Review, Vol. 20, No. 1, 
2015, pp. 35-57.  
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examples of EU action in this context. Critical to the development of 
preventive justice in this context is the collection, processing and exchange 
of a wide range of personal data. All these features of the preventive justice 
paradigm can be found in the emergence of the Union’s security strategy 
building the Security Union. 
1.3 The Security Union as a multi-purpose and cross-sectoral 
endeavour: Blurring the boundaries between migration, 
crime, security and foreign policy 
The Commission’s Communication on the “European Agenda for Security” 
emphasised the need for a joined-up interagency and cross-sectoral 
approach.9 This approach reflects a blurring of the boundaries between 
different areas of EU law and policy, ranging from immigration to criminal 
justice to foreign policy to defence. A laboratory in this field has been the 
development of EU policies aiming at controlling borders and mobility, 
where the traditional paradigm of immigration control has been replaced by 
an emphasis on border security.10  
These developments mirror the US approach, where a notable 
recommendation of the 9/11 National Commission Report was to target 
what was termed “terrorist travel”,11 resulting in the development of 
systems of generalised surveillance of mobility such as the establishment of 
PNR systems aimed at intervening pre-departure and preventing movement 
if necessary. In this paradigm, border control measures have thus been 
adopted and developed as security measures and data obtained in the 
context of immigration and border control (e.g. data on visa applications or 
passenger information) are also viewed as security data, which must be 
                                                     
9 European Commission, “The European Agenda on Security”, COM(2015) 185 final, 
Strasbourg, 28.4.2015. 
10 V. Mitsilegas, “Border Security in the European Union. Towards Centralised Controls 
and Maximum Surveillance”, in E. Guild, H. Toner and A. Baldaccini (eds), Whose 
Freedom, Security and Justice? EU Immigration and Asylum Law and Policy, Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2007, pp. 359-394. 
11 See the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, 2004, p. 385. 
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accessible not only by immigration authorities, but also by intelligence and 
law enforcement authorities for security purposes. 12  
Recent developments on the use of Security Council resolutions to 
boost EU action on border security, through the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP) under the banner of operation EUNAVFOR Med, 
confirm the further blurring of boundaries between immigration, security 
and defence, and result in the militarisation of the border.13 This cross-policy 
and interagency approach is based on maximum collection and exchange of 
personal data and access to EU databases irrespective of their main purpose 
or rationale. A constant theme in the seventh and eighth Commission 
progress reports towards the Security Union is the prioritisation of the 
interoperability of databases.14 A High-Level Expert Group on Information 
Systems and Interoperability was established and reported in May 2017,15 
while the mandate of the EU’s IT-management system is currently being 
revised to include the specific task of enabling interoperability.16 The most 
recent report on the Security Union at the time of writing emphasises yet 
again the need for enhancing information exchange and operational 
cooperation.17  
This blurring of boundaries between the use of various databases has 
significant consequences for fundamental rights and citizenship. Enabling 
                                                     
12 V. Mitsilegas, “The Law of the Border and the Borders of Law: Rethinking Border 
Control from the Perspective of the Individual”, in L. Weber (ed.), Rethinking Border 
Control for a Globalizing World, London: Routledge, 2015, pp. 15-32. 
13 D. Bigo, “The (in)securitization practices of the three universes of EU border control: 
Military/Navy – border guards/police – database analysts”, Security Dialogue, Vol. 45, 
No. 2, 2014, pp. 209-225. 
14 See European Commission, “Seventh progress report towards an effective and genuine 
Security Union”, COM(2017) 261 final, Strasbourg, 16.5.2017 and “Eighth progress report 
towards an effective and genuine Security Union”, COM(2017) 354 final, Brussels, 
29.6.2017. 
15 See High-Level Expert Group on Information Systems and Interoperability, “Final 
report”, European Commission, DG for Migration and Home Affairs, May 2017 
(http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regexpert/index.cfm?do=groupDetail.groupDetail
Doc&id=32600&no=1). 
16 See the European Commission’s “Proposal for a new Regulation on eu-LISA”, 
COM(2017) 352 final, Brussels, 29.6.2017, Art. 9. 
17 European Commission, “Ninth Progress Report towards an effective and genuine 
Security Union”, COM(217) 407 final, Brussels, 26.7.2017, p. 3. 
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access to immigration databases such as the Visa Information System (VIS)  
and Eurodac to law enforcement and security authorities overlooks the 
purpose of immigration law and poses significant challenges to privacy, data 
protection and non-discrimination.18 The shift from border control to the 
generalised surveillance of mobility further serves to extend control and 
surveillance to all travellers, including EU citizens – thus undermining 
fundamental principles of free movement and citizenship within the EU.19 
Blurring boundaries in this manner results in an all-encompassing, yet at the 
same time amorphous concept of security, which is continually prioritised 
but may serve to undermine key distinctions and limits to the reach of the 
state in the lives of individuals. 
1.4 Blurring the boundaries between internal and external 
security 
Another element in the emergence of the preventive justice paradigm in the 
Security Union, linked inextricably with calls for a multi-purpose and cross-
cutting approach outlined above, is the merging of internal and external 
security. This trend is acknowledged by the European Agenda on Security, 
stating expressly that 
we need to bring together all internal and external dimensions of 
security. Security threats are not confined by the borders of the EU. 
EU internal security and global security are mutually dependent 
and interlinked. The EU response must therefore be comprehensive 
and based on a coherent set of actions combining the internal and 
external dimensions, to further reinforce links between Justice and 
Home Affairs and Common Security and Defence Policy. Its success 
is highly dependent on cooperation with international partners. 
Preventive engagement with third countries is needed to address 
the root causes of security issues.20 
                                                     
18 N. Vavoula, “Immigration and Privacy in the Law of the European Union: The Case of 
Databases”, PhD thesis, Queen Mary University of London, 2017. 
19 See V. Mitsilegas, “The Borders Paradox: The Surveillance of Movement in a Union 
without Internal Frontiers”, in H. Lindahl (ed.), A Right to Inclusion and Exclusion? 
Normative Fault Lines of the EU’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2009, pp. 33-64. 
20 See European Commission, “The European Agenda on Security”, COM(2015) 185 
(2015), op. cit.  
THE SECURITY UNION AS A PARADIGM OF PREVENTIVE JUSTICE  11 
The emergence of the EU as a global security actor is not a novel 
phenomenon. The EU has played a leading role in negotiating major 
international and regional conventions on transnational crime and security 
and its institutions and certain Member States participate in non-traditional, 
global security norm-setters such as the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) 
and the UN Security Council, both key actors in developing a paradigm of 
preventive justice in the field of terrorist sanctions.21 The EU then revises its 
internal acquis to comply with the international standards it has contributed 
to shaping, claiming that it is essential for the EU legal order to align with 
global norms.22  
There is thus a process of synergy, which can result in the 
introduction of far-reaching norms into the EU legal order that may 
challenge fundamental legal principles. The evolution of criminal law on 
‘foreign fighters’ is a characteristic example in this context: norms first 
developed by the UN Security Council have been transplanted into the legal 
orders of EU Member States, first via the revision of the Council of Europe 
Counter-terrorism Convention and subsequently via the revision of EU 
substantive criminal law on terrorism.23 As with the regular revisions of 
internal EU anti-money laundering and terrorist finance law (justified as 
essential to align the EU acquis with the new standards by the FATF),24 the 
extension of EU substantive criminal law on terrorism has followed a 
paradigm developed initially by the Security Council.  
This internalisation of external norms has also occurred through 
transatlantic security cooperation. A key example in this regard is the 
                                                     
21 V. Mitsilegas, “The European Union and the Globalisation of Criminal Law”, in C. 
Barnard and O. Odudu, Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 2009-2010, Vol. 12, 
Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2010, pp. 337-407.  
22 V. Mitsilegas, “The EU and the Implementation of International Norms in Criminal 
Matters”, in M. Cremona, J. Monar and S. Poli (eds), The External Dimension of the Area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice, Bern: Peter Lang, 2011. 
23 V. Mitsilegas, “The European Union and the Global Governance of Crime”, in V. 
Mitsilegas, P. Alldridge and L. Cheliotis (eds), Globalisation, Criminal Law and Criminal 
Justice: Theoretical, Comparative and Transnational Perspectives, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 
2015, pp. 153-198. 
24 For more on the latest EU directive, see V. Mitsilegas and N. Vavoula, “The Evolving 
EU Anti-Money Laundering Regime: Challenges for Fundamental Rights and the Rule 
of Law”, Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, Vol. 23, No. 2, 2016, pp. 261-
293. 
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emergence of preventive legislation on PNR data. The conclusion of a series 
of EU–US international agreements enabling the transfer of PNR data to US 
authorities has been the outcome of the need for the EU to comply with 
unilateral US legal requirements and has been controversial in challenging 
fundamental rights in the EU legal order.25 However, and notwithstanding 
these concerns, recent terrorist incidents in Europe have provided political 
justification for the internalisation of this model of preventive surveillance 
in the EU, through the adoption of an ‘internal’ PNR Directive. The 
challenges to EU values that this internalisation of external standards in the 
field of security can pose should not be underestimated. The recent Opinion 
of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) on the EU–Canada PNR 
Agreement26 confirms that PNR systems as currently devised fall foul of 
fundamental rights in the EU. 
1.5 Blurring the boundaries between the public and the private: 
Everyday data and dangerousness 
The model of preventive justice focuses increasingly on the collection by the 
state of personal data and the co-option of the private sector in the fight 
against crime. The collection of personal data involves data generated by 
ordinary, everyday life activities. This includes records of financial 
transactions,27 airline travel (PNR) reservations28 mobile phone 
telecommunications,29 and digital evidence.30 The focus on monitoring 
                                                     
25 V. Mitsilegas, “Transatlantic Counter-terrorism Cooperation and European Values: 
The Elusive Quest for Coherence”, in D. Curtin and E. Fahey (eds), A Transatlantic 
Community of Law, Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 2014, pp. 289-315. 
26 See Opinion 1/15 of the Court (Grand Chamber) on the EU–Canada PNR Agreement, 
26 July 2017. 
27 See V. Mitsilegas, Money Laundering Counter-Measures in the European Union: A New 
Paradigm of Security Governance versus Fundamental Legal Principles, The Hague: Kluwer 
Law International, 2003; M. de Goede, Speculative Security, Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2012. 
28 V. Mitsilegas, “Contrôle des étrangers, des passagers, des citoyens: Surveillance et anti-
terrorisme”, Cultures et Conflits, No. 58, 2005, pp. 155-182. 
29 V. Mitsilegas, EU Criminal Law, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2009. 
30 S. Carrera, G. Gonzalez-Fuster, E. Guild and V. Mitsilegas, Access to Electronic Data by 
Third-Country Law Enforcement Authorities: Challenges to EU Rule of Law and Fundamental 
Rights, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, July 2015. 
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everyday life may thus result in mass surveillance, marked by the collection 
and storage of personal data in bulk.  
Inextricably linked with the focus on the monitoring of everyday life 
for preventive purposes is the privatisation of surveillance under a model of 
what has been referred to as a ‘responsibilisation strategy’ aiming to co-opt 
the private sector in the fight against crime:31 banks and other financial and 
non-financial institutions (as well as lawyers), airlines, mobile phone and 
Internet providers among others are legally obliged to collect, store and 
reactively or proactively transfer personal data to state authorities. The 
privatisation of preventive justice in this manner expands considerably the 
reach of the state and poses grave challenges to fundamental rights.  
Everyday and sensitive personal data are now being collected en masse 
and legislation imposes growing demands for this data to be transferred 
from the private sector to state authorities in a generalised manner. This has 
led to what has been called “the ‘disappearance of disappearance’ – a process 
whereby it is increasingly difficult for individuals to maintain their 
anonymity, or to escape the monitoring of social institutions”.32 State 
authorities thus have access to a wealth of personal data, enabling practices 
such as profiling and data mining. As the Court of Justice noted in Tele2 
regarding retention of metadata, 
[t]hat data, taken as a whole, is liable to allow very precise 
conclusions to be drawn concerning the private lives of the persons 
whose data has been retained, such as everyday habits, permanent 
or temporary places of residence, daily or other movements, the 
activities carried out, the social relationships of those persons and 
the social environments frequented by them … In particular, that 
data provides the means … of establishing a profile of the 
individuals concerned, information that is no less sensitive, having 
regard to the right to privacy, than the actual content of 
communications.33 
The impact of state intervention on the individual is intensified when one 
considers the potential of combining personal data from different databases 
                                                     
31 D. Garland, “The Limits of the Sovereign State”, British Journal of Criminology, Vol. 36, 
No. 4, 1996, pp. 445-471. 
32 Haggerty and Ericson (2000), op. cit., pp. 605-622. 
33 See CJEU, Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 21 December 2016, Joined Cases 
C-203/15 and 698/15, Tele2 Sverige AB v Post- och telestyrelsen and Secretary of State for the 
Home Department v Tom Watson and Others, para. 99. 
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collected for different purposes in a landscape of blurring boundaries and 
interoperability described above in order to create a profile of risk or 
dangerousness. Mass surveillance is linked closely with ongoing risk 
assessment in the preventive justice model. As noted by a number of 
governments intervening in the CJEU EU–Canada litigation, the use of PNR 
data  
is intended to identify persons hitherto unknown to the competent 
services who present a potential risk to security, while persons 
already known to present such a risk can be identified on the basis 
of advance passenger information data. If solely the transfer of PNR 
data concerning persons already reported as presenting a risk to 
security were authorised, the objective of prevention could consequently 
not be attained. (Emphasis added)34 
1.6 Caught between the public–private and internal–external 
divides: Digital evidence as a Trojan horse? 
In addition to existing statutory mechanisms requiring the collection and 
transfer of everyday information from the private sector to the state, a 
broader issue has arisen with regard to access by the state to personal data 
held by private companies in the context of cross-border investigations. The 
issue has been framed by EU institutions as one concerning ‘digital evidence’ 
in the context of the fight against ‘cybercrime’, although in reality it concerns 
judicial cooperation in criminal matters. The Commission has recently 
published a so-called non-paper on improving cross-border access to 
electronic evidence.35 The non-paper reiterates the Commission’s 
commitment in the Communication on a European Agenda on Security to 
reviewing obstacles to criminal investigations on cybercrime, notably on 
issues of access to electronic evidence, and set out the issues as follows: 
For most forms of crimes, in particular cybercrimes as witnessed 
recently, electronic evidence – such as account subscriber 
information, traffic or metadata, or content data – can provide 
significant leads for investigators, often the only ones. The 
electronic evidence connected to these crimes is often cross-
                                                     
34 See Opinion 1/15 on the EU–Canada PNR Agreement (op. cit.), para. 58. 
35 See the non-paper from the Commission services, “Improving cross-border access to 
electronic evidence: Findings from the expert process and suggested way forward” 
(undated) (https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/docs/pages/ 
20170522_non-paper_electronic_evidence_en.pdf).  
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jurisdictional, for example because the data is stored outside the 
investigating country or by providers of electronic communications 
services and platforms – whose main seat is located outside the 
investigating country, resulting in investigating authorities not 
being able to use domestic investigative tools. 
The Commission’s non-paper summarises work undertaken by the 
Commission’s services and states that cross-border access to electronic 
evidence may be obtained in three ways: 
 through formal cooperation channels between the relevant authorities 
of two countries, usually through mutual legal assistance (MLA) or a 
European Investigation Order (EIO) (where applicable), or police-to-
police cooperation; 
 through direct cooperation between law enforcement authorities of 
one country and service providers whose main seat is in another 
country, either on a voluntary or mandatory basis. Notably service 
providers established in the US and Ireland reply directly to requests 
from foreign law enforcement authorities on a voluntary basis, as far 
as the requests concern non-content data; and  
 through direct access from a computer, as allowed by a number of 
Member States’ national laws.  
The Commission claims that the current legal frameworks reflecting 
traditional concepts of territoriality are challenged by the cross-jurisdictional 
nature of electronic services and data flows, adding that a number of 
Member States and third countries have developed or are developing 
national solutions that might result in conflicting obligations and 
fragmentation and create legal uncertainty for both authorities and service 
providers. It also claims that owing to the fact that the concept of territoriality 
is still based largely on the place where data is stored, any cross-border 
access to electronic evidence that is not based on cooperation between 
authorities may raise issues in terms of territoriality, with this applying both 
within the EU and where data is stored in a third (non-EU) country.  
The different scenarios for future action set out in the Commission’s 
non-paper must be scrutinised fully and approached with caution at this 
stage. All three scenarios put forward – direct cooperation between law 
enforcement authorities, direct cooperation between law enforcement 
authorities and the private sector and most importantly, direct access to 
private databases – challenge fundamental principles of judicial cooperation 
in criminal matters in the EU and serve to bypass recently adopted EU law 
containing a high level of fundamental rights protection, namely the 
16  VALSAMIS MITSILEGAS 
Directive on the European Investigation Order. The Commission is pushing 
for broader availability of and accessibility to personal data under a model 
of prevention by framing an issue of judicial cooperation in criminal matters, 
requiring judicial authorisation, as an issue pertaining to ‘cybercrime’. It thus 
seems to adopt an agenda privileging police efficiency at the expense of a 
number of safeguards for the individual.  
The Commission claims in this respect that the problem is territoriality, 
when in reality solutions can be found under the current EIO and externally 
through the MLA systems to endeavour to provide information in a speedy 
manner – one of the key aims of mutual recognition in criminal matters 
under the EIO is in fact to secure this speed. The Commission also seems 
keen to blur the boundaries between internal and external action in the field, 
disregarding the important and critical case law of the CJEU regarding the 
data protection and privacy benchmarks required by third countries – and 
in particular the US – for data exchanges to take place. Direct cooperation 
between law enforcement authorities and the private sector and direct access 
to private databases cause a number of concerns in this regard, in an era in 
which the adequacy of US requirements is continually being questioned in 
courts on both sides of the Atlantic.  
In view of the significant challenges that the proposed models pose to 
fundamental rights and the integrity of the EU acquis, the justification for 
these new ideas seems to be limited. It is striking that the Commission seems 
to adopt as a justification piecemeal practices in a number of jurisdictions, 
whose compatibility with EU law is questionable. This follows a similar 
pattern as the justification for adopting an internal EU PNR system, which 
was justified – notwithstanding the controversy regarding the transatlantic 
PNR agreements – on the basis that a small number of EU Member States 
operated internal PNR systems. The legality of the EU PNR Directive is 
currently questionable following the CJEU Opinion on the EU–Canada PNR 
Agreement. 
1.7 Challenges of preventive justice to fundamental rights, 
citizenship and the rule of law 
The evolution of Europe’s Security Union within a paradigm of preventive 
justice poses significant dilemmas for the rule of law, the protection of 
fundamental rights and citizenship in the EU. In terms of the rule of law, 
preventive justice entails serious challenges ex ante (at the stage of the 
adoption of EU rules in terms of the existence and exercise of EU competence 
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to legislate and in terms of justification of EU action, transparency and 
democratic control) and ex post (in terms of setting limits to the arbitrariness 
of state action and ensuring full and effective judicial scrutiny and control).36  
In terms of challenges to the rule of law ex ante, a key example is the 
recent introduction into EU law of the criminalisation of conduct related to 
‘foreign fighters’ – with UN Security Council standards being transposed 
into EU law via the vehicle of amending the Council of Europe Convention, 
in a 9/11-style emergency framing with no impact assessment or full 
scrutiny of the constitutional implications of these proposals.  
Challenges to the rule of law ex ante are also posed by shifts in legality 
and the use of legal bases (with the legal bases of the Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice (AFSJ) being replaced by CFSP legal bases on terrorist 
sanctions and border security) and by the shift from the adoption of legal 
standards as such to an emphasis on unregulated operational action and 
cooperation. The rule of law ex post is challenged by limits to effective judicial 
protection and state arbitrariness, as evidenced in relation to preventive 
terrorist sanctions by the extensive Kadi litigation in the CJEU. Rule of law ex 
post concerns are inextricably linked with fundamental rights issues. 
A paradigm of security based upon preventive justice additionally 
challenges a number of fundamental rights, including the principle of 
legality in criminal offences and sanctions, the presumption of innocence 
(through the preventive criminalisation of terrorism and organised crime), 
the right to an effective remedy and effective judicial protection. It gives rise 
to concerns, in particular in cases of generalised pre-emptive surveillance 
outlined in this chapter, about the principle of non-discrimination and the 
rights to privacy and data protection.  
In a series of landmark rulings, the CJEU has upheld the importance of 
the rights to data protection and privacy and found generalised pre-emptive 
surveillance contrary to EU law.37 The Court has further confirmed that the 
                                                     
36 On the distinction between rule of law ex ante and ex post, see V. Mitsilegas, “Rule of 
Law: Theorising EU Internal Security Cooperation from a Legal Perspective”, in M. 
Rhinard and D. Bossong (eds), Theorising European Internal Security, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2016, pp. 113-114. 
37 CJEU, Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 8 April 2014 in Joined Cases C-
293/12 and C-594/12, Digital Rights Ireland Ltd v Minister for Communications, Marine and 
Natural Resources and Others; see also Tele2 Sverige and Watson (op. cit.); and Opinion 1/15 
on the EU–Canada PNR Agreement (op. cit.). 
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EU fundamental rights benchmark is also applicable in the Union’s external 
action, in the fields of both judicial cooperation in criminal matters38 and data 
exchange.39  
Judicial interventions are important in this context in highlighting the 
close link between protecting the right to privacy and upholding citizenship 
ties by safeguarding trust in the relationship between the individual and the 
state.40 This link between privacy and citizenship has been underscored by 
constitutional courts in EU Member States in litigation over the 
constitutionality of preventive data retention measures. According to the 
German Constitutional Court,41  
a preventive general retention of all telecommunications traffic data 
... is, among other reasons, also to be considered as such heavy 
infringement because it can evoke a sense of being watched 
permanently ... The individual does not know which state official 
knows what about him or her, but the individual does know that it 
is very possible that the official does know a lot, possibly also highly 
intimate matters about him or her.  
The Romanian Constitutional Court has noted on the other hand that data 
retention addresses all of the law’s subjects, regardless of whether they have 
committed criminal offences or whether they are the subject of a criminal 
investigation, which is likely to overturn the presumption of innocence and 
to transform a priori all users of electronic communication services or public 
communication networks into people susceptible of committing terrorism 
crimes or other serious crimes.  
Also according to the Romanian Court, continuous data retention is 
sufficient to generate, in the mind of the persons, legitimate suspicions 
regarding the respect of their privacy and the perpetration of abuses (by the 
state).42 These concerns have been reflected in the case law of the CJEU, 
                                                     
38 CJEU, Judgment of Court (Grand Chamber) of 6 September 2016 in Case C-182/15 
Petruhhin v Latvijas Republikas Ģenerālprokuratūra. 
39 CJEU, Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 6 October 2015 in Case C-362/14, 
Maximillian Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner. 
40 V. Mitsilegas, “The Value of Privacy in an Era of Security”, International Political 
Sociology, Vol. 8, No. 1, 2014, pp. 104-108. 
41 Judgment of 2 March 2010, 1 BvR 256/08, 1 BvR 263/08, 1BvR 586/08, para. 24.. 
42 Romanian Constitutional Court, Decision No. 1258 of 8 October 2009. 
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where the adverse impact of generalised preventive surveillance without an 
explicit link to a specific suspicion has been pointed out.43  
In its recent ruling in Tele2 Sverige and Watson, which built upon the 
Court’s ruling in Digital Rights Ireland, the CJEU noted that the interference 
of systematic and continuous data retention with the rights to privacy and 
data protection is very far-reaching and must be considered to be 
particularly serious, as the fact that the data is retained without the 
subscriber or registered user being informed is likely to cause the persons 
concerned to feel that their private lives are the subject of constant 
surveillance.44  
The Court noted that the legislation in question, which was found to 
be contrary to EU law, affects all persons using electronic communication 
services, even though those persons are not, even indirectly, in a situation 
that is liable to give rise to criminal proceedings; therefore, it applies even to 
persons for whom there is no evidence capable of suggesting that their 
conduct might have a link, even an indirect or remote one, with serious 
criminal offences.45 Protecting the right to privacy is essential to uphold 
citizenship ties more broadly in this context. 
1.8 The way forward: Constitutionalising the Security Union 
The above analysis has cast light on the challenges that the evolution of the 
European security strategy and a Security Union relying increasingly on a 
paradigm of preventive justice poses for the rule of law, the protection of 
fundamental rights and citizenship in Europe. The management of Union 
security responses has in recent months taken the form of regular reports on 
                                                     
43 For an overview and on the specific link between surveillance and suspicion, see V. 
Mitsilegas, “Surveillance and Digital Privacy in the Transatlantic ‘War on Terror’: The 
Case for a Global Privacy Regime”, Columbia Human Rights Law Review, Vol. 47, No.3, 
2016, pp. 1-77. 
44 See Tele2 Sverige and Watson (op. cit.), para. 100. 
45 Ibid., para. 105; see also Opinion 1/15 on the EU–Canada PNR Agreement, para. 205 
(op. cit.), where the Court noted that  
as regards air passengers in respect of whom no such risk has been 
identified on their arrival in Canada and up to their departure from that 
non-member country, there would not appear to be, once they have left, a 
connection – even a merely indirect connection – between their PNR data 
and the objective pursued by the envisaged agreement which would justify 
that data being retained. 
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the Security Union, combined – also in response to repeated terrorist 
incidents in major European cities – with separate communications by the 
European Council and the Commission. The ongoing emphasis on the 
Security Union and the publication of Commission reports almost on a 
monthly basis serve to produce timely reactions to events, but risk 
continually promoting new EU action and the adoption of new legislation in 
the field of security, thus replicating earlier security responses post-9/11 and 
post-7/7.  
Calls for new measures and initiatives may present the political and 
symbolic advantage of being seen to be doing something, and of responding 
urgently to terrorism. However, prior to the Security Union resulting in yet 
more EU law in the field, detailed and serious thought should be given to 
three matters: the adequacy of the existing – and quite extensive – Union 
legal framework on security, the effectiveness of proposed new initiatives, 
and the compatibility of Union security measures with the European 
constitution and its key values, including fundamental rights and the rule of 
law.  
Overreacting on security and disregarding fundamental rights in the 
process poses a direct challenge to the very values upon which the Union is 
based, values that the Union is constitutionally bound to uphold and 
promote in its external action after Lisbon. With the Security Union based 
increasingly upon operational cooperation, interoperability and the 
generalised collection and exchange of personal data under a model of pre-
emptive surveillance, the risks posed to fundamental rights, but also 
essential bonds of trust and citizenship across the Union are acute.  
The CJEU’s rejection of generalised surveillance, in a series of 
landmark and consistent cases, should be taken fully into account by the 
other Union institutions in developing the Security Union and making it 
rights-compliant. In times of upheaval, it is the judiciary that has reminded 
us of the importance of fundamental rights guarantees in the process of 
constitutionalising the Security Union and setting limits to an uncritical 
move towards prevention. 
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2. TWO CRUCIAL CHALLENGES IN  
CROSS-BORDER CRIMINAL 
INVESTIGATIONS  
ANNE WEYEMBERGH 
onsiderable progress has been made in terms of cooperation within 
the EU in the area of cross-border criminal investigations. However, 
the area is still facing many challenges. This contribution does not 
intend to be exhaustive but to highlight two main themes for the future of 
cooperation in this field, namely the need for greater consistency and 
complementarity among the various aspects of criminal justice (section 2.1) 
and the need to learn all the lessons from the current achievements and 
complete the EU integration process in this area (section 2.2).  
2.1 A need for greater consistency and complementarity in 
criminal justice matters 
The EU’s criminal justice area should be designed and established as a 
coherent system with weights and counterweights. Complementarity among 
its different instruments is essential. It is evident in the case of the 
relationship between mutual recognition and the approximation of laws: the 
link between the two aspects is expressly enshrined in Art. 82(2) of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), which subordinates 
approximation in procedural matters to the condition that it is necessary in 
order to facilitate mutual recognition and cooperation. Such a link is, for 
instance, clear with respect to evidence. As happened with the European 
Arrest Warrant (EAW),1 the practical application of the Directive on the 
                                                     
1 Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest 
warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States, OJ L 190, 18.7.2002, pp. 
1-20. 
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European Investigation Order (EIO)2 will most probably reveal the need to 
adopt complementary harmonising measures.3 
There is also a need to achieve greater consistency and 
complementarity among the different mutual recognition instruments and 
among these and other tools aimed at enhancing cooperation in cross-border 
investigations (section 2.1.1). Another aim should be to achieve better 
consistency and complementarity among the different EU actors competent 
in the field (section 2.2.2). Finally, enhanced cooperation and variable 
geometry is particularly challenging for the coherence of the EU area of 
criminal justice (section 2.2.3).  
2.1.1 Mutual recognition instruments 
As we had the chance to write elsewhere,4 there is an obvious need for more 
consistency and complementarity among the mutual recognition 
instruments.  
Currently, there is a lack of consistency among these instruments, 
which affects their legitimacy and credibility. When comparing the various 
framework decisions and directives applicable, some differences are 
striking, for instance as to the grounds permitted for refusal, including those 
based on fundamental rights, or as to the proportionality test to be conducted 
by the competent authorities before issuing or executing a decision, order or 
warrant.  
The interaction between these mutual recognition instruments should 
also be developed, for instance the relationship between the EAW and the 
EIO calls for reflection. The same is true for the relationship between the 
EAW and the European Supervision Order.5 “Organising” their interactions 
                                                     
2 Directive 2014/41/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 April 2014 
regarding the European Investigation Order in criminal matters, OJ L 130, 1.5.2014, pp. 
1-36 (see recital 43). 
3 See for instance, C. Janssens, The Principle of Mutual Recognition in EU Law, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2013, p. 261. 
4 See A. Weyembergh, I. Armada and C. Brière, “Critical assessment of the existing 
European Arrest Warrant Framework Decision”, Research paper for the Committee on 
Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs of the European Parliament (IPOL-
JOIN_ET(2013)510979_EN), 2014. 
5 Council Framework Decision 2008/947/JHA of 27 November 2008 on the application 
of the principle of mutual recognition to judgments and probation decisions with a view 
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would especially contribute towards solving the issue of overuse of the EAW 
for prosecution purposes and the resulting issue of overuse of pre-trial 
detention.6  
The same is also true for the interaction/relationship between mutual 
recognition instruments and other available tools intended to strengthen 
cooperation in cross-border investigations. This is especially the case for the 
relationship between the joint investigation teams (JITs)7 and the EIO. The 
question arises as to whether there is some kind of overuse of JITs in the 
sense that they are increasingly used without any ‘cross-border physical 
move’ of the national authorities involved, the latter staying in their own 
territory where they perform their investigations on their own but using the 
JIT tool to exchange, smoothly and rapidly, the information they obtain from 
their counterparts. Is such a use of JITs in line with the objective pursued by 
the EU legislator? It would, in any case, be necessary to improve the way in 
which JITs interact with the EIO.  
Whereas a few elements show that there is some awareness in this 
regard,8 deeper reflection is needed as to how to optimise recourse to and 
the interactions between the various elements offered by the ‘EU toolbox’. 
Among the recommendations that we have made elsewhere in this regard9 
is to provide for a clear duty for the practitioners, when they intend to resort 
to one of the EU tools, to pay due consideration to available alternative 
measures. This implies having knowledge of the overall picture of the EU 
area of criminal justice and thus particular efforts in terms of training the 
competent authorities. 
                                                     
to the supervision of probation measures and alternative sanctions, OJ L 337, 16.12.2008, 
pp. 102-122. 
6 See Weyembergh, Armada and Brière (2014), op. cit. 
7 Council Framework Decision 2002/465/JHA on joint investigation teams, OJ L 162, 
20.6.2002, pp. 1-3. 
8 See for instance the EIO Directive, where the interaction with the EAW and EIO is 
explicitly tackled in recital 26. Indeed, it states:  
With a view to the proportionate use of an EAW, the issuing authority should 
consider whether an EIO would be an effective and proportionate means of 
pursuing criminal proceedings. The issuing authority should consider, in 
particular, whether issuing an EIO for the hearing of a suspected or accused 
person by videoconference could serve as an effective alternative. 
9 Weyembergh, Armada and Brière (2014), op. cit. 
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2.1.2 EU specialised agencies and bodies 
The increase in the number of EU specialised agencies and bodies in justice 
and home affairs (JHA) is well known. Such ‘abundance’ means that good 
articulation between them is required, especially if the purpose is to establish 
a consistent Area of Freedom, Security and Justice in which its three 
interrelated components – freedom, security and justice – are effectively 
implemented. Sound articulation between the EU bodies is also crucial in 
order to develop a multidisciplinary approach in the fight against serious 
cross-border crime. This need for articulation has been repeatedly 
underlined, particularly by EU institutions, for which there must be 
complementarity, which implies working hand-in-hand to achieve common 
goals, the respect of specific mandates and expertise, as well as good 
communication and coordination in case of overlaps.  
However, establishing such complementarity is proving a difficult task 
for a number of reasons. Among these, one can mention the structural 
differences traceable to the time when they were established and to the 
modalities of their establishment by the EU legislator (e.g. first or third 
pillar), the differences in professional cultures (e.g. police and justice), the 
silo approach taken by both the Commission and the Council, in which the 
EU agencies/bodies are dealt with by different directorates-general within 
the Commission (which do not always entertain the best relations) and by 
different units in the General Secretariat of the Council.10  
Against this background, the legislative instruments governing each 
EU agency/body remain vague with regard to cooperation with 
counterparts. Interagency relations are mostly left to the EU agencies and 
bodies themselves. This reflects the need for flexibility, which is indeed 
important. Nonetheless, and particularly where there are clear overlaps 
between their respective mandates or difficulties in collaboration, more 
concrete legislative provisions regulating bilateral cooperation might well 
need to be added to the relevant instruments of EU secondary law.  
A general improvement in relations between the EU agencies and 
bodies has been witnessed, due to the conclusion or revision of bilateral 
agreements and memoranda of understanding, to the passage of time and 
the resulting gains in terms of experience. Such improvement also stems 
                                                     
10 This resulted from the division of the ex-Directorate-General 2 devoted to judicial 
cooperation in civil and criminal matters, police and customs cooperation.  
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from other factors, such as the creation of coordination and monitoring 
mechanisms and the encouragement of interagency cooperation in JHA. It 
has especially taken the form of meetings of the JHA contact group and of 
the JHA heads of agencies. They annually report to the Standing Committee 
on Operational Cooperation on Internal Security,11 notably through a 
scorecard on cooperation, which is annexed to the common annual report 
they present. Recently adopted legislative texts, such as the Europol 
Regulation,12 and the proposals under negotiation, such as the Eurojust 
Regulation,13 show that this effort has already been made in part, for instance 
with the establishment of the ‘hit/no hit’ system in the information sharing 
regime between Eurojust and Europol.14  
Still, and in spite of a lot of quite positive official declarations, there are 
difficulties to resolve. Among the ‘worrying’ elements is the growing 
imbalance of powers and resources between Europol and Eurojust: the 
former especially benefits from more resources and has been conferred an 
essential role in the internal security strategy, whereas the latter has far less 
in terms of resources and is weakened by the current fragmentation of the 
EU’s judicial actors, which will become even more pronounced with the 
arrival of a new judicial actor, namely the European Public Prosecutor’s 
Office (EPPO).15  
                                                     
11 This Standing Committee was set up within the Council by the Council Decision of 25 
February 2010 and has met regularly since March 2010.  
12 Regulation (EU) No. 2016/794 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 
May 2016 on the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol), 
OJ L 135, 24.5.2016, pp. 53-114. 
13 Council of the European Union, Proposal for a Regulation on the European Union 
Agency for Criminal Justice Cooperation (Eurojust) – General approach, 6643/15, 
Brussels, 27 February 2015. 
14 See Art. 40 of the proposal for a Eurojust Regulation and Art. 21 of the Europol 
Regulation.  
15 See I. Armada, C. Brière and A. Weyembergh, “Competition or cooperation? State of 
play and future perspectives on the relations between Europol, Eurojust and the 
European Judicial network”, New Journal of European Criminal Law, Vol. 6, No. 2, 2015, 
pp. 258-287; I. Armada, C. Brière and A. Weyembergh, “The interagency cooperation and 
future architecture of the EU criminal justice and law enforcement area”, Research paper 
for the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs of the European 
Parliament (IPOL_STU(2014)510000), November 2014. 
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The establishment of the latter creates new complexity. As a new EU 
judicial body, the EPPO will have to integrate itself into the landscape of 
existing EU agencies/bodies that are also active in protecting the EU’s 
financial interests. Its relations with the EU’s Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), 
Eurojust and Europol will be of crucial importance to ensure that the EPPO 
contributes effectively to fighting offences against the EU’s financial 
interests. These relations will be set out in specific provisions in the future 
EPPO and Eurojust regulations but they suffer from several weaknesses.16 
They will also be further developed when Regulation 883/2013 on OLAF17 
is being revised.  
2.1.3 Management of variable geometry 
There is a need for deep reflection on the management of variable geometry 
and the imbalances that it creates. The role of enhanced cooperation in both 
police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters has clearly increased over 
time. It has acquired a growing place with the Treaty of Lisbon and has 
become more topical with the advent of the EPPO, which will be established 
via enhanced cooperation as permitted by Art. 86(1) TFEU18 and as set out in 
the Commission’s White Paper of 1 March 2017 on the future of Europe. 
                                                     
16 See C. Brière and A. Weyembergh, “Relations between the EPPO and Eurojust – Still a 
privileged partnership?”, in P. Geelhoed, A. Meij and L. Erkelens (eds), Shifting 
Perspectives on the European Public Prosecutor’s Office, The Hague: Asser Press, Springer 
Verlag, 2017, forthcoming; C. Brière and A. Weyembergh, “The future cooperation 
between OLAF and the European Public Prosecutor’s Office”, Study for the Committee 
on Budgetary Control of the European Parliament (PE 603.789), June 2017 and by the 
same authors, “Towards a European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO)”, Study for the 
Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs of the European Parliament (PE 
571.399), November 2016 (http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/ 
2016/571399/IPOL_STU(2016)571399_EN.pdf). 
17 Regulation (EU, Euratom) No. 883/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 11 September 2013 concerning investigations conducted by the European Anti-Fraud 
Office (OLAF) and repealing Regulation (EC) No. 1073/1999 and Council Regulation 
(Euratom) No. 1074/1999, OJ L 248, 18.9.2013, pp. 1-22. 
18 For the final version of the regulation, resulting from the negotiations within the 
Council before the launch of enhanced cooperation as provided for by Art. 86(1), see 
Council of the European Union, Proposal for a Regulation on the establishment of the 
European Public Prosecutor’s Office, 5766/17, 31 January 2017. 
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Enhanced cooperation procedures are among the ways forward set out in 
that latter document and particularly so in the areas of justice and security.19  
Whereas enhanced cooperation presents advantages, it threatens the 
coherence of the European criminal justice area. Indeed, allowing some 
Member States to avoid or to escape part of the acquis brings with it the risk 
of ending up with serious imbalances. Two examples can be given in this 
respect. First, as regards the aforementioned complementarity among 
mutual recognition instruments, the UK has so far been bound by the EAW 
but not by the European Supervision Order, although it strongly denounced 
what it perceived as overuse of the EAW in the pre-trial phase. Second, as in 
the case of Denmark, Ireland is bound by the EAW but not by the EIO.20 In 
terms of the relationship between mutual recognition and approximation of 
laws, neither the UK, Ireland nor Denmark are bound by Directive 2013/48 
on the right of access to a lawyer,21 which ensures that the person subject to 
an EAW has access to a lawyer in the executing state and is informed of 
his/her right to appoint a lawyer in the issuing state.22 Such examples raise 
a question as to the limits of the ‘pick and choose’ possibility. Limits aimed 
at ensuring consistency do exist and should be taken into due consideration. 
However, they are not systematically provided for and seem rather 
randomly applied.23  
A solid effort in this field should be made. The role of the Court of 
Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in this regard is also notable, as shown 
by its two interesting decisions in UK v Council where it limited the ‘cherry-
                                                     
19 See particularly the third scenario of the European Commission’s White Paper on the 
Future of Europe, Reflections and Scenarios for the EU27 by 2025, COM(2017) 2025, 
Brussels, 1.3.2017. 
20 See Houses of the Oireachtas, Joint Committee on European Scrutiny, Sixth Report: 
Special Report on New EU Legislation, 1 January to 30 June 2010, November 2010, p. 225.  
21 Directive 2013/48/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council 22 October 2013 
on the right of access to a lawyer in criminal proceedings and in European arrest warrant 
proceedings, and on the right to have a third party informed upon deprivation of liberty 
and to communicate with third persons and with consular authorities while deprived of 
liberty, OJ L 294, 6.11.2013, pp. 1-12. 
22 Ibid., Art. 10. 
23 About these limits, see A. Weyembergh, “Enhanced cooperation in criminal matters: 
Past, present and future”, in R. Kert and A. Lehner (eds), Liber Amicorum fûr Frank Höpfel, 
Vienna, 2017, forthcoming. 
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picking’ approach to the Schengen Protocol.24 Indeed, the Court insisted on 
the importance of maintaining the coherence of the acquis25 and concluded 
that Member States legitimately refused to authorise the participation of the 
UK in the relevant measures (i.e. the Frontex Regulation26 and the Decision 
concerning access to the Visa Information System27). These are two 
important precedents but it remains to be seen whether the Court will be 
given and will seize the opportunity to defend the consistency of the EU 
acquis as it did in both of these respects. 
2.2 A need to learn lessons from current achievements and 
complete the EU integration process 
On some points, the EU integration process in the penal domain is 
incomplete and this entails the risk of resulting in an unbalanced EU area of 
criminal justice or an area missing some of its objectives or not being efficient 
enough in reaching them. Four illustrations of such incompleteness follow. 
First, there is a certain level of incompleteness resulting from the poor 
level of transposition by the Member States. There is an obvious need to 
monitor this closely, to check for correct transposition in the Member States 
and to launch infringement procedures if necessary. Since 1 December 2014, 
i.e. the end of the transitional period, such infringement procedures can also 
be launched for the absence of or bad transposition of ‘old instruments’ of 
the ex-third pillar of the Treaty on European Union. Such a possibility does 
not seem to have been fully exploited so far. Furthermore, it should be 
exploited in all the domains of criminal justice – not only in those sectors 
seeking to develop security, but also in the approximation of procedural 
                                                     
24 See the decisions of the CJEU in Case C-77/05, UK v Council (Frontex Regulation) [2007] 
and Case C-482/08, UK v Council (Decision concerning access to the Visa Information 
System) [2010]. 
25 Case C-482/08 (supra), para 48.  
26 Council Regulation (EC) No. 2007/2004 of 26 Oct. 2004 establishing a European Agency 
for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member 
States of the European Union, OJ L 349, 25.11.2004, p. 1. 
27 Council Decision 2008/633/JHA of 23 June 2008 concerning access for consultation of 
the Visa Information System (VIS) by designated authorities of Member States and by 
Europol for the purposes of the prevention, detection and investigation of terrorist 
offences and of other serious criminal offences, OJ L 218, 13.8.2008, p. 129. 
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guarantees for suspects and accused persons, for instance. Indeed, it is the 
effectiveness of the whole area of criminal justice that is to be guaranteed. 
Second, mutual recognition is not complete in the sense that it does not 
cover the entire landscape of judicial cooperation. We refer here to the 
transfer of proceedings, where a proposal was negotiated before the entry 
into force of the Lisbon Treaty but was abandoned,28 and to the quite 
complex field of disqualification decisions.29 There is also a need to 
accompany mutual recognition with other measures, without which it can 
be detrimental to individuals. Two examples are worth recalling here. On 
the one hand, more ambitious rules to prevent and solve conflicts of 
jurisdiction but also to modernise and reinforce the ne bis in idem principle 
should be on the EU’s legislator’s agenda.30 Indeed, on several points, the 
existing ones are not sufficiently ambitious. On the other hand, the EU 
should also address the issue of compensation for unjustified arrest, 
detention and surrender or transfer on the basis of EAWs or other relevant 
instruments of mutual recognition. Indeed, practice shows that cases of 
unjustified detention for the purpose of executing an EAW, for instance, do 
take place. Unjustified detentions may be the consequence of different 
circumstances, i.e. clear mistakes by the issuing or executing states (or both), 
or errors by the person, for example following the theft or selling of identity 
cards.  
The concerned persons sometimes receive compensation but 
sometimes they do not. The question is extremely complex: situations that 
should give rise to compensation are very different, the difficulties the 
persons may face, and the way responsibility may shift between the issuing 
and executing states may vary considerably. EU intervention in this field is 
urgently needed. The differences among national compensation mechanisms 
may be regarded as impairing the achievement of an EU area of criminal 
justice where EU citizens can equally enjoy their rights. The EU should 
ensure that reinforced judicial cooperation is not detrimental to individuals’ 
fundamental rights. It follows that in order to counterbalance the 
                                                     
28 Council of the European Union, Proposal for a Council Framework Decision on the 
transfer of proceedings in criminal matters, 11119/09, 30 June 2009. 
29 See the Programme of measures to implement the principle of mutual recognition of 
decisions in criminal matters, OJ C 12, 15.1.2001, pp. 10-22. 
30 See potential derogations to the ne bis in idem principle as provided in Art. 55 of the 
Convention on Implementing the Schengen Agreement.  
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‘prosecutorial effect’ of the EAW and other mutual recognition instruments, 
the EU has a responsibility to ensure that the individual who suffers from 
unjustified detention receives fair compensation, as provided for by Art. 6 of 
the Charter read together with Art. 53, para. 2. This EU obligation would 
mirror the one provided for in Art. 5, para. 5 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights31 as interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights.32  
Third, on a series of points, the defence position and cooperation 
should be strengthened. In recent years and particularly since the entry into 
force of the Lisbon Treaty, a lot of initiatives have been launched and several 
new, important instruments have been adopted, as illustrated by the six 
directives approximating procedural guarantees for suspects and accused 
persons.33 Yet, much is still to be done, concerning for instance the training 
of defence lawyers, EU handbooks specifically designed for them, the 
                                                     
31 The European Convention on Human Rights provides in its Art. 5(5) as follows: 
“Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the 
provisions of this Article shall have an enforceable right to compensation.” Under EU 
law a right to compensation may be deduced from Art. 6 of the Charter read together 
with Art. 53(2).  
32 For more details, see “Compensation” in Council of Europe, A guide to the 
implementation of Art. 5 of the ECHR, Human Rights Handbook No. 5, Strasbourg, pp. 
67-68. 
33 See the following directives of the European Parliament and of the Council: Directive 
2010/64/EU of 20 October 2010 on the right to interpretation and translation in criminal 
proceedings, OJ L 280, 26.10.2010, pp. 1-7; Directive 2012/13/EU of 22 May 2012 on the 
right to information in criminal proceedings, OJ L 142, 1.6.2012, pp. 1-10; Directive 
2013/48/EU (op. cit.), pp. 1-12; Directive (EU) 2016/343 of 9 March 2016 on the 
strengthening of certain aspects of the presumption of innocence and of the right to be 
present at the trial in criminal proceedings, OJ L 65, 11.3.2016, pp. 1-11; Directive (EU) 
2016/800 of 11 May 2016 on procedural safeguards for children who are suspects or 
accused persons in criminal proceedings, OJ L 132, 21.5.2016, pp. 1-20; and Directive (EU) 
2016/1919 of 26 October 2016 on legal aid for suspects and accused persons in criminal 
proceedings and for requested persons in European arrest warrant proceedings, OJ L 
297, 4.11.2016, pp. 1-8. 
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creation of an institutionalised network of defence lawyers34, 35 or the set-up 
of a secure system for exchanging information in cross-border cases.36 
Fourth, the integration process is incomplete because it does not go far 
enough in some respects, in the sense that it does not push EU integration as 
far as needed to achieve its objectives. This is, for instance, clear in protecting 
the EU’s financial interests if one takes a look at the current version of the 
EPPO Regulation: the question is whether it goes far enough to be able to 
attain the objectives of effectively preventing and fighting fraud related to 
the EU budget and of protecting individuals’ rights. Indeed, during the 
negotiations, Member States tended to renationalise – or re-horizontalise – 
the EPPO as much as possible.37  
2.3 Concluding remarks 
The aforementioned observations do not intend to ‘condemn’ the numerous 
EU achievements in the field. They aim at highlighting and raising 
awareness of some of the main challenges ahead. In this context, one should 
keep in mind that it is a work in progress. In line with the dynamic or step-
by-step approach dear to the founding fathers of the EU, much is still to come 
and to be done. In order for the EU and its Member States to reach their 
destination, there is a final, essential point to highlight, which is the need to 
keep a high level of expertise and objectivity in the field, particularly when 
it comes to ex ante evaluations or impact assessments. Some impact 
                                                     
34 See for instance, G. Vernimmen-Van Tiggelen and L. Surano, “Analyse transversale”, 
in G. Vernimmen-Van Tiggelen, L. Surano and A. Weyembergh (eds), The future of mutual 
recognition in criminal matters in the European Union, Université Libre de Bruxelles, 2009, 
p. 560; see also European Criminal Policy Initiative, “A Manifesto on European Criminal 
Procedure Law”, ZIS, 11/2013, p. 435. 
35 Ambitious proposals have been put forward in the past, i.e. the Eurodefensor – see 
especially S. Schüneman (ed.), Ein Gesamtkonzept für die europaïsche Strafrechtspflege [A 
European Programme of Criminal Law and Procedure], 2006, p. 93. 
36 In this regard, see the lack of continuity of the pilot project “PenalNet – Secure E-
Communications in Criminal Law Practice”, which was an initiative developed from 
2007 to 2013, supported and co-financed by the European Commission, and involving 
the Spanish, French, Hungarian, Italian and Romanian bar associations.  
37 See Brière and Weyembergh (2016), op. cit. 
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assessments have been neglected38 while others have been criticised.39 In this 
respect, a considerable effort is needed because, if EU intervention in the 
field lacks credible justification, then it will face a real problem of legitimacy.  
 
                                                     
38 See the proposal for a directive on combating terrorism and replacing Council 
Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA, COM(2015) 625 final, 2.12.2015, which justifies 
quite briefly the absence of an impact assessment in spite of its sensitivity: “Given the 
urgent need to improve the EU framework to increase security in the light of recent 
terrorist attacks including by incorporating international obligations and standards, this 
proposal is exceptionally presented without an impact assessment.” 
39 See for instance European Commission, Regulatory Scrutiny Board, opinion on the DG 
JUST – Proposal for a Regulation on Mutual Recognition of Freezing and Confiscation 
Orders (Ref. Ares(2016)6635351 – 25/11/2016), Brussels, 2016. 
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3. OLD AND NEW CHALLENGES TO EUROPEAN 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE  
PETRA BÁRD 
riminal justice in the EU Member States poses multiple challenges to 
the rule of law and human rights, and vice versa: deterioration of the 
latter values jeopardises the effective operation of crime prevention 
and prosecution. The first part of this chapter will look at three of these 
challenges and show how EU criminal cooperation between the Member 
States takes the problems to a new level. The second part considers the 
difficulties of existing mechanisms in tackling the three problems. 
3.1 Three challenges for criminal justice 
3.1.1 Everyday science fiction and the quest for absolute security 
The quest for absolute security dates back to postmodernism, making 
societies victims of their own structures and generating risk factors of 
various sorts: health, environmental, criminal, etc. The primary objective 
became the identification of insecurities and their prevention.1 The fight 
against terrorism vividly illustrates politics and law-making based on the 
worst-case scenario, striving at maximum security.2  
The point of departure of the proponents of the security model is that 
security and human rights are competing aspects that might mutually 
exclude each other. They insist that the global threat to security necessitates 
an entirely new equilibrium. Threat creates emergency, and emergency 
situations call for a different allocation of liberties than what we are used to 
in normal times. New technologies in crime prevention – such as CCTV 
                                                     
1 See U. Beck, Risikogesellschaft: auf dem Weg in eine andere Moderne, Frankfurt am Main: 
Suhrkamp, 1986; A. Giddens, The consequences of modernity, Cambridge: Polity Press, 
1991.  
2 G.T. Marx, “La Société de Sécurité Maximale”, Déviance et Société, Vol. 12, No. 2, 1988, 
pp. 147-166. 
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cameras, DNA fingerprinting for ever-more types of crimes or even 
misdemeanours, the extensive use of wiretapping, data fishing, sales of 
security in the private sphere to victims (e.g. camera use or chips placed on 
or in their loved ones, including dogs and kids) – result in a so-called 
surveillance assemblage3 that is typical of postmodern societies. New 
attempts to formulate the quest for security in the rights language make 
these claims stronger than ever.4 
Those wary of the security-versus-liberty balance metaphor emphasise 
that the two notions do not constitute a zero-sum game, not least because 
they are not comparable concepts.5 An alleged new equilibrium would 
constitute numerous problems: those concerned insist that some 
fundamental rights cannot be abandoned, that giving them up is a slippery 
slope and that it will be extremely difficult to regain liberties once we have 
abandoned them. They voice their worries about the growing tendencies of 
negative attitudes towards religious organisations, ethnic minorities, 
foreigners and asylum seekers. In relation to new technologies, they 
emphasise privacy and data protection considerations.6  
The stress placed on the security side of the balance has some further, 
less direct and more subtle drawbacks from the point of view of the rule of 
law. Actual rights have to be given up for the sake of a perceived, future 
danger, whereas it is extremely difficult to determine the probability of the 
danger occurring. The ‘risk society’ prepares for the worst case, the ‘what if’ 
scenario, placing everything and everyone under surveillance and control so 
as not to overlook any type of risk and new technologies serve as ideal tools 
in this exercise. From a technological viewpoint, the possibilities are 
limitless. The question is whether a certain morality could be enforced and 
                                                     
3 See, e.g. R. Lippert, “Signs of the surveillant assemblage: Urban CCTV, privacy 
regulation and governmentality”, Social and Legal Studies, Vol. 18, No. 4, 2009, pp. 505-
522. 
4 L. Lazarus, “The right to security – Securing rights or securitising rights?”, in R. 
Dickinson, E. Katselli, C. Murray and O.W. Pedersen, Examining critical perspectives on 
human rights, Cambridge and New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2012, pp. 87-
106. 
5 E. Guild, S. Carrera and T. Balzacq, “The Changing Dynamics of Security in an Enlarged 
European Union”, Challenge Research Paper No. 12, Centre for European Policy Studies, 
Brussels, 2008, pp. 8-9 (https://www.ceps.eu/system/files/book/1746.pdf).  
6 C. Sunstein, Laws of fear: Beyond the precautionary principle, Cambridge, MA: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005. 
OLD AND NEW CHALLENGES TO EUROPEAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE  35 
rationality could be reintroduced into decision-making through legal means 
to prevent abuses called into life by risk hysteria.  
Problems at the national level are multiplied in the EU context, not 
least with the principle of availability introduced by The Hague programme, 
where “the methods of exchange of information should make full use of new 
technology”.7 The Council Presidency further clarified that “the aim is 
obviously that as large a list of information categories as possible is 
exchangeable with as little effort as possible (i.e. requiring a minimum of 
formalities, permissions, procedures, if any)”.8 Interoperability became the 
magic word for databases in the EU. Beyond the problems related to the 
creation of a panoptic society, this also means that information kept in 
violation of privacy rights in one Member State9 could easily end up being 
used in a criminal procedure in another EU member country, thereby 
proliferating potential infringements of human rights.10 
3.1.2 Cruelty of the Middle Ages in contemporary criminal justice 
We also face an opposite problem. While science fiction-like high-tech 
solutions employed in the fight against crime pose new problems, we still 
face centuries-old challenges we thought to have abandoned towards the 
end of the Middle Ages with the Enlightenment infiltrating into the criminal 
justice systems of the day. Cesare Beccaria spoke out against cruel and 
barbaric criminal sanctions already in 1764,11 but we still have cases where 
                                                     
7 See The Hague Programme: Strengthening Freedom, Security and Justice in the 
European Union, OJ C 53/1, 3.3.2005. 
8 Presidency of the Council of the European Union, “Approach for enhancing the 
effective and efficient information exchange among EU law enforcement authorities”, 
7416/05, Brussels, 17 March 2005, point 5.  
9 Cf. European Court of Human Rights, S and Marper v United Kingdom, Application nos. 
30562/04 and 30566/04, 4 December 2008. 
10 See Council of the European Union, Decision 2008/615/JHA of 23 June 2008 on the 
stepping up of cross-border cooperation, particularly in combating terrorism and cross-
border crime, OJ L 210/1, 6.8.2008 and Decision 2008/616/JHA of 23 June 2008 on the 
implementation of Decision 2008/615/JHA on the stepping up of cross-border 
cooperation, particularly in combating terrorism and cross-border crime, OJ L 210/2, 
6.8.2008. 
11 Cesare marchese di Beccaria, On crimes and punishments, trans. by H. Paolucci, 
Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill, 1963. 
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states violate the absolute prohibition of torture, inhuman and degrading 
treatment or punishment.  
More specifically, when such problems in the domestic setting are 
systemic,12 abuses are “exported” and multiplied in the EU criminal 
cooperation setting, especially with the help of the principle of mutual 
recognition.13 The principle was labelled by the Tampere Programme in 1999 
as a “cornerstone” of judicial cooperation contributing to the Union 
becoming an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice.14 In 2000 the 
Commission further defined the concept as meaning that a judicial decision, 
once taken in one Member State, should automatically be accepted in all 
other Member States, and have the same or at least similar effects there.15 
Meanwhile, both the EU legislative and the judiciary refined the principle in 
an attempt to make sure that the principle does not lead to the multiplication 
of human rights abuses.  
European co-legislators have introduced a proportionality check, a 
consultation process between the executing and issuing judicial authority 
and explicit grounds for non-execution based on fundamental rights in the 
2014 Directive on the European Investigation Order.16 In the same year the 
European Parliament, in a resolution based on a “legislative initiative 
report”, called for similar grounds to be introduced in the framework 
decision on the European Arrest Warrant17 and more generally, in respect of 
                                                     
12 See e.g. European Court of Human Rights, Varga and Others v Hungary, Application 
nos. 14097/12, 45135/12, 73712/12, 34001/13, 44055/13, and 64586/13, 10 March 2015. 
13 Art. 82(1) TFEU states: “Judicial cooperation in criminal matters in the Union shall be 
based on the principle of mutual recognition of judgments and judicial decisions and 
shall include the approximation of the laws and regulations of the Member States in the 
areas referred to in paragraph 2 and in Article 83.” 
14 Presidency Conclusions of the Tampere European Council of 15 and 16 October 1999, 
Bull. 10/1999, point 33. 
15 European Commission, Communication on “Mutual recognition of Final Decisions in 
criminal matters”, COM(2000) 0495 final, Brussels, 27.6.2000, p. 2. 
16 Directive 2014/41/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 April 2014 
regarding the European Investigation Order in criminal matters, OJ L 130/1, 1.5.2014. 
17 Council of the European Union, Framework Decision 2009/299/JHA of 26 February 
2009 amending Framework Decisions 2002/584/JHA, 2005/214/JHA, 2006/783/JHA, 
2008/909/JHA and 2008/947/JHA, thereby enhancing the procedural rights of persons 
and fostering the application of the principle of mutual recognition to decisions rendered 
in the absence of the person concerned at the trial, OJ L 81/24, 27.3.2009. 
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other measures implementing mutual recognition in the area of judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters.18 This latter suggestion has not yet been 
taken up by the Commission; however, another branch of government, the 
EU judiciary, came to rescue. In April 2016,19 for the first time in the history 
of EU criminal cooperation, the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU) held that mutual trust in the mechanisms for fundamental rights 
protection of all Member States cannot be taken for granted; even if an EU 
instrument does not contain a fundamental rights exception for refusing 
enforcement, the executing judicial authority must not blindly trust the 
issuing Member State. Rather, it has to assess the fundamental rights 
situation in that country. Even though the Court left a number of issues 
open,20 the judgment can be seen as a milestone in putting a halt to the 
proliferation of human rights abuses. 
3.1.3 An all-encompassing problem: Rule of law backsliding 
Rule of law backsliding should also be mentioned in this context.21 In a 
country based on the rule of law, built-in correction mechanisms compensate 
for the deficiencies of a majoritarian government: the doctrines of separation 
of powers, checks and balances, constitutional scrutiny, judicial oversight 
and media pluralism all make sure that those in power do not abuse power. 
                                                     
18 See European Parliament, Resolution of 27 February 2014 with recommendations to 
the Commission on the review of the European Arrest Warrant (2013/2109 (INL)), 
P7_TA-PROV(2014)0174. See also M. del Monte, “Revising the European Arrest 
Warrant”, European Added Value Assessment accompanying the European 
Parliament’s Legislative Own-Initiative Report (Rapporteur: Baroness Ludford MEP), 
European Parliamentary Research Service, PE 510.979, March 2014, along with Annex I 
to that assessment by A. Weyembergh with the assistance of I. Armada and C. Brière, 
“Critical Assessment of the Existing European Arrest Warrant Framework Decision” and 
Annex II by A. Doobay, “Assessing the Need for Intervention at EU level to Revise the 
European Arrest Warrant Framework Decision”. 
19 CJEU, Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 5 April 2016, Pál Aranyosi and Robert 
Căldăraru v Generalstaatsanwaltschaft Bremen, Requests for a preliminary ruling from the 
Hanseatisches Oberlandesgericht in Bremen, Joined Cases C-404/15 and C-659/15 PPU. 
20 For details, see W. van Ballegooij and P. Bárd, “Mutual Recognition and Individual 
Rights: Did the Court get it Right?”, New Journal of European Criminal Law, Vol. 7, No. 4, 
2016, pp. 439-464. 
21 The term has been coined by J.-W. Müller in “Safeguarding Democracy inside the EU: 
Brussels and the Future of Liberal Order”, Working Paper No. 3, Transatlantic Academy, 
Washington, D.C., 2013.  
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These institutions and procedures operate along the paranoid logics of 
constitutional law introducing precautionary measures into democratic 
systems to protect them against a future potential government acquiring and 
retaining powers at all costs, i.e. superseding constitutional government 
with emotional government.  
In contrast, in a country making a U-turn on the path of the rule of law, 
the government will systematically eliminate the channels for any kind of 
internal dissent, i.e. diminishing the potentialities for criticism, for example 
by modifying election laws through gerrymandering, weakening the powers 
of the constitutional court, influencing the judiciary, eliminating 
ombudsman’s offices, weakening media pluralism and attacking civil 
society. This is what academic literature denotes as constitutional capture22 
and what the Lisbon Treaty calls a “serious and persistent breach” of EU 
values.23 At the time of writing, Member States illustrating such systemic 
threats include Hungary24 and Poland,25 but established democracies are not 
immune to rule of law challenges either. 
For the first time in EU treaty history, the Lisbon Treaty expressly 
refers to Union values. Art. 2 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) makes 
clear that the EU is a Wertegemeinschaft,26 a community based on common 
values. Nevertheless, the EU is lacking an enforcement mechanism for these 
foundational values. The challenge underlying enforcement lies in the 
debate about conferral of powers and national sovereignty, subsidiarity and 
proportionality, i.e. about the vertical separation of powers between the EU 
and its constitutive elements. With special regard to purely internal 
                                                     
22 J.-W. Müller, Constitutional Patriotism, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007.  
23 See Art. 7 of the Treaty on European Union. 
24 See e.g. the European Parliament Resolution of 3 July 2013 on the situation of 
fundamental rights: Standards and practices in Hungary (pursuant to the European 
Parliament Resolution of 16 February 2012) (2012/2130(INI)), which is commonly 
referred to by the name of its rapporteur, the (Rui) ‘Tavares Report’, or more recently 
European Parliament Resolution of 17 May 2017 on the situation in Hungary 
(2017/2656(RSP). 
25 See the European Commission’s College Orientation Debate on recent developments 
in Poland and the Rule of Law Framework, Brussels, 13 January 2016 
(http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-16-62_en.htm). 
26 See for example Konrad Adenauer’s address at the Foreign Press Association in 
London on 7 December 1951, in Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamtes der 
Bundesregierung, Nr. 19/51, 314. 
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situations, the legitimacy of EU interference is repeatedly questioned by 
Member States. But a Member State’s breach of fundamental values should 
be regarded as a European issue. It is likely to undermine the very 
foundations of the Union and the trust between its members, whatever field 
the breach occurs in.27 Beyond harming nationals of a Member State, Union 
citizens residing in that state will also be detrimentally affected. A lack of 
limits to illiberal practices28 may encourage other Member State 
governments to follow suit. In other words, rule of law violations – if no 
consequences occur – may become contagious.29  
Moreover, all EU citizens will to some extent suffer due to the given 
state’s participation in the EU’s decision-making mechanisms, and to say the 
least, the legitimacy of decision-making of the Union will be affected. 
Therefore, a state’s departure from the rule of law standards and the 
European consensus will ultimately hamper the exercise of rights of 
individuals EU-wide.30 Rule of law backsliding does not leave any legal 
domain intact and also jeopardises the criminal justice system. Acceptance 
of criminal court judgments, for example, will be legitimately questioned by 
other Member States, if the issuing country’s judiciary lacks independence, 
if its constitutional tribunal was incapable of exercising meaningful 
constitutional review or if there was institutional discrimination against 
certain minorities. 
                                                     
27 European Commission, Communication on “Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union 
– Respect for and promotion of the values on which the Union is based”, COM(2003) 606 
final, Brussels, 15.10.2003, p. 5. 
28 The term was coined long ago, but it gained practical relevance in the EU after 
Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán praised such state approaches in his speech 
given in Tusnádfürdő on 25 July 2014. The original speech is accessible in video format 
(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PXP-6n1G8ls). Cf. the speech by Frans 
Timmermans: “there is no such thing as an illiberal democracy” (see F. Timmermans, 
“EU framework for democracy, rule of law and fundamental rights”, Speech to the 
European Parliament, Strasbourg, Speech/15/4402, 12 February 2015). 
29 See L. Waller, “Viktor Orbán: The conservative subversive”, in “Class of 2017”, Politico 
28, 2017. 
30 For further effects on the EU, see P. Bárd, S. Carrera, E. Guild and D. Kochenov, “An 
EU Mechanism on Democracy, the Rule of Law and Fundamental Rights”, CEPS Paper 
in Liberty and Security, No. 91, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, 2016, pp. 
62-68. 
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3.2 Remedies to tackle the three problems and their challenges 
Whereas there are a number of mechanisms addressing the above problems, 
they suffer from fundamental flaws.  
First, European mechanisms to tackle the above problems – at least 
those with an effective enforcement mechanism – are mainly human rights- 
oriented. They might remedy problems in the first and second scenarios 
mentioned – science fiction-like violations of privacy on the one hand, and 
more traditional human rights abuses on the other. The third type of rule of 
law problems, however, are not effectively tackled. Future Member States 
are filtered for their compliance with these values before they accede to the 
Union,31 but no similar method exists to supervise adherence to these 
foundational principles after accession. History and recent events have 
proven that this so-called ‘Copenhagen dilemma’ is currently a very vivid 
one in the EU.  
Although there are several EU-level instruments for evaluating and 
monitoring EU values at the Member State level,32 these mechanisms 
constitute a scattered and patchwork set of Member States’ EU surveillance 
systems overseeing their obligations with regard to the rule of law and 
fundamental rights.33 The only ‘hard law’ with a Treaty basis is Art. 7 TEU. 
Yet Art. 7 has never been activated in practice because of a number of 
political and legal obstacles. In response to these deficiencies, in 2014 the 
European Commission launched a new EU framework to strengthen the rule 
of law,34 commonly known as the pre-Art. 7 procedure. The pre-Art. 7 
                                                     
31 See European Parliament, Plenary debate on the political situation in Romania, 
statement by Viviane Reding, 12 September 2012. See also V. Reding, “The EU and the 
Rule of Law: What Next?”, speech delivered at the Centre for European Policy Studies, 
Brussels, 4 September 2013. 
32 These include, for instance, the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism for Bulgaria 
and Romania, the EU Justice Scoreboard, the EU Anti-Corruption Report, as well as the 
European semester, annual reports on fundamental rights published periodically by the 
European Commission, the European Parliament and the Fundamental Rights Agency, 
Commission infringement procedures (Arts 258 and 259 of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union, TFEU), peer reviews in accordance with Art. 70 TFEU, and 
European Parliament resolutions. 
33 Bárd et al. (2016), op. cit.  
34 European Commission, Communication, “A New EU Framework to Strengthen the 
Rule of Law”, COM(2014) 158, Strasbourg, 11.3.2014. 
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procedure, however, does not remedy the problem. Its monitoring 
dimension is weak in nature; the launch of a ‘rule of law opinion’ or a ‘rule 
of law recommendation’ in the frame of a pre-Art. 7 process is rather 
discretionary; the assessment is not carried out by entirely independent 
academic experts who would ensure the full impartiality of the findings; and 
finally, it has also failed on the efficiency test at its debut vis-à-vis Poland. 35 
Academics and policy-makers caught up with the issue of rule of law 
backsliding and constitutional capture in the EU soon after it happened in 
some Central and Eastern European Member States, and formulated an array 
of proposals for how to deal with the outstanding problems,36 but the EU 
branches of government have not yet taken up the early suggestions. 
Second, the main entities responsible for the enforcement of EU values 
are the courts, which are well suited to solve human rights-related problems, 
especially if minorities’ rights are at stake. Minorities are often 
misrepresented or lacking any representation. Some are simply not part of 
the electorate (typically certain groups of detainees are affected, but in the 
UK, none of them have voting rights), while others simply constitute an 
unpopular minority and as a consequence fall victim to majoritarianism. 
Members of minority groups who have been excluded from ‘we the people’ 
                                                     
35 For the initial recommendation, see the Commission recommendation regarding the 
rule of law in Poland, C(2016) 5703 final, Brussels, 27.7.2016 (http://ec.europa.eu/ 
justice/effective-justice/files/recommendation-rule-of-law-poland-20160727_en.pdf). 
For later developments and their criticism, see e.g. L. Pech and K. Lane Scheppele, 
“Poland and the European Commission, Part III: Requiem for the Rule of Law”, VerfBlog, 
3 March 2017 (http://verfassungsblog.de/poland-and-the-european-commission-part-
iii-requiem-for-the-rule-of-law/); P. Bárd and S. Carrera, “The Commission’s Decision 
on ‘Less EU’ in Safeguarding the Rule of Law: A play in four acts”, CEPS Policy Insights, 
No. 2017/08, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, March 2017, pp. 1-11 
(https://www.ceps.eu/publications/commission’s-decision-’less-eu’-safeguarding-
rule-law-play-four-acts).  
36 For brief overviews, see C. Closa, D. Kochenov and J.H.H. Weiler, “Reinforcing the 
Rule of Law Oversight in the European Union”, RSCAS Working Paper 2014/25, 
European University Institute, Florence, 2014; E.-M. Poptcheva, “Member States and the 
rule of law: Dealing with a breach of EU values”, Briefing, European Parliament Research 
Service (PE 554.167), March 2015 (http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/ 
etudes/BRIE/2015/554167/EPRS_BRI(2015)554167_EN.pdf). For more in-depth 
analyses, see the contributions in C. Closa and D. Kochenov (eds), Reinforcing Rule of Law 
Oversight in the European Union, Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 2016; and 
A. Jakab and D. Kochenov (eds), The Enforcement of EU Law and Values, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2016. 
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may be granted participation in democratic processes by courts and 
ombudspersons – entities anyway better equipped with tools of human 
rights protection than other branches of power. Whereas courts are the ideal 
branch of power to deal with human rights infringements, they are less 
equipped to address rule of law challenges, especially in a state of 
constitutional capture. 
Third, the weakness of external apex courts – such as the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), still the main human rights defender in 
Europe – should be mentioned. The Strasburg Court is not exposed to the 
above problem, i.e. to being captured, but it is relatively insensitive to the 
specificities of the EU legal system, such as the principles of loyalty, mutual 
trust or mutual recognition – or at least this was the criticism of the 
Luxembourg Court in Opinion 2/13 vetoing EU accession to the European 
Convention on Human Rights.37 Such a problem could only be overcome if 
the CJEU has a chance to scrutinise all EU cases with a human rights element 
before the ECtHR does so. Should it establish a judicial review for human 
rights cases that corresponds to Strasbourg tests, the fears over the ECtHR 
disrespecting or indeed violating the EU law principles, such as the primacy, 
unity and effectiveness of EU law, would recede.  
The ECtHR has already paved the way for such a mechanism by 
establishing the Bosphorus presumption and making sure that only cases that 
the CJEU has had a say on end up in Strasbourg.38 The ECtHR still keeps this 
option open, even after Opinion 2/13 was delivered and even though that 
Opinion was fairly hostile to human rights and the Strasbourg Court in 
particular.39 However, for the Bosphorus presumption to survive, and so as to 
grant individuals meaningful rights equivalent to the protection afforded by 
the Strasbourg mechanism, the EU’s legislative and judicial powers will have 
to clarify how they wish to reconcile the protection of fundamental rights 
with EU values, such as mutual trust, mutual recognition,40 respect for 
national identities and the primacy of EU law, and how they wish to share 
                                                     
37 CJEU, Opinion 2/13 of 18 December 2014. 
38 ECtHR, Bosphorus v Ireland, Application no. 45036/98, 20 June 2005; Michaud v France, 
Application no. 12323/11, 6 December 2012.  
39 ECtHR, Avotiņš v Latvia, Application no. 17502/07, 23 May 2016. 
40 Van Ballegooij and Bárd (2016), op. cit. 
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responsibility among the Member States, and between the Member States 
and the EU when ensuring liberty and security.41  
Finally, as things currently stand in the EU, all enforcement 
mechanisms – including those addressing human rights violations and those 
tackling rule of law problems – are unresponsive. They can neither prevent 
deterioration nor culmination into systemic breaches of human rights and 
rule of law violations, nor can they serve as the basis of mutual trust and 
recognition. 
It seems that the establishment of an ex ante rule of law mechanism, 
including human rights monitoring based on equality, scientific rigour and 
sound methodology, is inevitable. The mechanism should entail a prompt 
response to rule of law backsliders, and should include effective, dissuasive 
and proportionate sanctions.42 This would be vital for the EU, since 
deterioration of the rule of law at the domestic level is ultimately also a 
European matter. A state’s departure from the European consensus on rule 
of law standards will eventually hamper the exercise of individuals’ rights 
EU-wide. As long as the Member States – with or without good reason – have 
no faith in one another’s mechanisms for human rights protection, the 
administration of EU criminal justice will also remain cumbersome.  
Apart from these substantive problems, the principle of primacy 
would also be jeopardised. Member States would invoke the human rights 
argument in order to permit exemptions from the principle of primacy of EU 
law. The German Federal Constitutional Court is most illustrative for 
retaining the right to be the ultimate reviewer of EU law in the form of 
fundamental rights, ultra vires or constitutional identity review.43 Whereas 
the German Constitutional Court takes a firm stance on protecting its own 
                                                     
41 “If used lightly and carelessly, the national security exception can be a much stronger 
centrifugal force in Europe than cries of constitutional identity could ever be.” See R. 
Uitz, “The Return of the Sovereign: A Look at the Rule of Law in Hungary – and in 
Europe”, VerfBlog, 5 April 2017 (http://verfassungsblog.de/the-return-of-the-
sovereign-a-look-at-the-rule-of-law-in-hungary-and-in-europe). 
42 See the European Parliament Resolution of 25 October 2016 with recommendations to 
the Commission on the establishment of an EU mechanism on democracy, the rule of law 
and fundamental rights (2015/2254(INL)), P8_TA-PROV(2016)0409. 
43 For such attempts, see e.g. BVerfGE 37, 271 – Solange I, 7 BVerfGE 73, 339 – Solange II, 
BVerfGE 102, 147 – Bananenmarktordnung, BVerfGE 89, 155 – Maastricht, BVerfGE 123, 
267 – Lissabon, BVerfG, 21.06.2016 – 2 BvR 2728/13; 2 BvR 2728/13; 2 BvR 2729/13; 2 
BvR 2730/13. 
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review powers on the constitutional permissibility of EU law, it only does so 
in order to grant EU values a higher level of protection; moreover, in the 
overall assessment it almost always comes to EU law-friendly conclusions. 
But its firm stance on being the final arbiter of EU law may encourage other 
domestic apex courts to follow suit, and to opt out from the principle of 
primacy, and these latter fora may use the same claims for a less friendly 
interpretation of EU law or even for lowering the level of human rights 
protection. Not remedying the problems addressed in the present chapter 
may therefore potentially have fatal consequences for EU criminal 
cooperation and the whole of the EU legal system.44 
 
                                                     
44 G. Vermeulen, W. De Bondt and C. Ryckman (eds), Rethinking international cooperation 
in criminal matters in the EU: Moving beyond actors, bringing logic back, footed in reality, 
Antwerp, Apeldoorn and Portland: Maklu, 2012, pp. 269–270. 
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4. REVIEWING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF EU 
COUNTER-TERRORISM POLICIES 
FIONA DE LONDRAS 
 comprehensive review of the effectiveness of EU counter-terrorism 
policies is welcome. I have previously written that there is a clear 
need for the effectiveness of the wide range of EU laws and policies 
on counter-terrorism to be reviewed, not least so as to properly understand 
their impacts (including on rights) and their legitimacy (beyond legality).1 
The need for such a review is clear when one considers, first, the basic 
principles of good public administration and the role therein of assessing 
whether policy decisions actually ‘work’; second, the impact in domestic 
legal systems across the EU Member States of measures introduced in 
Brussels; and third, the demands of democratic legitimacy within a multi-
level structure such as the European Union.  
However, having accepted the need for a comprehensive review of EU 
counter-terrorism policies, the Union – and particularly Commissioner 
Julian King – is faced with the question of how to go about that review. That 
is the focus of this contribution, which makes three connected but discrete 
arguments. These are i) that asking the right questions is key to the success 
of an effectiveness review, ii) that understanding context is vital to assessing 
effectiveness and framing potential recommendations, and iii) that such a 
review must take into account the limitations of the EU and the implications 
thereof for counter-terrorism. This chapter addresses each of these points in 
turn. 
                                                     
1 See F. de Londras, “Governance Gaps in EU counter-terrorism: Implications for 
democracy and constitutionalism”, in F. de Londras and J. Doody (eds), The Impact, 
Legitimacy and Effectiveness of EU Counter-Terrorism, London: Routledge, 2015, p. 204. 
A 
46  FIONA DE LONDRAS 
4.1 Asking the right questions 
An effectiveness review is clearly challenging, not least because it requires 
an analysis of whether the materials, laws and policies under review actually 
‘work’ in a meaningful sense. This is the essence of the concept of 
effectiveness: for something to be effective it should achieve what it was 
designed to do.2 In the context of counter-terrorism, as in other contexts, this 
is perhaps more difficult than it sounds, for it requires analysis of both meta-
objectives and specific objectives.  
Meta-objectives here are the broader objectives of counter-terrorism 
within a rights-based, liberal constitutionalist milieu per se, i.e. to enhance 
security, to maintain the rule of law and to maintain the constitutionalist 
character of the polity, state or supra-state institution (in this case the EU). 
The specific objectives are those that have been articulated for a specific 
instrument or policy, for example the disruption of terrorist financing or the 
sharing of passenger name data between aviation corporations and state or 
supra-state authorities.  
While we might imagine that specific objectives should be relatively 
easy to analyse, in fact challenges can arise from the fact that they are 
sometimes not clearly articulated, and that questions of scale can arise. So, if 
an instrument assists in the disruption of some terrorist finance but terrorist 
organisations have adapted and found other financing mechanisms to evade 
this regulation, or much conventional financing activity continues 
undisrupted, is the instrument effective? And is it sufficiently effective to 
justify any interference with fundamental rights that might be occasioned by 
its use? These are the kinds of questions that an effectiveness review should 
be able to answer in a way that, for example, a judicial review ordinarily 
cannot.  
The purpose of judicial review is to check legality and proportionality, 
but not to enquire definitively into effectiveness per se.3 In this way, judicial 
                                                     
2 See F. de Londras, “Evaluation and Effectiveness in Counter-Terrorism”, in W. 
Hardyns, K. Ponnet, G. Reniers, W. Smit, L. Braeckmans and B. Segaert (eds), Socially 
Responsible Innovation in Security: Critical Reflection, London: Routledge, 2018, 
forthcoming. 
3 On the limitations of judicial review in the context of counter-terrorism effectiveness 
assessment, see F. de Londras, “Accounting for Rights in EU Counter-Terrorism: 
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review is an important but ultimately limited tool in attempts to review 
counter-terrorism.4 An effectiveness review must, then, ask questions that 
relate to both legality and proportionality (in a classical, quasi-legalistic 
mode) but also to effectiveness. Otherwise, there is no new or added value 
from the effectiveness review compared with a pre-existing judicial or legal 
review, and the really difficult questions of the relationship and pay-offs 
between legal acceptability and practical effectiveness, with connected 
concerns about legitimacy, cannot be grasped. 
4.2 The challenge of context 
Getting to these important questions in such a review is anything but simple. 
This is not least because of three important elements of context: the 
predetermination of key antecedent questions through the process of 
compaction, the predetermination of key questions about worthy goals and 
rationality by the political process, and the pragmatic need for compromise 
that underpins all law- and policy-making at the EU level. 
4.2.1 Compaction 
It has long been noted that there is a tendency for domestic counter-terrorism 
law to be normalised.5 That is, that measures introduced as ‘exceptional’ to 
address difficult counter-terrorism challenges lose their exceptional status, 
and their innovations begin to ‘creep’ across the legal system. For example, 
jury-free trials introduced to tackle paramilitary violence begin to be used 
for organised crime, and the like.6 The standard that was considered 
exceptional when the law was first introduced becomes normalised, and 
becomes the starting point the next time an extraordinary challenge presents 
itself. In this way, the starting point for human rights protection is 
                                                     
Towards Effective Review”, Columbia Journal of European Law, Vol. 22, No. 2, 2016, pp. 
237, 264-267. 
4 Ibid; see also F. Davis and F. de Londras (eds), Critical Debates on Counter-Terrorism 
Judicial Review, Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 2014. 
5 For a comprehensive and illustrative account see, e.g. A. Neal, “Normalization and 
Legislative Exceptionalism: Counterterrorist Lawmaking and Changing Times of 
Security Emergencies”, International Political Sociology, Vol. 6, No. 3, 2012, p. 260. 
6 This is what happened with Ireland’s Special Criminal Court; see A. Greene, “Shielding 
the State of Emergency: Organised Crime in Ireland, the State’s Response”, Northern 
Ireland Legal Quarterly, Vol. 62, No. 3, 2011, p. 249. 
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consistently renegotiated ‘downwards’ and our conceptualisation of 
standard policing (compared with extraordinary security activities) becomes 
blurred.7  
The same phenomenon can be observed in the context of EU counter-
terrorism, in which the content of a pre-existing measure is taken as a starting 
point, the necessity, effectiveness, rationality and impact of which does not 
need to be assessed; its mere existence as part of the acquis appears essentially 
to predetermine its effectiveness. This can be observed in the context of the 
EU Directive on Combating Terrorism. The explanatory memorandum in 
which the Directive was proposed by the Commission suggested that the fact 
that many of the (then-proposed) measures already existed in the 2002 and 
2008 Framework Decisions8 was sufficient to effectively foreclose debate as 
to their appropriateness.9  
This suggestion was notwithstanding the continuing concern on the 
part of much of civil society about, for example, the expansive nature of the 
definition of terrorism in the 2002 Framework Decision.10 Thus, the 
provisions of the 2002 and 2008 Framework Decisions were ‘compacted’ (i.e. 
became hardened and acted as the foundational stones on which the next 
advancement in the acquis would take place), so that at the time the 2017 
Directive was proposed, no root and branch assessment of its necessity, 
rationality and likely impact was actually undertaken. 
                                                     
7 On ‘downwards recalibration’ in human rights and counter-terrorism, see F. de 
Londras, Detention in the ‘War on Terror’: Can Human Rights Fight Back? Cambridge, MA: 
Cambridge University Press, 2011; H. Fenwick, “Recalibrating Human Rights and the 
role of the Human Rights Act post 9/11: Reasserting international human rights norms 
in the ‘war on terror’”, Current Legal Problems, Vol. 63, No. 1, 2010, p. 153. 
8 Council of the European Union, Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA of 13 June 2002 on 
combating terrorism, OJ L 164, 22.6.2002, p. 3, amended by Council Framework Decision 
2008/919/JHA of 28 November 2008 amending Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA on 
combating terrorism, OJ L 330, 9.12.2008, p. 31.  
9 European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on combating terrorism and replacing Council Framework Decision 
2002/475/JHA on combating terrorism, COM(2015), 625 final, Brussels, 25.12.2015. 
10 See for example the Joint Submission by Amnesty International, the International 
Commission of Jurists, the Open Society Justice Initiative and the Open Society European 
Policy Institute of 6 February 2016 (https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/ 
sites/default/files/submission-ec-terrorism-directive-20160219.PDF). 
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Taking this tendency towards compaction into account has an 
important implication for an effectiveness review. It points to the need to 
strip back these layers of normalisation for the purposes of truly ‘seeing’ and 
assessing the impacts of counter-terrorism law on the legal system as a 
whole, in order then to feed that into a consideration of effectiveness. 
4.2.2 Political predetermination 
Any assessment of the proportionality of a measure (in both legal and 
practical terms) requires a clear scoping of the problem to be addressed, a 
convincing case that the measure proposed is necessary to address that 
problem, and establishment that the measures proposed are rationally 
connected to that aim.11 These are not only expected steps in legalistic 
proportionality analysis, but also very basic principles of public 
administration – a process that is fundamentally about problem-solving.  
Once again, it has long been observed that security generally 
(including counter-terrorism) is a field in which these basic principles are 
sometimes neglected,12 not least because political decisions that ‘something 
must be done’ sometimes overtake the administrative (and perhaps bureau-
technocratic) processes of problem-scoping and problem-solving. Thus, in 
domestic jurisdictions the temporal connection between an attack and an 
(often repressive) counter-terrorism law has been remarked upon,13 
sometimes with the attack being presented as proof of both the problem and 
the necessity for the measure in question. Something similar can be seen in 
the EU context, although perhaps not quite as blatantly. However, where the 
Council determines that ‘something must be done’, often in the wake of an 
attack within the Union, the Commission and other agencies of the Union 
have very little option but to make something happen. Once again, using the 
recent Directive on Combating Terrorism as an example may be instructive.  
The momentum for the 2017 Directive originated in October 2014 with 
EU Council Conclusions that referenced emerging concerns around foreign 
terrorist fighters and the need to review the effectiveness of existing 
legislation to respond to this phenomenon, in particular. The European 
                                                     
11 See, for example, R. Sulitzeanu-Kenan, M. Kremnitzer and S. Alon, “Facts, Preferences, 
and Doctrine: An Empirical Analysis of Proportionality Judgment”, Law & Policy Review, 
Vol. 50, No. 2, 2016, p. 348. 
12 See for example F. de Londras (2015), op. cit., p. 204. 
13 For an account see, for example, C. Pantazis and S. Pemberton, “Reconfiguring Security 
and Liberty”, British Journal of Criminology, Vol. 52, No. 3, 2011, p. 1. 
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Commission in January 2015 and the European Parliament in February 2015 
subsequently supported the Council’s recommendations, and on 2 
December 2015, shortly after the terrorist attacks in Paris, the European 
Council and the European Parliament adopted the European Commission’s 
proposal for a Directive on Combating Terrorism. The evidence 
underpinning the proposal was scarce, to say the least.  
Although the then-most-recent Europol EU Terrorism Situation and 
Trend Report at the time indicated that the scale of the problem of foreign 
terrorist fighters was increasing, there was remarkably little empirical 
evidence on which to ground the claim that a specific legal instrument to 
tackle foreign terrorist fighters was needed, or that it should be introduced 
at the EU level. A similarly vague approach to the scale of the problem and 
question of necessity preceded the passage of UN Security Resolution 2178 
(November 2015) and the Additional Protocol to the Council of Europe 
Convention on Combating Terrorism (May 2015), giving effect to that 
Resolution. Here we see also the multi-level nature of compaction, with the 
content of international instruments to which the EU instrument was giving 
effect predetermining much of the approach taken in the policy and design 
phase of the 2017 Directive. Within that context, little or no space was left for 
critical discussions of necessity, scale and rationality; much of the Union’s 
approach was effectively predetermined by politico-legal decisions taken 
elsewhere. 
4.2.3 Compromise 
Of course, it is not always the case that counter-terrorism measures emerge 
from such a process, or have predetermined by politics these key questions 
of necessity and rationality by reference to the scale of the problem. 
However, in some cases it is, and in these cases effective review is difficult 
to undertake as it may require calling into question some decisions that are, 
ultimately, political decisions as to what role the Union should play in 
countering terrorism across its Member States.  
The nature of the Union as both an entity in itself and a collection of 28 
Member States (at least for now) adds a further level of context and 
complexity to the task of asking the right questions. It is in the nature of all 
EU laws that they are, fundamentally, a compromise (or a set of 
compromises) and that the legal instrument (perhaps particularly a 
directive) that is settled on at the Union level will lay out a minimum level 
of agreement between the participating states. The obligation on the Member 
States will then be to implement that minimum standard. Yet, there is no 
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preclusion on using the legal obligation to implement the Directive on 
Combating Terrorism as an opportunity to go beyond what it requires and 
introduce more repressive measures.  
The fact that the Directive must be implemented as a matter of law 
closes out opportunities to challenge the necessity and rationality of the law 
per se at the domestic level, while the information monopolies that exist 
across the security sphere make it difficult to challenge the claims that 
country x needs to go even further than the Directive requires in order to 
tackle the particular dynamics of terrorism in the jurisdiction in question. 
Combined with the regrettable fact that civil society space and the political 
purchase of rights are declining in a number of EU Member States (such as 
Hungary and Poland), this means that the obligation to legislate for 
European law may well become a licence to legislate for repression.  
Any comprehensive review of the effectiveness of EU counter-
terrorism – to be meaningful – must also look at what happens to EU law 
and policy when it ‘leaves’ the European space and ‘enters’ the domestic 
space: What are its (direct and indirect) impacts on domestic legal standards, 
human rights, operational protocols and civil liberties? How is the obligation 
to implement used as an opportunity to advance repressive political 
priorities and positions? What is the practical effect, in the domestic sphere, 
of the European instrument? This must be more than a simple 
implementation review (i.e. a ‘check’ as to whether Member States have 
fulfilled their legal obligation to implement directives) and instead go into 
the substance of implementation. That, however, is clearly challenging, and 
brings us to difficulties arising from the limitations of the EU. 
4.3 Dealing with the limitations of the EU  
When the attacks of 9/11 took place, the EU did not have a body of counter-
terrorism law and policy; now it has an emerging Security Union and a 
substantial acquis in the field. Security-oriented institutions and agencies 
have been developed, from coordination agencies such as Europol and 
Eurojust to dedicated institutional offices such as the EU’s Counter-
Terrorism Coordinator. All of this has happened without a comprehensive 
review of EU counter-terrorism policies having taken place: the system has 
grown and mushroomed, reacting to attacks and risks, innovating for 
efficiency and circumstance, and becoming increasingly embedded across 
multiple areas of the workings of the EU.  
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In that context – when a vast infrastructure and doctrinal acquis has 
developed in a certain area – it can be almost insurmountably difficult to take 
into account the possibility that the system in itself may be insufficient, 
ineffective or inappropriate. Nevertheless, for a comprehensive review to be 
meaningful, surely it must be conducted with an openness to the possibility 
of such an outcome. The review must, to borrow from Susan Marks,14 be 
willing to consider the roots of a problem and then to assess the system’s 
structures, institutions, laws, policies, assumptions and working practices 
against the extent to which it enables Member States to tackle those root 
causes.  
In this context, it means that the review must be conducted with a 
willingness fundamentally to question whether EU law is the appropriate 
mechanism for achieving the meta-objectives and specific objectives of 
counter-terrorism. We must be willing to consider critically the implications 
of a body of law and policy that creates minimum standards and thus 
licenses but does not constrain domestic law-making, in a law and policy field 
that is notoriously susceptible to overreaching, cognitive bias, false positives 
and human rights abuses.  
As a body of law and policy, EU counter-terrorism does nothing to 
constrain overreach at the domestic level while creating irresistible 
imperatives towards domestic legislation – imperatives that can be used to 
justify processes of making law and policy in national parliaments that are 
difficult for civil society to penetrate and influence. This is all the more 
worrying when one considers that it is precisely the ex ante processes of 
impact assessment through which civil society is structurally engaged in the 
policy-making process that may be ‘bypassed’ by the EU institutions in order 
speedily to design and implement measures.15 
4.4 Concluding remarks 
There is a great danger – with a process limited by time, human resources 
and budget – that what is billed as a comprehensive review of EU counter-
terrorism policies will not have the ability to get to the truly knotty questions 
                                                     
14 See S. Marks, “Human Rights and Root Causes”, Modern Law Review, Vol. 74, No. 1, 
2011, p. 57. 
15 On the role of ex ante impact assessment in EU counter-terrorism see F. de Londras 
(2016), op. cit., p. 237. For reasons of ‘urgency’, no ex ante impact assessment was carried 
out for the Directive on Combating Terrorism. See the Explanatory Memorandum to the 
Directive, European Commission, COM(2015), 625 final (2015), op. cit. 
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suggested here that are vital to a true effectiveness analysis. Without doubt, 
those questions are difficult, and may well lead to some uncomfortable 
conclusions. However, the stakes are high, for the EU, for security, for 
fundamental rights, and for the domestic laws and policies throughout the 
Member States that are inevitably impacted by the EU acquis. In such a 
context, and with so much at stake, difficult questions are best addressed. 
Whether the comprehensive review is the vehicle that can and will address 
them remains to be seen. 
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DIANA DAVILA GORDILLO AND  
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adicalisation and counter-radicalisation have been part of the political 
debate in Europe since 2005, when in the aftermath of the London 
bombings of that year the EU launched its counter-terrorism strategy 
under the British presidency of the Council. The strategy was organised 
around four ‘pillars’:1 prevent, protect, pursue and respond. Simultaneously, 
the European Council adopted the “European Union Strategy for Combating 
Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism”, updated in 2014.2 In 
November 2010, the European Commission presented the “EU Internal 
Security Strategy”.3 Subsequently, in January 2014, the Commission 
presented the Communication on “Preventing Radicalisation to Terrorism 
and Violent Extremism: Strengthening the EU’s Response”.4 
The EU’s primary role is to support national initiatives to fight 
terrorism by creating a legal framework for cooperation, providing funding 
                                                     
1 See Council of the European Union, “The European Union Counter-Terrorism 
Strategy”, 14469/4/05, Brussels, 30.11.2005. 
2 Council of the European Union, “The European Union Strategy for Combating 
Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism”, 14781/4/05, Brussels, 24.11.2005; 
“Revised EU Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism”, 
15175/08, Brussels, 14.11.2008; “Revised EU Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and 
Recruitment to Terrorism”, 9956/14, Brussels, 15.1.2014. 
3 See the “EU Internal Security Strategy” (COM(2010) 673 final, Brussels, 22.11.2010), 
endorsed by the Council of the European Union. 
4 European Commission, Communication on “Preventing Radicalisation to Terrorism 
and Violent Extremism: Strengthening the EU’s Response”, COM(2013) 941 final, 
Brussels, 15.1.2014.  
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for internal security and developing common abilities.5 As part of these 
support strategies, in 2011 the European Commission set up the 
Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN, Directorate-General for 
Migration and Home Affairs) as an ‘umbrella network’ to pool expertise, 
knowledge and good practices, with the collaboration of civil society 
members (including victims), local authorities, academics and field experts. 
The RAN is an assistance body for Member States that provides input into 
national policies through policy recommendations. The RAN policy 
recommendations, for instance, were considered in the drafting of the 2014 
“Revised EU Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to 
Terrorism” and the 2014 Commission Communication on preventing 
radicalisation mentioned above.  
In this chapter, we show that the RAN is one of the core institutions 
producing a new European discourse on security, in which terrorism is to be 
governed “through society”.6 The policy recommendations of the RAN 
emphasise that strategies should go beyond traditional law enforcement 
techniques, promoting the empowerment of communities. They require the 
involvement of a wide array of actors, including non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs), experts and front-line practitioners, as well as civil 
society and communities. Furthermore, they call for training for those acting 
‘on the ground’ closer to communities. 
In this chapter, we analyse five aspects of these recommendations and 
how they shape the EU counter-radicalisation response. The chapter 
examines how i) the discourse of the RAN conceives of policy 
recommendations that put communities at the centre of counter-
radicalisation policies; ii) it conceptualises the development of ‘tailor-made’ 
strategies; and iii) it reformulates grievances as mere ‘perceptions’, avoiding 
engagement with factual data. Finally, the chapter shows how the RAN 
relies on the engagement of iv) key individuals and v) front-line practitioners 
tasked with propagating the state-sanctioned narrative about radicalisation, 
with the concomitant exclusion of alternative voices. In conclusion, we show 
how these recommendations promote a state that ‘rules at a distance’, 
                                                     
5 European Commission, “Fighting terrorism at EU level – Fact sheet”, Brussels, 
11.1.2015. 
6 N.S. Rose, Powers of freedom: Reframing political thought, Cambridge, UK and New York, 
NY: Cambridge University Press, 1999. 
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through proxies but which nonetheless is more in control of the situation 
within the communities by having people on the ground.  
5.1 Shifting responsibility from the state to the community 
The RAN policy recommendations justify a shift of responsibilities from the 
state to the communities, a trend characteristic of advanced liberalism.7 At 
the core of this project lies the objective of empowering communities and key 
individuals.8 Communities are construed as the units based upon which 
strategies on counter-radicalisation will be devised.  
Most importantly, from this perspective, communities are defined as 
sources of vulnerability, as sources of possible actors and as the spaces 
within which counter-radicalisation will take place. Locating communities 
at the centre of counter-radicalisation ensures that actions will take place “at 
a level closest to the most susceptible individuals in the most affected 
communities”.9  
As part of the process of putting communities at the centre of counter-
radicalisation, the RAN policy recommendations define radicalisation as a 
local issue that requires local solutions and active communities. Most 
importantly, the RAN asserts that this ‘local issue’ can be contained within 
those communities.  
5.2 “Emotions are more important than evidence” 
To do so, the policy recommendations stress that the grievances considered 
to be root causes of radicalisation are not necessarily factual but only 
perceived or felt by communities. This framing is crucial, because felt or 
perceived grievances can be managed by communities, whereas factual 
grievances require at the very least some action from the state. The policy 
recommendations thus propose strategies that avoid privileging factual or 
cognitive engagement. For instance, the RAN Working Group on Prison and 
Probation (P&P) explains: “Emotions are more important than evidence … 
success is not achieved in counter-narrative terms through evidence, which 
                                                     
7 Ibid. 
8 RAN, Charter of Principles Governing the Activities of the RAN Center of Excellence, 
Brussels, 2011. 
9 Ibid. 
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can always be refuted and countered. Instead, they need to appeal to human 
emotions.”10  
Likewise, the RAN Working Group on Deradicalisation and Exit 
Interventions (RAN DERAD) provides another illustration of this: 
The methodological emphasis is put on emotional learning and 
emotional intelligence rather than cognitive learning and debate 
skills … [G]ood-practice interventions don’t overstress educational 
‘topics’ or ‘historical issues’ as such but instead look for the subjective 
investments placed on them by each participating individual. (Emphasis 
added)11  
Building along the lines of grievances as perceived, the policy 
recommendations emphasise appealing to human emotions and subjective 
investment. Evidence and “historical issues” are downplayed. This type of 
strategy supports the idea of a state that is released from responsibility for 
the grievances faced by communities. At the same time, individuals and 
communities are made responsible for their own grievances. In short, 
communities are increasingly invested with the responsibility of managing 
and containing radicalisation.  
Communities are thus the objects of these policy recommendations, as 
well as the source of subjects who will be engaged and eventually work as 
part of the counter-radicalisation policies. This builds on the notion that 
‘earlier and closer interventions’ are best. Acting at the ‘closest’ level is one 
of the crucial arguments the RAN presents to refocus attention on 
communities. This type of action requires the engagement of local actors. The 
RAN policy recommendations assert that interventions are only possible 
through local actions and the involvement, participation and support of 
these local actors. They are defined as individuals with the ability to stop 
radicalisation within the boundaries of the communities. To do so, however, 
grievances need to be framed as non-factual. Following this line of reasoning, 
the RAN Working Group on Early Intervention and Prevention of 
Radicalisation (RAN PREVENT) states: 
Some of the key drivers for radicalisation are the lack of identity, 
belonging, role models and a sense of participation for the 
                                                     
10 RAN P&P Working Group, “Proposed Policy Recommendations for the High Level 
Conference”, Brussels, December 2012. 
11 RAN DERAD Working Group, “Proposed Policy Recommendations for the High Level 
Conference”, Brussels, December 2012. 
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individual at risk and therefore a consistent, local actor can be key in 
providing for some of those needs and filling those gaps. (Emphasis 
added)12  
According to the working group, a perceived grievance can be addressed or 
a gap “filled” by a community’s actions. This can be done, for instance, 
through the provision of role models, a sense of belonging and participation. 
The RAN policy recommendations hence assert that communities should be 
able to provide for and ‘fill the gaps’ that have caused radicalisation through 
their own actors. 
5.3 Tailor-made strategies 
The RAN policy recommendations insist on the need for ‘tailor-made’ 
strategies that speak to each community in culturally specific ways. This 
approach comprises the inclusion of local actors and communities as 
responsible subjects and implementers of counter-radicalisation strategies. 
An active advocate of tailor-made strategies is the RAN Working Group on 
Voices of Victims of Terrorism (VVT). This group, in one of its policy 
recommendations, stresses the need for culturally specific interventions.13  
The RAN policy recommendations have thus shifted the focus of the 
counter-radicalisation discourse towards communities and the local level. 
However, this focus has not been equally divided among all members of 
communities. In fact, the policy recommendations differentiate between 
members of communities, defining some as “key individuals” or “key 
groups”, while others are defined only as members of communities, or even 
as vulnerable individuals.  
5.4 Key individuals as “trusted Muslims”  
Whereas a reference to local actors seems to imply a widespread opening for 
all members of the community to be engaged, the RAN policy 
recommendations ascertain that the local voices will only be few. The policy 
recommendations have outlined this differentiation since the launch of the 
                                                     
12 RAN PREVENT Working Group, “Proposed Policy Recommendations for the High 
Level Conference”, Brussels, December, 2012. 
13 RAN VVT Working Group, “Proposed Policy Recommendations for the High Level 
Conference”, Brussels, December, 2012. 
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network in 2011, through calls to empower “key groups in vulnerable 
communities”.14 Similarly, the policy recommendations of the RAN 
INT/EXT Working Group on Internal and External Factors stress the 
importance of key individuals in the definition of counter-radicalisation 
strategies. This group asserts that “knowledgeable local actors can 
reconstruct identity and provide a more humanistic point of view to counter 
the individual or group mentality of the radicalised extremist”.15 This 
illustrates how, within communities, a limited number of individuals will be 
treated differently in the process of implementing counter-radicalisation 
policies. Some individuals will be objects of the policies, while others, the 
key groups, will be empowered and more directly engaged. In other words, 
while the majority of the community is regarded as “suspect” some “key 
individuals” will be regarded as “trusted Muslims”.16  
According to the policy recommendations, key individuals are those 
members of the communities who are able to help bridge the connection 
between the greater society and the self-reliant community. Nevertheless, it 
is unclear how these individuals are chosen. The RAN INT/EXT Working 
Group is the only one that advances a definition of who these key individuals 
are and what is expected of them. The working group asserts its duty as 
regards local actors as follows: 
Identify and engage … actors (including spiritual leaders and mass 
organisations such as the Nahdlatul Ulama) that have the 
legitimacy, credibility and expertise necessary to: a) marginalise 
and discredit the narratives associated with violent extremism; and 
b) generate a positive paradigm, which facilitates social harmony 
and cohesion within EU Member States and abroad.17  
Whereas the work that these individuals should do is fairly clear, it is unclear 
how the “legitimacy, credibility and expertise” required of key individuals 
is evaluated. Other working groups, such as RAN PREVENT, limit their 
policy recommendations to stress that key individuals should be aware of 
                                                     
14 See the RAN Charter (2011), op. cit. 
15 RAN INT/EXT Working Group, “Proposed Policy Recommendations for the High 
Level Conference”, Brussels, December 2012. 
16 F. Ragazzi, “Suspect community or suspect category? The impact of counter-terrorism 
as ‘policed multiculturalism”, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, Vol. 42, No. 5, 2016, 
pp. 1-18. 
17 RAN INT/EXT Working Group (2012), op. cit. 
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“wider issues in communities”18 – which is again vague and hard to 
operationalise in practice. The first hint about how key individuals’ 
legitimacy is construed comes from the RAN Police and Law Enforcement 
Working Group (POL). Their document, contrary to what could be expected, 
makes no reference to legitimacy within the community but rather to the 
external recognition these subjects should achieve. The policy 
recommendation states: “Local professionals and communities, in addition 
to better understanding, and acceptance that the phenomenon 
[radicalisation] exists, must also gain sufficient confidence in the police or 
security services.”19 This document thus illustrates that the legitimacy is 
based on the willingness of these individuals to work with the state and that 
their position is dependent on acquiescence to the official discourse about 
radicalisation. It therefore seems that sharing the views of the state is a pre-
condition to be considered a key individual.  
The acceptance of the state narrative implies a connection on the part 
of the key individuals with the state. However, as has been argued, the fact 
that communities have been brought to the centre of counter-radicalisation 
policies implies the state taking a step back. Therefore, this connection takes 
place at the community level with front-line practitioners. According to the 
2014 RAN policy recommendations,  
[l]ocal practitioners can make a difference, as they know their 
citizens and communities best and thus have the opportunity to 
detect worrying signs and act upon them. They can also develop 
tailor-made de-radicalisation or re-socialization programmes … We 
identified relevant practitioners from the following different 
sectors: legal and law enforcement (community/local police 
officers), local governments, youth work, the educational sector, 
(mental) health care and NGOs.20  
5.5 Front-line practitioners to access vulnerable communities 
Front-line, or local, practitioners can be defined as the counterparts of key 
individuals. Key individuals and front-line practitioners have direct access 
to the vulnerable communities and as such are able to develop a certain 
                                                     
18 RAN PREVENT Working Group (2012), op. cit. 
19 RAN POL Working Group, “Proposed Policy Recommendations for the High Level 
Conference”, Brussels, December 2012. 
20 RAN, Report, Cities Conference on Foreign Fighters to Syria, The Hague, 30 January 2014. 
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degree of legitimacy and credibility within communities while at the same 
time being considered legitimate interlocutors by the state. They work 
within the communities, are critical contributors to the tailor-made strategies 
and most importantly are expected to provide insights about the 
communities. As the RAN PREVENT Working Group puts it, “the ones who 
are best positioned are practitioners and volunteers that work ‘on the 
ground’”.21  
The choice of words seems particularly important here. The reference 
to “on the ground” is part of the differentiation the RAN policy 
recommendations make between being part of the community and being 
“outside” it. That is, of being a key individual and being a front-line 
practitioner. This differentiation illustrates the deep and clear division the 
RAN policy recommendations are making between vulnerable communities 
and other communities. 
Front-line practitioners are also the connection between vulnerable 
communities and the state. As with key individuals, a prerequisite for their 
engagement is their acceptance of the state-sanctioned narrative about 
radicalisation and concomitant policies. It follows that the discourse 
articulated within the communities must be unified and standardised. 
Nevertheless, this requires a certain presence of the state, as outlined by the 
RAN DERAD Working Group:  
The deradicalisation intervention delivered by outside non-
governmental practitioners [needs] to be securely embedded in the 
governmental institution and supported through the informed 
assistance of the institution’s statutory employees. Since good-
practice deradicalisation is systemic by nature … the intervention 
needs to be systemically grounded in and complemented by the 
everyday procedures of the institution.22  
Consequently, the vision of the RAN is one in which front-line practitioners 
are directly overseen by the state in order to present a unified and 
standardised discourse. Indeed, front-line practitioners are thus the ones 
making sure that key individuals convey the same discourse carried by the 
state and translated by front-line practitioners for the communities. 
Furthermore, this document from the RAN DERAD Working Group 
establishes a ‘two-tiered’ approach through which counter-radicalisation 
policies are delivered, thereby differentiating between front-liners and 
                                                     
21 RAN PREVENT Working Group (2012), op. cit. 
22 RAN DERAD Working Group (2012), op. cit. 
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governmental institutions. The latter are clearly not directly engaging with 
communities but employing front-liners to carry out their policies.  
Interestingly, the RAN policy recommendations underscore the 
importance of a two-tiered approach based on two arguments. First, that it 
would be counter-productive to introduce into communities an ‘expert’ with 
no rapport or engagement with the communities. The RAN refers to 
“parachuting” an expert into communities and insists on its negative 
effects.23 The reference to “parachuting” has the same effect as the reference 
to “on the ground” previously addressed. It is employed to differentiate the 
actual public spaces of the communities and the state. In addition, the RAN 
also argues that a direct state presence might limit trust and rapport on the 
part of communities towards practitioners. A case in point is the following 
statement: “People feeling marginalized and sometimes alienated by state 
structures will rather accept to work with non-governmental practitioners 
than with authorities.”24  
The second argument of the policy recommendations in favour of the 
two-tiered approach is that direct state intervention may complicate matters 
because of bureaucratic constraints. The following points illustrate this:  
Too much statutory control and regulation … leads to the inhibition 
of creativity and responsiveness of those specialist non-statutory 
organisations … In addition, these organisations [civil society and 
NGOs] are often specifically set up to deliver ‘this’ [build trust, 
delivering intervention and prevention] work. They are therefore 
able to be flexible and responsive in their approach whereas larger, 
more bureaucratic organisations may face greater challenges due to 
the ‘broader’ nature of their function/ role e.g. social workers whose 
remit it is to safeguard – not to provide counter narrative.25  
Clearly the RAN presents arguments to disengage the state from direct 
action. Yet total disengagement does not occur, for, as argued previously, 
those executing policies will have to accept the official discourse and 
reiterate it. Consequently, it is possible to assert that by promoting the 
employment of front-line practitioners the RAN policy recommendations 
legitimise the state taking a step back and implementing a system of 
governance by ‘indirect rule’.  
                                                     
23 RAN PREVENT Working Group (2012), op. cit. 
24 RAN, “Empowering Local Actors to Prevent Violent Extremism”, Discussion Paper for 
the High Level Conference in Brussels, 29 January 2013. 
25 RAN PREVENT Working Group (2012), op. cit. 
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5.6 Concluding remarks: Trusted Muslims and suspect 
communities 
One of the main critiques of counter-radicalisation policies is that they 
produce “suspect communities”.26 According to much of the critical 
literature, ‘suspicion’ under these types of policies is not directly linked to a 
possible wrongdoing but to membership of a particular community. As this 
chapter has shown, however, communities are both the objects and the 
subjects of security practices.27 Counter-radicalisation policies function as 
much through suspicion as they do through trust relations: key figures and 
trusted Muslims are an essential part of the strategy.28 As such, counter-
radicalisation works through more engrained notions of self-management 
and societal involvement in the procurement of security, which has direct 
political effects.  
RAN policy recommendations exemplify the blueprint of counter-
radicalisation as a societal discourse, which locates communities at the 
centre, develops tailor-made strategies, reframes grievances as perceived 
and non-factual, and engages co-opted key individuals and front-line 
practitioners to relay the state-sanctioned narrative about radicalisation, 
with the concomitant exclusion of alternative voices. These processes engage 
communities and disengage the state. In the RAN policy recommendations, 
the state is no longer a visible actor, whereas communities are in turn 
expected to become active, responsive and responsible. Most importantly, 
key individuals function in such a way as to silence voices within the 
communities. The RAN policy recommendations thus promote a state that 
‘rules at a distance’ through proxies but which nonetheless remains more in 
control of the situation within the communities by having people on the 
ground. 
                                                     
26 See S. Body-Gendrot, “Muslims: Citizenship, security and social justice in France”, 
International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice, Vol. 36, No. 4, 2008, pp. 247–256; A. 
Kundnani, Spooked! How not to Prevent Violent Extremism, Institute of Race Relations, 
London, 2009; L. Nouri and A. Whiting, “Prevent and the Internet”, in C. Baker-Beall, C. 
Heath-Kelly and L. Jarvis (eds), Counter-Radicalisation Critical Perspectives, Abingdon: 
Routledge, 2015; and C. Pantazis, and S. Pemberton, “From the ‘old’ to the ‘new’ suspect 
community”, British Journal of Criminology, Vol. 49, No. 5, 2009, pp. 646-666.  
27 C. Heath-Kelly, “Counter-terrorism and the counterfactual: Producing the 
‘radicalisation’ discourse and the UK prevent strategy”, British Journal of Politics and 
International Relations, Vol. 15, No. 3, 2013, pp. 394-415. 
28 Ragazzi (2016), op. cit. 
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nformation exchange in the EU constitutes an essential part of various 
different policies. In many policy fields, information sharing is crucial for 
decision-making but this does not necessarily include the exchange of 
personal information. In certain fields, however, information exchange 
contains vast troves of personal data and therefore affects the rights of 
individuals. The Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ), as it was 
renamed in the Amsterdam Treaty, has seen significant policy developments 
since the late 1990s.  
There has arguably been no other example of a policy area making its 
way so quickly and comprehensively to the centre of the Treaties and to the 
top of the EU’s policy-making agenda.1 In areas related to law enforcement 
and judicial cooperation, such as the AFSJ, horizontal information sharing 
(including the exchange of personal data) has become an essential tool in the 
internal security policy of the EU.2 It is also an essential tool of external 
security. This has helped the creation of a common administrative space and 
                                                     
1 See J. Monar, “Justice and Home Affairs in a Wider Europe: The Dynamics of Inclusion 
and Exclusion”, ESRC ‘One Europe or Several?’ Programme Working Paper 07/00, 
Economic and Social Research Council, Swindon, 2000 (http://www.mcrit.com/ 
scenarios/visionsofeurope/documents/one%20Europe%20or%20Several/J%20Monar
%20.pdf).  
2 F. Boehm, Information Sharing and Data Protection in the Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice: Towards Harmonized Data Protection Principles for Information Exchange at EU-level, 
Berlin and Heidelberg: Springer Verlag, 2012, p. 1. 
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effective policy implementation while avoiding the creation of a large, 
centralised EU government.3  
Data sharing is the opposite of ‘stove piping’ and implies that existing 
data are shared among multiple users for efficiency reasons and the desire 
to achieve more effective decision-making. It is closely associated with 
intelligence reform in response to changing and often accentuated security 
threats or apparent failures of intelligence, regarding collection, sharing or 
analysis. Interoperability implies not only full availability but also inter-
connections between different systems and actors. It refers to the ability of 
information systems to exchange (personal) data and to enable the sharing 
of information.4 
The interoperability-based mechanisms of data exchange in the AFSJ 
share many of the traits of what is usually termed as Europe’s composite 
administration. Composite administration is a concept that seeks to bring 
into balance “autonomy, mutual considerateness and the ability to 
undertake common action”.5  
The term is usually employed to describe the networked character of 
relations between the various regional, national and supranational levels of 
administration in the EU. Some versions of the concept of composite 
administration have convincingly demonstrated that Europe’s multilevel 
administrative system is also increasingly connected to international levels 
                                                     
3 D.-U. Galetta, H. Hofmann and J.-P. Schneider, “Information Exchange in the European 
Administrative Union: An Introduction”, European Public Law, Vol. 20, No. 65, 2014, p. 
68. 
4 European Commission, High-Level Expert Group on Information Systems and 
Interoperability, “First Meeting – 20 June 2016, Report”, Brussels, 27 June 2016, p. 6 
(http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regexpert/index.cfm?do=groupDetail.groupDetail
Doc&id=24078&no=1); European Commission, High-Level Expert Group on 
Information Systems and Interoperability, “Scoping Paper”, Brussels, June 2016 
(http://statewatch.org/news/2016/sep/eu-com-hleg-interoperability-info-systems-
scoping-paper-6-16.pdf). 
5 E. Schmidt-Aßmann, “Einleitung: Der Europäische Verwaltungsverbund und die Rolle 
des Europäischen Verwaltungsrechts”, in E. Schmidt-Aßmann and B. Schöndorf-
Haubold (eds), Der Europäische Verwaltungsverbund, Heidelberg: Mohr Siebeck Verlag, 
2005, p. 7. 
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of governance.6 As the possibilities for transnational security mechanisms 
have expanded in recent decades, it is unsurprising that composite 
administration, in interoperable networks, has come to include also 
cooperation with third states. 
The acceleration and intensification of databases at the EU level goes 
hand in glove with the concern to preserve the states’ control over what 
occurs in their territories while maintaining a European space without 
internal borders. The EU’s powers in security are exercised by a wide array 
of institutions and a growing number of agencies and administrative bodies. 
The Hague programme of 2004 placed greater emphasis on the exchange of 
information between EU agencies and the interoperability of databases,7 
particularly in the context of migration management.8 Intelligence networks 
in the AFSJ result from the policy of interoperability. They are composed of 
quite different types of EU legal entities: independent EU agencies (Europol, 
Frontex), large police and immigration databases (Schengen and the Visa 
Information System, VIS). The various nodes are multi-level, multi-actor and 
can span both the public and private sectors. Ballaschk has helpfully distilled 
two different levels of networks: vertical (basically the EU agencies and 
bodies) and horizontal (Prüm Treaty and passenger name records) as well as 
the ‘intermediate’ information systems (eu-LISA, Schengen, VIS, Eurodac 
and Customs).9  
The question of interoperability has been most sensitive regarding 
access to the VIS and Eurodac. Both databases were primarily designed as 
instruments of migration control. Law enforcement agencies at the national 
and EU levels have attempted to utilise migration control practices to abet 
counter-terrorism activities. In particular, there is evidence that systems for 
monitoring and gathering data on migrants have been harnessed as part of 
                                                     
6 A. von Bogdandy and P. Dann, “International Composite Administration: 
Conceptualizing Multi-Level and Network Aspects in the Exercise of International 
Public Authority”, German Law Journal, Vol. 9, 2008, pp. 2013, 2015. 
7 Boehm (2012), op. cit., p. 7. 
8 V. Mitsilegas, “The Borders Paradox: The Surveillance of Movement 
in a Union without Internal Frontiers”, in H. Lindahl (ed.), A Right to Inclusion and 
Exclusion? Normative Fault Lines of the EU’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, Oxford: 
Hart Publishing, 2009, p. 55. 
9 J. Ballaschk, “Interoperability of Intelligence Networks in the European Union: An 
analysis of the policy of Interoperability in the EU’s Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice and its compatibility with the right to data protection”, PhD thesis, University of 
Copenhagen, 2015. 
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the EU’s anti-terrorism strategy. Migration data was long declared essential 
for law enforcement and counterterrorism purposes and national security 
agencies were granted access to pre-existing databases as well as to a 
growing number of new databases and data collection schemes in this area. 
6.1 Interoperable EU databases: Security of the interstice 
The use of new information and communication technologies in the AFSJ in 
the form of information systems has spiralled in recent decades, as witnessed 
by the recent creation of a new EU agency specifically to manage these 
information systems: eu-LISA, the European agency for the operational 
management of large-scale IT systems in the AFSJ. In its own words, it 
“strives to support and facilitate European policies in the area of justice, 
security and freedom. It proactively supports and promotes effective 
cooperation and information exchange between relevant EU law 
enforcement bodies by ensuring the uninterrupted operation of large-scale 
IT systems”.10 These information systems vary greatly in their degree of 
complexity and formality. In the EU, a layered approach has been followed. 
New or enhanced EU bodies (or specific databases) intended to promote 
information sharing among the law enforcement and security agencies of its 
Member States (through Europol, Eurodac and Schengen) have seen their 
powers boosted considerably (for example, Europol and Eurojust). More 
recently, new agencies have been set up (the European Border and Coast 
Guard) or discussed (an EU intelligence agency). 
The EU has actively attempted to facilitate and encourage information 
sharing among the Member States by developing the principle of 
availability.11 According to this principle, information needed for law 
enforcement purposes by the authorities of one EU Member State should be 
made available by the authorities of another Member State, subject to certain 
conditions. The Hague programme of 2004 placed greater emphasis on the 
                                                     
10 See the eu-LISA website, “Mandate and Activities” (http://www.eulisa.europa.eu/ 
AboutUs/MandateAndActivities/Pages/default.asp). 
11 J.D. Occhipinti, “Availability by Stealth? EU Information-sharing in Transatlantic 
Perspective”, in C. Kaunert and S. Léonard (eds), European Security, Terrorism and 
Intelligence: Tackling New Security Challenges in Europe, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2013, pp. 143, 144. 
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exchange of information between EU agencies and the interoperability of 
databases,12 particularly in the context of migration management.13  
Mitsilegas commented that the emphasis on enabling the flow of data 
between EU databases or EU agencies and bodies in order to enhance the 
exchange of personal data is often justified on the basis of the ‘war on 
terror’.14 As Ballaschk puts it, “[t]he history of the development of a 
supranational EU justice and home affairs policy is a history of institutional 
and political interoperability”.15 Interoperability is a more general and less 
passive term than availability that implies not only full availability but also 
interconnections between different systems and actors. It refers to the ability 
of information systems to exchange data and to enable the sharing of 
information.16 It fits within an accentuated trend in recent years towards 
more institutional and organisational interoperability in law enforcement 
and intelligence in the EU and globally.  
In a recent Commission Communication on “Stronger and Smarter 
Information Systems for Borders and Security”, for example, the 
Commission highlighted the recent terrorist attacks in Paris and Brussels and 
the need to improve the interoperability of information systems as a long-
term objective.17 To achieve these objectives, the Commission set up a High-
Level Expert Group on Information Systems and Interoperability, which has 
been given the task of assessing different options for achieving 
interoperability and of identifying any gaps and shortcomings of 
information systems at the European level.18 The expert group recently 
published a report of its first meeting and the challenges that lie ahead, but 
no mention was made of the legal framework applicable to data protection 
                                                     
12 See European Council, “The Hague Programme: Strengthening freedom, security and 
justice in the European Union”, OJ C 53/1, 3.3.2005; see also Boehm (2012), op. cit., p. 7. 
13 Mitsilegas (2009), op. cit., p. 55. 
14 Ibid. p. 54. 
15 Ballaschk (2015), op. cit., pp. 38-39. 
16 European Commission, High-Level Expert Group on Information Systems and 
Interoperability, “Scoping Paper” (2016), op. cit. 
17 European Commission, “Stronger and Smarter Information Systems for Borders and 
Security”, COM(2016) 205 final, Brussels, 6.4.2016, p. 2. 
18 Ibid., p. 15. 
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in information exchanges between EU agencies.19 The expert group appears 
to be more centred on enhancing interoperability, further cooperation and 
the technical requirements.20  
The Commission nonetheless emphasised the importance of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights and in particular the new data-protection 
reform instruments in addressing current gaps and shortcomings in the EU 
as regards data management for border control and security. The 
Commission holds that the principles of the Charter and EU data protection 
legislation will “guide the Commission” and ensure that the “further 
development of information systems in these areas will be in line with the 
highest standards of data protection”.21 For now such words are mere pious 
aspirations that have no grounding in concrete data protection requirements 
nor in any readily comprehensible way for data subjects to challenge the 
exchange of their personal data and the use to which it is subsequently put. 
6.2 In search of transparency and accountability: Pie in the sky? 
The visible part of the EU pushes for “a strong Europe in a world of 
uncertainties”.22 One of the key challenges facing Europe is “to ensure the 
security of our citizens confronted with growing external and internal 
threats”. In the EU, the ‘dignified’ institutions (the European Council, 
Council of the EU, European Parliament and national parliaments) will all 
have a visible role to play should a European defence union of sorts come to 
pass with military headquarters and joint defence forces.  
Yet the focus of this chapter is on concealed security governance. In a 
policy area like the AFSJ, the need for a careful balance between EU-wide 
security interests and the demands of national sovereignty, might 
recommend not giving public opinion the impression that the EU is 
extensively involved in security matters. The area of security and law 
enforcement is where information gathering, mining and interoperable 
                                                     
19 European Commission, High-Level Expert Group on Information Systems and 
Interoperability, “First Meeting – 20 June 2016, Report” (2016), op. cit. 
20 See for example the High-Level Expert Group on Information Systems and 
Interoperability, “Scoping Paper” (2016), op. cit. 
21 European Commission, COM(2016) 205 final (2016), op. cit., p. 5. 
22 This is the core joint ambition of the French and German foreign ministries for the post-
Brexit EU, in a joint paper with this title by Jean-Marc Ayrault and Frank-Walter 
Steinmeier of September 2016. 
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sharing is very largely invisible but at the same time subject to accelerated 
and intensified cooperation. It makes use of vast networks of ‘data cops’ to 
do its ‘efficient’ work. The problem is, how do we make the invisible 
transparent? And how do we make informal, unseen and multijurisdictional 
arrangements accountable?  
A network that straddles multiple organisations and jurisdictions 
gives rise to specific problems that are not the same as those for formal 
institutions. The boundaries of networks are inevitably amorphous with 
fluctuating membership and relationships, and they will generally not have 
their own formal powers or even necessarily formal routines. In one specific 
respect security networks are like an organisation: “its members are all 
members of organizations, and the behaviour of network members is 
conditioned by the patterns of behaviour common to their organizations”.23 
Informal expectations are powerful within the network. In the words of 
Glennon, “members are thus counted on, for example, to exhibit loyalty to 
existing decisions, avoid publicly embarrassing other members of the 
network, and demonstrate fidelity to commonly shared values and 
assumptions”.24 
What can, if anything, be done to improve visibility and 
accountability? There are different layers to consider in thinking further 
about possible directions for improvements. One approach is to tone up the 
‘dignatarian’ muscles, for example by deleting or amending the national 
security exception (Art. 4(1) TEU), or by narrowing the scope of or limiting 
formal secrecy requirements in security (adopting an EU secrets law as 
earlier proposed).25 But such stopgap measures are unlikely to be widely 
adopted or fruitful even if they were more likely to happen in practice. 
Another approach in thinking further about ways of challenging the 
lack of transparency and accountability is through the principle of legality 
and the rule of law. As Kaarlo Tuori points out, one of the normative 
problems of the EU’s “security constitution” is that AFSJ provisions treat 
individuals as “passive recipients of collective security goods rather than 
active citizens or bearers of rights” who “enter the focus of security measures 
                                                     
23 M.J. Glennon, National Security and Double Government, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2015, pp. 86-87. 
24 Ibid., p. 87. 
25 For example, in my inaugural address at the University of Amsterdam in 2011: “Top 
Secret Europe” (Inaugural Lecture 415, University of Amsterdam, 2011). 
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primarily as security risks whose characteristics, propensities and actions 
must be surveyed and recorded”. In this sense, Tuori concludes, the EU’s 
security constitution treats individuals as objects of surveillance, as 
replaceable members of a group rather than citizens, and therefore risks 
leading to their “de-individualization”.26 In this light, the need to ensure that 
fundamental rights are observed becomes even more pressing. 
What can the affected individuals do themselves? Despite the fact that 
it is their personal data that is concerned, there is very little that affected 
individuals can do. They will very rarely know that information about them 
is entered into a database or of any causal link with any subsequent action 
or decision in their regard. There is hardly access to justice in the sense of an 
ability to bring a case. Of course, law enforcement is always a special case to 
some extent when it comes to data gathering and data sharing. The need for 
confidentiality, even of secrecy, is clear certainly when it comes to ongoing 
or planned prosecutions. Still, when not only national cops, but also national 
border guards and intelligence officers access personal data that was entered 
for a concise and different purpose we need to recall the “forgotten purpose” 
of purpose limitation.27 The reason this matters is that data cops “do not 
regulate truck widths or set train schedules. They have the capability of 
radically and permanently altering the political and legal contours of our 
society.”28 
 
                                                     
26 K. Tuori, European Constitutionalism, Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 
2015, p. 317. 
27 E. Brouwer, “Legality and Data Protection Law: The Forgotten Purpose of Purpose 
Limitation”, in L.F.M. Besselink, F. Pennings and S. Prechal (eds), The Eclipse of the 
Legality Principle in the European Union, Alphen aan de Rijn: Kluwer Law International, 
2011. 
28 M.J. Glennon, “Investigating Intelligence Activities: The Process of Getting Information 
for Congress”, in T.M. Franck (ed.), The Tethered Presidency: Congressional Restraints on 
Executive Power, New York, NY: New York University Press, 1981, p. 52. 
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7. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND THE 
EXCHANGE OF PERSONAL DATA: 
SAFEGUARDING TRUST AND 
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 
EVELIEN BROUWER 
7.1 Introduction 
Recurring terrorist attacks in cities in Europe, but also elsewhere, establish 
the necessity of timely and effective cooperation among the different 
authorities involved in preventing terrorism and serious crimes. This 
cooperation requires, first of all, mutual knowledge about the competent 
organisations or agencies in other states and the existing networks and 
contact channels between the states involved, to allow swift and reliable 
exchange of information. Second, in order to ensure the willingness to 
cooperate and to share information, international cooperation can only be 
based on mutual trust between these states. This trust concerns the reliability 
and accuracy of the information to be shared, but also the lawfulness of data 
processing and the protection of fundamental rights in the different states 
involved.  
When dealing with the cooperation between EU states, mutual trust is 
considered a fundamental principle underlying such cooperation in the Area 
of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ). Yet the case law of the Court of 
Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has underlined that even if trust with 
regard to the protection of fundamental rights and EU law can be assumed, 
there is no such principle of “blind trust”.1 In the case of evidence concerning 
                                                     
1 See E. Brouwer and D. Gerard (eds), “Mapping Mutual Trust: Understanding and 
Framing the Role of Mutual Trust in EU Law”, EUI Working Paper MWP 2016/13, 
European University Institute, Florence (http://cadmus.eui.eu/). See also the different 
contributions to the special section on “Mutual Recognition and Mutual Trust – 
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a breach in the protection of fundamental rights in another EU state, such 
evidence may rebut trust, and thus block cooperation, also with regard to 
the exchange of personal information.2  
Whereas there is ongoing discussion about the threshold to apply for 
the evidence necessary to substantiate the ‘rebuttable presumption’ of 
mutual trust between EU states, it seems clear that when dealing with 
cooperation between the EU and third states, this threshold must certainly 
be lower. Unlike within the EU, the cooperation between the EU and third 
states is not built upon shared values and fundamental principles, the 
harmonisation of law and procedural guarantees, or mechanisms for 
cooperation and supervision. Therefore, as underlined by the CJEU in the 
case law described below, the adoption of agreements with third countries, 
and more specifically agreements on data sharing, must include further and 
more detailed rules on the protection of fundamental rights.  
Since the terrorist attacks in the US in September 2001, many 
instruments have been adopted within the legal framework of the EU 
dealing with the collection and exchange of personal information. Aside 
from those resulting in large-scale data collection on third-country nationals 
(such as the Schengen Information System (SIS) II, Visa Information System 
(VIS) and Eurodac), these measures also involve the exchange of information 
between judicial and law enforcement authorities (through Europol, 
Eurojust and the Prüm Treaty) and the adoption of agreements on data 
transfers between the EU and third states. The cooperation between the EU 
and third states involves among others the exchange of passenger data with 
the US, Canada and Australia, and cooperation between the US government 
and Europol for the purpose of the Terrorist Financing Tracking Program 
(TFTP).3 During the negotiations preceding the adoption of these 
                                                     
Reinforcing EU Integration?”, in European Papers – A Journal on Law and Integration, Vol. 
1, No. 3, 2016, and Vol. 2, No. 1, 2017. 
2 Already in 2006, the CJEU found that with regard to entry bans reported in the 
Schengen Information System (SIS), the refusal of entry to third-country nationals who 
were spouses of EU citizens could not automatically be based on the SIS information, but 
required the further exchange of information between the reporting and the executing 
state. See CJEU, Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 31 January 2006 in Case C-
503/03, Commission v Kingdom of Spain.  
3 An analysis of many of these measures is provided in D. Bigo, E. Brouwer, S. Carrera, 
E. Guild, E.-P. Guittet, J. Jeandesboz, F. Ragazzi and A. Scherrer, “The EU Counter-
Terrorism Policy Responses to the Attacks in Paris: Towards an EU Security and Liberty 
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agreements, concerns were raised by the European Parliament, different 
non-governmental organisations, and the national and EU supervisory data-
protection authorities, addressing the level of data protection in the third 
state and the scope of legal protection of the data subjects involved. Because 
of these concerns, together with the scrutinising role of the CJEU (on the 
basis of which, for example, the EU–US Agreement on Passenger Name 
Records (PNR) of 2004 was annulled), the negotiations on these agreements 
were painstakingly long, requiring both a diplomatic and a stringent 
position by the European Commission.4 The adoption in December 2016 of 
the EU–US Umbrella Agreement, entering into force in February 2017, was 
presented by Věra Jourová, Commissioner for Justice, Consumers and 
Gender Equality, as a “common transatlantic privacy framework based on 
high standards with the USA”, supporting and facilitating “law enforcement 
cooperation by building trust and legal certainty for data transfers”.5  
In case law dealing with the mass collection of personal data and data 
transfer to third states, the CJEU has defined important criteria that, as 
argued above, at least should be taken into account when dealing with 
agreements on the transfer of personal data between third states and the EU.6 
On the basis of this case law and the new EU data protection rules entering 
into force in 2018, this chapter will address the following standards: 
necessity and proportionality, transparency or the principle of purpose 
limitation, and the right to legal remedies. It will submit that these standards 
                                                     
Agenda”, CEPS Policy Brief No. 81, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, 
February 2015. 
4 See CJEU, Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 30 May 2006 in Joined Cases C-
317/04 and C-318/04, European Parliament v Council and Commission, annulling Decision 
2004/496/EC – Agreement between the European Community and the United States of 
America – Passenger Name Records of air passengers transferred to the United States 
Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (adopted on the wrong legal basis, Art. 95 EC, 
on the internal market). See also the new Agreement of 14 December 2011, published in 
OJ L 215/5, 11.8.2012. 
5 See V. Jourová, “EU–US data flows and data protection: Opportunities and challenges 
in the digital era”, speech delivered in Washington, D.C. on 31 March 2017 
(SPEECH/17/826), Press Release, European Commission, Brussels. 
6 See also on the implications of the CJEU’s case law in I. Nesterova, “Crisis of Privacy 
and Sacrifice of Personal Data in the Name of National Security: The CJEU Rulings 
Strengthening EU Data Protection Standards”, ESIL Conference Paper No. 11/2016, 
European Society of International Law Annual Conference in Riga, 8–10 September 2016 
(http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2911999&download=yes). 
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should be the among the guiding principles during, but also before starting 
negotiations with a third state for the purpose of sharing personal 
information. Furthermore, the chapter will address some lack of clarity and 
possible gaps in protection under the Umbrella Agreement, also taking into 
account the risks of onward transfers by the third state to other non-EU 
states.  
7.2 Necessity and proportionality 
In early case law, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) made clear 
that the collection, storage and processing of personal information falls 
within the scope of the right to privacy as protected in Art. 8 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), irrespective of whether this 
information is subsequently used or not.7 Art. 8(2) ECHR prescribes that 
every limitation to the right to privacy should be in accordance with the law 
and necessary in a democratic society for one of the goals specified in Art. 
8(2). In EU law, the right to privacy has been included in Art. 7 of the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights, and read together with Art. 52(1) of the 
Charter, these provisions further require that each limitation should be in 
accordance with the principle of proportionality.  
According to the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) of 2016, 
which will be applicable from 2018, the processing of personal data shall only 
be lawful for the grounds specified in its Art. 6.8 Dealing with the execution 
of public tasks, this provision entails that the processing must be “necessary 
for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the 
exercise of official authority vested in the controller”. Except for the 
situations described in para. 2, Art. 9 prohibits the processing of special 
categories of personal data, such as racial or ethnic origin, religious or 
philosophical belief and biometric data. Furthermore, the Data Protection 
Directive 2016/680 dealing with the processing of data for law enforcement 
purposes and which was to be implemented in 2016, provides in Arts 35-40 
                                                     
7 ECtHR, Amann v Switzerland, Application no. 27798/95, 16 February 2000. 
8 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 
2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data 
and on the free movement of such data, OJ L 119, 4.5.2016. 
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further requirements specifically dealing with the transfer of personal data 
to third states.9  
The aforementioned conditions on data transfers to third states must 
be read and applied in conformity with the fundamental rights of privacy 
and data protection and the criteria defined on the basis of these rights by 
the ECtHR and the CJEU. More specifically, the conclusions formulated by 
the CJEU in the cases of Digital Rights Ireland in 2014 and Schrems in 2015 
should be considered basic criteria to be fulfilled by the EU legislator 
whenever negotiating agreements with third states.10 In the judgment in 
Digital Rights Ireland, the CJEU annulled the Data Retention Directive 
2006/24, because its implementation would risk violating the rights in Arts 
7 and 8 of the Charter. In its case law, the CJEU referred explicitly to the case 
law of the ECtHR, dealing with Art. 8 ECHR.11  
In its judgment in Digital Rights Ireland, the reasons the CJEU gave for 
finding the Data Retention Directive in violation of Arts 7 and 8 of the 
Charter were related to the following grounds.12 First, the Directive was not 
considered in compliance with the principle of proportionality, as it would 
entail processing the data of practically the entire European population, 
involving persons without any link to criminal prosecution. Second, the 
Directive did not include prior review by a court or independent body to 
determine whether access is strictly necessary. Third, the CJEU found that 
the Directive established a “general absence of limits” with regard to 
authorities having access to data and subsequent use, or abuse. Fourth, the 
time limits as provided in the Directive would not be circumscribed to what 
is strictly necessary.  
Applying these standards to third-country agreements, such as the 
Umbrella Agreement, but also to future agreements, this means that at the 
least the following criteria must be met, taking into account the principle of 
                                                     
9 Directive (EU) 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 
on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by 
competent authorities for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection or 
prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, and on the free 
movement of such data, OJ L 119/89, 4.5.2016. 
10 See CJEU, Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 8 April 2014 in Case C-293/12, 
Digital Rights Ireland Ltd v Minister for Communications, Marine and Natural Resources and 
Others; see also CJEU, Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 6 October 2015 in C-
362/14, Maximillian Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner. 
11 See Case C-293/12 (supra), paras 35 and 55. 
12 Ibid., paras 57-68. 
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necessity and proportionality. They should not include provisions allowing 
for the blanket and unspecified processing or transfer of personal 
information, involving large groups of citizens without any link to an 
individual suspicion or criminal investigation. Prior to the adoption of the 
agreement, the national and European data protection supervisors must be 
involved, assessing the necessity of the measure at stake. Furthermore, the 
agreement must provide specified and clear rules, limiting both the data 
retention of processed data, as well as the access and use by authorities, to 
what is strictly necessary. This latter requirement is closely related to the 
principle of purpose limitation, which is developed further in the next 
section.  
7.3 Purpose limitation – Transparency 
The requirement of transparency when dealing with data collection and data 
sharing follows not only from the right to privacy as included in Art. 8 ECHR 
and Art. 7 of the Charter, but is also to be considered one of the central 
principles of data protection law: the principle of purpose limitation.13 
Within the context of EU law, the right to data protection has been 
recognised as a separate fundamental right in Art. 8 of the Charter. The 
explicit inclusion of the principle of purpose limitation in Art. 8(2) of the 
Charter underlines that this is to be regarded as an intrinsic part of the right 
of data protection.  
The principle of purpose limitation is included in Arts 5(1)(b) and 6 of 
the GDPR. According to Art. 5(1)(b), personal data may only be collected for 
“specific, explicit, and legitimate purposes and not further processed in a 
manner incompatible with those purposes”. Furthermore, Art. 5(1)(c) of the 
GDPR explicitly refers to the principle of data minimisation, providing that 
personal data should be “adequate, relevant, and limited to what is 
necessary in relation to the purposes for which they are processed”.  
Elsewhere, we have described the different layers of the principle of 
purpose limitation, including the ban on “aimless data collection” and the 
obligation of purpose specification.14 The first entails a material limitation of 
                                                     
13 See Art. 5 of the Data Protection Convention of the Council of Europe of 28 January 
1981, ETS, No. 108.  
14 E. Brouwer, “Legality and Data Protection Law: The Forgotten Purpose of Purpose 
Limitation”, in L.F.M. Besselink, F. Pennings and S. Prechal (eds), The Eclipse of Legality 
Principle in the European Union, Alphen aan de Rijn: Kluwer Law International, 2011, pp. 
273-294. 
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the power to collect and process personal information, the second is an 
obligation to lay down in clear and transparent rules which data are to be 
collected or processed for which purposes. In different judgments, the 
ECtHR has clarified that “in accordance with the law”, as stipulated as a 
condition in Art. 8(2) ECHR, means that the law allowing the use or 
collection of personal information must be accessible to the individual 
concerned and its consequences predictable.15  
Dealing with the use of secret police files by the Swedish special police 
service in the famous Leander case, the ECtHR recognised that in cases of 
national security, the requirement of predictability cannot be the same as 
that applied to general cases.16 However, the ECtHR made clear that “the 
law has to be sufficiently clear in its terms to give them an adequate 
indication as to the circumstances in which, and the conditions on which, the 
public authorities are empowered to this secret and potentially dangerous 
interference to private life”.  
In 2008, assessing the UK’s Interception of Communication Act in the 
Liberty v UK judgment, the ECtHR explicitly rejected the government’s 
submission that when considering the requirement of a specific and clear 
legal basis, there would be a difference between intercepting the 
communication of targeted individuals and general surveillance schemes. 
More specifically, “[t]he Court does not consider that there is any ground to 
apply different principles concerning the accessibility and clarity of the rules 
governing the interception of individual communications, on the one hand, 
and more general programmes of surveillance, on the other”.17  
Unlike its predecessor, Directive 95/46/EC, the GDPR does not refer 
explicitly to the right to privacy, nor to Art. 8 ECHR. However, Art. 1(2) 
specifies that this Regulation “protects fundamental rights and freedoms of 
natural persons and in particular their right to the protection of personal 
data”. In different decisions, the CJEU has underlined the close relationship 
between the right to privacy and data protection.18 The necessary condition 
                                                     
15 See ECtHR, Huvig and Kruslin v France, Application nos 11801/85 and 11105/84, 24 
April 1990, and Malone v UK, Application no. 8691/79, 2 August 1984. 
16 ECtHR, Leander v Sweden, 26 March 1987, paras 50-51. 
17 ECtHR, Liberty v UK, Application no. 58243/00, 1 July 2008, para. 61-63. 
18 CJEU, Judgment of the Court of 20 May 2003 in Cases C-465/00, Rechnungshof v 
Österreichischer Rundfunk and Others, and Christa Neukomm (C-138/01) and Joseph 
Lauermann (C-139/01), paras 68-71. 
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of transparent and specified rules, following from the protection of Arts 7 
and 8 of the Charter, was underlined by the CJEU in its judgment in Digital 
Rights Ireland, in which the CJEU invalidated the Data Retention Directive.19 
According to the CJEU,  
the EU legislation in question must lay down clear and precise rules 
governing the scope and application of the measure in question and 
imposing minimum safeguards so that the persons whose data have 
been retained have sufficient guarantees to effectively protect their 
personal data against the risk of abuse and against any unlawful 
access and use of that data.  
Referring to earlier case law of the ECtHR applying Art. 8 ECHR, the CJEU 
stressed that the “need for such safeguards is all the greater where, as laid 
down in Directive 2006/24, personal data are subjected to automatic 
processing and where there is a significant risk of unlawful access to those 
data”. 
The aforementioned principles, and interpretation by the CJEU, imply 
that new instruments for data processing and data sharing, including 
agreements with third states, must provide clear rules defining the scope and 
content of the powers at stake. Furthermore, purpose limitation prohibits the 
blanket and unspecified sharing of data between authorities in the EU, and 
between the EU and third states. This also requires using precise definitions, 
and ensuring a harmonised interpretation and implementation of mutual 
agreements. For example, when including definitions for terms such as 
‘terrorist events’ or ‘serious crimes’, if not further defined, these terms may 
be considered too vague and too open for a different interpretation to 
provide a sufficient and reliable basis for mutual exchange of information. 
Even if lower standards with regard to predictability may apply when it 
comes to internal security measures, the ECtHR made clear that both the 
circumstances and the conditions on the basis of which personal information 
may be processed for these purposes should be ‘sufficiently clear’. Dealing 
with third-country agreements where the risk of unlawful access might be 
larger, further safeguards are necessary.  
Finally, EU agreements with third states must be adopted on a clear 
legal basis and published in official journals, and substantive information 
                                                     
19 See Digital Rights Ireland (Case C-293/12), op. cit., paras 54-55, where the CJEU also 
refers to the judgments of the ECtHR dealing with Art. 8 ECHR, including the Liberty v 
UK judgment. 
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with regard to the scope and implementation of third-country agreements 
should be submitted to the European Parliament and national parliaments. 
Only this allows parliaments and individuals to assess the legality of an 
agreement and prevents a lack of clarity about which state or organisation is 
to be held accountable for the implementation of the agreement.20  
7.4 Access to effective legal remedies 
The right to an effective judicial remedy is protected in Art. 47 of the Charter 
and more specifically with regard to data processing in Art. 79 of the 
GDPR.21 In addition, dealing with data relating to criminal convictions and 
offences “or related security measures”, Art. 10 of the GDPR provides that 
this data processing may only be carried out “under the control of official 
authority” or when the processing is authorised by EU or national law 
providing for “appropriate safeguards for the rights and freedoms of data 
subjects”. The GDPR provides for a more extended role of national 
supervisory authorities and the European Data Protection Supervisory 
Board (replacing the current European Data Protection Supervisor).  
In the Schrems judgment, the CJEU emphasised the importance of the 
right to effective judicial protection:  
legislation not providing for any possibility for an individual to 
pursue legal remedies in order to have access to personal data 
relating to him, or to obtain the rectification or erasure of such data, 
does not respect the essence of the fundamental right to effective 
judicial protection, as enshrined in Article 47 of the Charter. The first 
paragraph of Article 47 requires everyone whose rights and 
freedoms guaranteed by the law of the European Union are violated 
to have the right to an effective remedy before a tribunal in 
compliance with the conditions laid down in that article. The very 
                                                     
20 That is to avoid a gap of legal protection as recently established in view of the EU–
Turkey deal on the relocation of asylum seekers from the EU to Turkey and vice versa. 
Here, the General Court declared itself not competent to assess the human rights 
implications of this agreement, considering it was not an EU treaty – see the Order of the 
General Court of 28 February 2017 in Case T-192/16, NF v European Council.  
21 Art. 79 of the GDPR states that “each data subject shall have the right to an effective 
judicial remedy where he or she considers that his or her rights under this Regulation 
have been infringed as a result of the processing of his or her personal data in non-
compliance with this Regulation”. 
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existence of effective judicial review designed to ensure compliance 
with provisions of EU law is inherent in the existence of the rule of 
law.22  
Furthermore, in Digital Rights Ireland, when annulling the Data Retention 
Directive because of violation of Arts 7 and 8 of the Charter, the CJEU 
scrutinised the lack of access to any independent review. According to the 
CJEU,  
the access by the competent national authorities to the data retained 
is not made dependent on a prior review carried out by a court or 
by an independent administrative body whose decision seeks to 
limit access to the data and their use to what is strictly necessary for 
the purpose of attaining the objective pursued and which intervenes 
following a reasoned request of those authorities submitted within 
the framework of procedures of prevention, detection or criminal 
prosecutions. Nor does it lay down a specific obligation on Member 
States designed to establish such limits.23  
Moreover, the CJEU found that  
it should be added that that directive does not require the data in 
question to be retained within the European Union, with the result 
that it cannot be held that the control, explicitly required by Article 
8(3) of the Charter, by an independent authority of compliance with 
the requirements of protection and security … is fully ensured. Such 
a control, carried out on the basis of EU law, is an essential 
component of the protection of individuals with regard to the 
processing of personal data.24  
In other words, the CJEU regarded the lack of independent control and 
safeguards ensuring the security and compliance with data protection rules 
in a third state to which personal data would be transferred from controllers 
or authorities within the EU, as a violation of Art. 8 of the Charter.  
 Considering the EU–US Umbrella Agreement, it is questionable 
whether the individual right of access to legal remedies and the supervisory 
role of data protection authorities is sufficiently and effectively safeguarded. 
In the first place, the scope of protection provided by the Umbrella 
Agreement seems to be limited. This Agreement has been approved by EU 
negotiators under the condition of the US legislator adopting the Judicial 
                                                     
22 See Schrems (Case C-362/14), op. cit., para. 95. 
23 See Digital Rights Ireland (Case C-293/12), op. cit., para. 62. 
24 Ibid., para. 68. 
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Redress Act, as this would ensure that data subjects whose data would be 
transferred from the EU to the US would have access to legal remedies.  
However, the text of the Judicial Redress Act, adopted in February 
2016 by the US Congress, only offers citizens of designated countries access 
to civil remedies, in accordance with the US Privacy Act of 1974, and this list 
just includes EU states (with the exception of Denmark and the UK).25 
Therefore, third-country nationals resident in the EU, or third-country 
nationals whose data have been collected by EU authorities (e.g. in SIS II, 
Eurodac or the VIS) and subsequently transferred to US authorities, are not 
covered by this right to judicial remedies.  
Second, the US Privacy Act and the Judicial Redress Act provide access 
to civil law procedures, but not legal redress actions in the field of criminal 
or administrative law. This means that formally, whenever measures are 
taken in immigration or criminal law procedures against EU citizens whose 
data have been transferred under the Umbrella Agreement, these 
individuals may be excluded from access to legal remedies, or their 
procedural rights may be limited by US law. In this regard, the rules in the 
Umbrella Agreement differ from the specific provisions included in the EU–
US TFTP Agreement of 2010, which provides for “all persons regardless of 
nationality or residence, access to judicial redress from adverse 
administrative action”. Also, the EU–US PNR Agreement includes a wider 
scope of legal protection in Art. 13(1), providing that “any individual 
regardless of nationality, country of origin, or place of residence whose 
personal data and personal information has been processed and used in a 
manner inconsistent with this Agreement may seek effective administrative 
and judicial redress in accordance with US law”. Furthermore, Art. 13(2) 
provides that “any individual is entitled to seek to administratively 
challenge the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) decisions related to 
the use and processing of PNR”. Where these provisions seem to bridge the 
aforementioned gap of the Judicial Redress Act, the relationship between the 
general rules of the Umbrella Agreement and the rules in the specific transfer 
agreements should be made clearer, also when adopting future agreements.  
Finally, the effect of the executive order under the Trump 
administration of 25 January 2017 (“Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior 
                                                     
25 The Judicial Redress Act requires the adoption of a separate list of ‘designated 
countries’, to be found on the US Department of Justice website 
(http://www.justice.gov/opcl/judicial-redress-act-2015). This list excludes Denmark 
and the UK, awaiting the formal notification that these countries shall apply the 
Umbrella Agreement.  
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of the United States”) requires further investigation. According to section 14 
of the Privacy Act, as amended by this executive order, “[a]gencies shall, to 
the extent consistent with applicable law, ensure that their privacy policies 
exclude persons who are not United States citizens or lawful permanent 
residents from the protections of the Privacy Act regarding personally 
identifiable information”.26 Although the phrase “to the extent consistent 
with applicable law” may limit the practical outcome of this executive order, 
the text itself seems to imply that the former extension of rights in the US 
Privacy Act to EU citizens by the adoption of the Judicial Redress Act should 
be considered void.  
7.5 Adequacy decision, appropriate level of data protection and 
onward transfer to third states 
In Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner, the CJEU annulled the Safe 
Harbour Decision 2000/520, in which the Commission had found that US 
law provided an adequate level of data protection in accordance with 
Directive 95/46, allowing the transfer of personal data from the EU to 
organisations within the US. In this judgment, the CJEU defined “an 
adequate level of data protection” as a level of protection that is “essentially 
equivalent protection to that guaranteed within the European Union”.27 
Even if the means chosen by a third state to ensure an adequate level of 
protection might differ from those employed in the EU, the CJEU found that 
those means must nevertheless “prove, in practice, effective in order to 
ensure protection essentially equivalent to that guaranteed within the 
European Union”.  
Therefore, “essentially equivalent” would mean that the essential 
elements of data protection included in Art. 8 of the Charter are to be 
complied with. This, according to the CJEU, also implies that, “as the level 
of protection ensured by a third state is liable to change”, the Commission 
should periodically assess the content of those rules to ensure that the 
                                                     
26 See “Executive Order: Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States”, 
Office of the Press Secretary, White House, Washington, D.C., 25 January 2017 (https:// 
www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/01/25/presidential-executive-order-
enhancing-public-safety-interior-united).  
27 See Schrems (Case C-362/14), op. cit., para. 74. 
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decision with regard to the adequate level of data protection is still factually 
and legally justified.28  
In accordance with Art. 45 of the GDPR (and Art. 36 of Directive 
2016/680), the transfer of personal data to a third country or an international 
organisation requires a prior adequacy decision by the Commission. This 
decision can only be based on an assessment of the adequacy of protection 
in that third state or organisation with regard to, among others, the rule of 
law, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as 
“effective and enforceable data subject rights and effective administrative 
and judicial redress for the data subject at stake”. In the absence of such a 
decision, Art. 46 of the GDPR (and Art. 37 of Directive 2016/680) allows 
personal data to be transferred to a third country or international 
organisation, but only if the processor or controller provides “appropriate 
safeguards and on condition that enforceable data subject rights and 
effective legal remedies for data subjects are available”.  
Considering this general requirement of either an adequacy decision 
or the provision of an appropriate level of protection necessary for the 
transfer of data from the EU to third states, it seems odd that the Umbrella 
Agreement allows in Art. 7 the onward transfer of personal data, acquired 
on the basis of this Agreement between the EU and the US, to other third 
states, only if the prior consent of the state originally transferring this data 
has been obtained. The Umbrella Agreement does not provide, through a 
decision on the adequate level of data protection in the US, for this onward 
transfer, but refers in Art. 7(2) to “an appropriate level of protection of 
personal information”, which should be ensured in the third state.29 
Furthermore, Art. 7(2) provides that the transfer “may” be subjected to 
specific conditions. In other words, the onward transfer of data to third states 
on the basis of the Umbrella Agreement is bound by fewer guarantees and 
safeguards than those provided in the GDPR and Directive 2016/680 for the 
transfer of personal data from the EU to third states in general.  
7.6 Concluding remarks 
The negotiation of agreements with third states allowing the transfer of 
personal data should be based on evidence sustaining the necessity and 
                                                     
28 Ibid., para. 76. 
29 See also the Note on the EU–US Umbrella Agreement by the Meijers Committee, 
CM1613, Utrecht, 2016 (www.commissie-meijers.nl). 
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proportionality of any systematic and general data transfers. In this regard, 
it should be taken into account that the GDPR and Directive 2016/680 
already provide a basis for the exchange of personal data in individual and 
specific situations, under conditions and supervision by data protection 
authorities. The adoption of any new agreements with a third state allowing 
for the further and more general exchange of personal data requires a prior 
and in-depth examination of the law, practice and judicial redress systems 
in that state.  
Furthermore, the level of protection should be in accordance with the 
criteria developed in the aforementioned case law of the CJEU and 
“essentially equivalent” to the protection offered by the GDPR and the 
Directive. Any future agreement must have a clear legal basis and be 
officially published to ensure its transparency and the accountability of the 
powers and actors involved. Finally, in dealing with the Umbrella 
Agreement, the EU legislator should address the current gap in protection 
for non-EU citizens with regard to the right to- judicial remedies and the lack 
of specific safeguards for the onward transfer of data to third states.  
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8. A SECURITY UNION IN FULL RESPECT OF 
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS: BUT HOW 
EFFECTIVELY RESPECTFUL?  
GLORIA GONZÁLEZ FUSTER 
he EU’s security policy must be designed, and unfold, in full respect 
of fundamental rights. This imperative emanates directly from the 
EU’s Treaties, and obliges EU institutions to keep in mind compliance 
with EU fundamental rights at all stages of policy-making, as well as beyond. 
This, however, does not always appear to be an easy task – especially insofar 
as compliance with the fundamental rights to privacy and personal data 
protection are concerned. 
The Union’s security policy has indeed been decidedly built upon 
extensive reliance on the use of information, and most crucially personal 
information. By virtue of EU security-related policies and instruments, the 
personal data of both EU citizens and third-country nationals are nowadays 
massively retained, vastly shared, often copied and increasingly made 
available both internally and externally.  
These practices and their underpinning policy choices, leaning 
towards ‘security’ through widespread data processing, put pressure on 
critical, basic privacy and data protection, such as proportionality and 
necessity. In light of these principles, measures involving personal data 
processing should only be supported after strictly considering the need for 
each data processing operation, which calls for a careful prior evaluation of 
their potential, as well as assessing and balancing other possible, less 
invasive, alternatives. 
EU institutions and Member States have not systematically carried out 
these assessments with clear success. Over the last few years, they have more 
than once visibly failed to duly grasp the relevance and implications of the 
rights to privacy and personal data protection as enshrined by the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights. And, as a result, the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU) has repeatedly ruled against both EU institutions 
and national authorities in matters related to privacy and personal data 
T 
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protection. A few particularly well-known judgments and opinions illustrate 
this recurrent problem. 
In April 2014, the CJEU declared the Data Retention Directive to be 
invalid,1 which imposed, in the name of the fight against serious crime, 
obligations to retain and make available the communications data of all users 
across EU Member States.2 Examining the instrument’s validity from the 
viewpoint of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, the Court notably 
criticised the way in which the obligations to retain communications data 
covered the data of “all persons … in a generalised manner”,3 and the 
“general absence of limits” governing access to such data.4 
Less than a year later, in October 2015, the Court of Justice annulled5 a 
decision by the European Commission aimed at facilitating flows of personal 
data from the EU to organisations established in the US.6 The Commission’s 
decision was declared invalid on the grounds of its failure to comply with 
EU legal requirements, read in the light of the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights. The Court emphasised that interference with the rights to privacy 
and personal data protection is only permissible insofar as “strictly 
necessary”. The Court noted that legislation can never be regarded as such 
if it authorises, “on a generalised basis”, the storage of anyone’s personal 
data “without any differentiation, limitation or exception being made in the 
light of the objective pursued”, and without objective criteria limiting access 
to the data by public authorities or their use, for specific purposes that are 
                                                     
1 Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 
on the retention of data generated or processed in connection with the provision of 
publicly available electronic communications services or of public communications 
networks and amending Directive 2002/58/EC, OJ L 105, 13.4.2006, pp. 54–63. 
2 CJEU, Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 8 April 2014 in Joined Cases C-
293/12 and C-594/12, Digital Rights Ireland Ltd v Minister for Communications, Marine and 
Natural Resources and Others.  
3 Ibid., § 57. 
4 Ibid., § 60. 
5 CJEU, Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 6 October 2015 in Case C-362/14, 
Maximillian Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner. 
6 See Decision 2000/520/EC of 26 July 2000 pursuant to Directive 95/46 on the adequacy 
of the protection provided by the safe harbour privacy principles and related frequently 
asked questions issued by the US Department of Commerce, OJ L 2015, 25.8.2000.  
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“strictly restricted and capable of justifying” the interference with the 
fundamental rights entailed.7 
More recently, in July 2017, the Court of Justice similarly declared that 
the proposed EU–Canada Agreement on the transfer and processing of 
passenger name records for air passengers flying between the EU and 
Canada was not compatible with the Treaties.8 The Agreement had been 
prepared in 2014, and when the Council requested approval by the European 
Parliament, the latter decided to refer the matter to the CJEU. Looking into 
it from the prism of the EU Charter, the Court decries the fact that the 
envisaged Agreement permitted the “systematic and continuous transfer”9 
of categories of data not defined with enough precision,10 as well as the lack 
of sufficient clarity concerning criteria to limit disclosure of the data.11 
These pronouncements represent major steps in the progressive 
assertion of fundamental rights requirements of EU law. They strongly 
affirm the relevance of the right to privacy, and consolidate the progressive 
emergence of the EU right to personal data protection, which was a key 
novelty brought forward by the entry into force of the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights in 2009. They can also be read as an explicit warning 
against the temptation of routinely pursuing security through an 
indeterminate reinforcing of the processing of personal data, calling instead 
for only adopting measures that circumscribe such processing to the greatest 
extent possible. Interference with the fundamental rights to privacy and data 
protection are only permissible when strictly necessary, and on condition that 
any data processing measures are designed in a manner that curtails the 
extent of the interference to strict necessity. 
Despite such a clear and repeated message addressed at the EU 
legislator and policy-makers, reactions have not been particularly vigorous. 
After each of these pronouncements, EU institutions have generally 
expressed that they have taken note of them, typically announcing their 
intention to take their time to analyse their impact, and ponder the issue at 
stake. In this sense, for instance, the judicial invalidation of the Data 
                                                     
7 Ibid., § 93. 
8 CJEU, Opinion 1/15 of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 26 July 2017 on the EU–Canada 
PNR Agreement. 
9 Ibid., § 127. 
10 Ibid., § 163. 
11 Ibid., § 217. 
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Retention Directive did not lead to any immediate strong reaction against 
the generalised retention of communications data across the EU.  
Data subjects in the EU actually had to wait for another judgment by 
the Court of Justice to further amplify the message that the general and 
indiscriminate retention of everybody’s communications data is 
incompatible with EU law, also when implemented at the national level.12 
The timidity of reactions by the EU’s institutions is growing increasingly 
problematic as this message is repeated again and again, thus becoming 
ever-less unexpected news that would need special time to digest. It 
certainly does not emanate from any sudden, unpredictable or variable set 
of standards, but follows directly from the text of the EU Charter (most 
notably, but not only, Arts 7 and 8), on the interpretation of which further 
guidance is in the meantime widely available.13 
The recent Comprehensive Assessment of the Union’s action in the 
area of internal security gave the European Commission an excellent 
opportunity to engage in a critical reflection on these issues – in relation to 
both the substance (that is, the question of how compliant the Union’s 
security policy is with fundamental rights requirements) and the procedures 
in place (the question of how such compliance is guaranteed). The 
assessment aimed at exhaustively reviewing the Union’s action in the area 
of internal security, as developed and crystallised over the last 15 years.14 
Despite identifying some gaps and room for improvement in certain 
areas of EU security policy, the European Commission draws from the 
assessment the conclusion that, specifically in relation to fundamental rights, 
everything is globally fine.15 It interprets the exercise as confirming that 
“compliance with fundamental rights is a key characteristic of EU security 
                                                     
12 See CJEU, Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 21 December 2016 in Joined 
Cases C-203/15 and C-698/15, Tele2 Sverige AB v Post- och telestyrelsen and Secretary of 
State for the Home Department v Tom Watson and Others. 
13 See, for instance, European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS), “Developing a ‘toolkit’ 
for assessing the necessity of measures that interfere with fundamental rights 
(Background paper for consultation)”, Brussels, 16 June 2016. 
14 European Commission, “Comprehensive Assessment of EU Security Policy” 
Commission Staff Working Document, SWD(2017) 278 final, part 1, 26.7.2017, Brussels, 
p. 4, which accompanied the Communication on the “Ninth progress report towards an 
effective and genuine Security Union”, COM(2017) 407 final, Brussels, 26.7.2017. 
15 European Commission, COM(2017) 407 final (supra), p. 12. 
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policy, in line with the legal obligation under the Treaties”,16 and celebrates 
two concrete aspects: first, that the CJEU is seemingly fulfilling its role in 
terms of judicial control; and second, that the European Commission has 
been working on trying to mainstream fundamental rights in the 
formulation of legislative and policy proposals.17 
No particular link is established by the European Commission 
between the fact that the observed regular need for the Court of Justice to 
intervene and invalidate EU legal instruments might be indicative of the 
persistent shortcomings of such celebrated fundamental-rights 
mainstreaming. And this can only be deplored. Indeed, the European 
Commission’s objective should not be to support an EU security policy that 
eventually complies with fundamental rights, but a security policy that 
complies with such requirements from the very start (or, in words more in line 
with privacy and data protection parlance, by design and by default).  
Any really ‘comprehensive’ assessment of the Union’s action in the 
area of internal security should thus aim at evaluating not only the 
effectiveness of EU policies and instruments to support and attain security 
objectives, but also the effectiveness of the measures in place to guarantee 
their full compatibility with fundamental rights. Such an evaluation should 
include a substantive review (addressing the question of whether the 
measures in place and those in the pipeline are compliant with fundamental 
rights requirements). It should also involve a detailed and in-depth review 
of the manner in which compliance is guaranteed (including the point at 
which such compliance is achieved – after how many years of implementing 
unlawful pieces of legislation, after how much data is unduly retained and 
made available, after how many instances of illegal interference with data 
subjects’ fundamental rights to privacy and data protection). 
A careful assessment of this kind would reveal the intrinsic limitations 
of designing a security policy that is primarily based on the processing of 
(most of the time personal) data, but fails to firmly give privacy and data 
protection the same level of priority. Taking seriously the idea that 
“protecting and fostering citizens’ security and complying with fundamental 
rights are complementary and mutually reinforcing” requires applying the 
same demands for effectiveness to both concomitant objectives;18 more 
efforts are thus required to make sure not only that the Security Union is 
                                                     
16 Ibid., p. 3. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid. p. 6. 
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effective and in full respect of fundamental rights in the end, but also that 
such respect is guaranteed from inception as effectively and efficiently as 
possible.  
If policy choices like further promoting information exchange and 
‘fully exploiting’ the potential of information systems,19 boosting data access 
and calling for ever-smarter systems are (still) deemed the way forward for 
EU security, these choices urgently need to be better framed, channelled and 
construed in line with the strict necessity and proportionality requirements 
emanating from EU fundamental rights. In other words, and in spite of the 
European Commission’s optimistic reading of the EU’s Comprehensive 
Assessment of EU Security Policy, the time has certainly come to devise a 
security policy that is effectively value-driven,20 as opposed to occasionally, 
abruptly stopped by surviving EU values.  
                                                     
19 See, for instance, European Commission, “Commissioner Julian King’s exchange of 
views at the first LIBE security dialogue at the European Parliament”, Speech, Brussels, 
23 March 2017. 
20 See for example, in relation to cybersecurity, the work of the CANVAS project 
(Constructing an Alliance for Value-driven Cybersecurity), co-funded by the EU 
(https://canvas-project.eu/). 
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9. WILL MORE DATA BRING MORE SECURITY? 
REMARKS ON THE SECURITY UNION 
APPROACH TO INTEROPERABILITY 
REINHARD KREISSL 
his chapter elaborates on the input and discussion at the CEPS Policy 
Workshop on “Reappraising EU Security Policy: Effectiveness, rule of 
law and rights in countering terrorism and crime”, addressing in 
particular questions raised about information sharing: Is ‘more data’ the 
most efficient answer in view of current experience and future trends? What 
are the issues raised by the increasing use of EU information systems, and 
the development of biometric technologies, for law enforcement purposes in 
light of the principles of proportionality, necessity and fundamental rights 
of data protection and privacy? 
To better identify and assess the problems emerging with regard to the 
use of data in the operations of the European Security Union, some 
conceptual clarifications and practical considerations can be helpful to better 
understand the processes underlying data-driven security work.  
First, it could be helpful to have a more precise definition and clearer 
understanding of the problems to be addressed. European policy documents 
discussing the issues emerging in the progress towards an effective and 
genuine Security Union link migration and security as similar and 
interconnected problems. This tends to blur important differences between 
problems to be solved separately when discussing policies governing the 
collection and use of data, information and intelligence. Starting from an 
explicit, precise and actionable concept of security, a number of important 
problems with regard to data, information and intelligence can be identified, 
requiring close scrutiny.  
However, whether these problems have anything to do with migration 
per se or the governance of individual mobility and travel into or within the 
Schengen area is an open question. Taking a look at recent terrorist crimes in 
Europe, many of the attackers would fall under the category of home-grown 
T 
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terrorists, i.e. while having a non-European ethnic background, mostly from 
the Middle East and North Africa, they were born and raised in the country 
where they launched their attacks and also held European passports. 
The migration–security link, while taken for granted in most policy 
discussions, should be disentangled to better understand and more 
effectively address the problems of data-driven intelligence strategies when 
it comes to assessing data-driven approaches to govern mobility and identify 
individuals, using categories of threat and risk.  
The High-Level Expert Group on Information Systems and 
Interoperability, in its final report of May 2017, supports (within the existing 
legal framework) a policy of lowering thresholds for seamless access to data 
in order to enhance control of migration, the mobility of persons and 
security, and to combat undefined terrorist threats.  
Practical considerations of how such a policy might affect the daily 
routine work of operatives, law enforcement authorities and border 
personnel are not taken into account. Nor are the systemic problems of a 
data-driven approach to border control and security adequately addressed. 
Again, a brief look at terrorist attacks shows that data and intelligence about 
the attackers had been collected, but had not triggered any action preventing 
the attacks. This situation reflects the irony of comprehensive data collection 
by intelligence, border and law enforcement authorities. The more persons 
are registered in any of the databases the higher the probability of finding a 
file on an attacker in one of these data collections after a crime has been 
committed.  
The collection of data and their seamless exchange among relevant 
authorities within Europe (and beyond) per se is no adequate strategy to 
address security problems. The equation of more data equals more security 
ignores the practical and conceptual problems of data analysis. 
A critique of EU policies in the security and migration areas by data 
protection and privacy experts focuses on rule of law issues. A number of 
relevant points can be raised here. While such an analysis centred on the rule 
of law has its merits, it leaves aside the problems emerging in the practical 
implementation of regulations governing the collection and use of data by 
European authorities. 
Taking into account the practical problems at the end-user level is 
important to assess the feasibility and effectiveness of any new data-driven 
strategy. Asking for more and seamless access to data/information from a 
wide variety of sources immediately translates into more efforts and more 
resources spent. This is echoed by recurrent requests to increase the numbers 
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of personnel within the law enforcement, intelligence and border control 
authorities. However, the problem here is not primarily one of quantity but 
also of quality, organisation, and strategies for information and intelligence 
processing. 
Again, one should distinguish here between three different operational 
contexts, e.g. mass border control, targeted law enforcement investigations 
and data-driven intelligence operations. 
i) When using data to check the identity of a person, a standard scenario 
here might look like this: person x applies for a visa, requests entry into 
EU territory or is checked at a checkpoint within this territory. Border 
guards or any other official representative of EU/Member State 
authorities check the ‘identity claims’ of the applicant against existing 
databases. This may require time-consuming procedures, such as 
taking fingerprints or processing other biometrical identification 
markers. Operating on the basis of a hit/no hit approach, as suggested 
by the High-Level Expert Group, further action may be taken or access 
may be granted. Such a procedure, when applied as a standard routine 
for border checks, will have substantial impact, most probably 
seriously disrupting the flow of traffic. In the case of a ‘hit situation’ 
there may be a number of causes, not all of them related to security 
problems. As Molotch1 points out, the schematised categories of a 
normal person ignore a multitude of idiosyncratic variations that have 
no relevance for security, but can trigger a security alert. As a result of 
such an alert based on a data check, entry into European territory may 
be refused. This approach may not only disrupt the flow of movement 
but also create a substantial number of false positives, while not 
significantly reducing the number of false negatives.2 
ii) A more refined version of this approach could use early warning signs, 
e.g. performing in-depth identity checks only when a member of a 
defined group is involved. Here other problems have to be solved, 
relating to categories of profiling: How can and should a risk profile be 
                                                     
1 H. Molotch, Against security: How we go wrong at airports, subways, and other sites of 
ambiguous danger, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014, p. 87 passim. 
2 The problem of false positives/negatives may be aggravated by the mechanism of base 
rate fallacy, based on flawed mundane calculations of the type “[a]ll terrorists are 
Muslims, so all Muslims should be considered potential terrorists” (see A. Locksley, C. 
Hepburn and V. Ortiz, “Social stereotypes and judgments of individuals: An instance of 
the base-rate fallacy”, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, Vol. 18, No. 1, 1982, pp. 
23-42). 
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designed and used? How can an individual be identified as a member 
of such a risk group? Informed decisions at the level of individual 
border guards and law enforcement officers on duty have to be made 
to single out individuals for identity checks. Very little is known about 
these decisions and there are no quality-tested, standardised 
procedures in place to assure the quality, uniformity and effectiveness 
of such a risk-based approach. Critical observers, based on in-depth 
studies of security work on the ground, have coined the term “security 
theatre” (e.g. Schneier in 2009)3 to describe the practical limits of such 
a strategy (e.g. Mueller and Stewart; Schneier in 2006).4 
iii) There may be situations where more data about an individual suspect 
can help to improve and facilitate law enforcement operations. Data 
and information in most cases provide useful evidence to investigate a 
criminal event. Data from CCTV or intelligence operations, for 
example, in many cases contribute to criminal investigations, although 
the final apprehension of the suspect always requires the work of 
experienced police officers, drawing on what could be called the 
detective’s tool kit. Still, this constellation is different from the two 
other scenarios described in (i) and (ii) above, both representing the 
needle in the haystack dilemma, whereas in (iii) a specific individual 
has already been identified and data queries are applied to learn more 
about this person, her social media use, mobility pattern or local social 
networks, etc. 
As shown by this brief discussion of different constellations, where data are 
used for security purposes, an extensive use of data is not a silver bullet for 
security work or security-related migration control. The overall policy 
approach should not be to ask for more data, but rather to direct efforts 
towards improving targeted forms of data analysis. 
When investigating the use of data for security purposes we have 
distinguished different approaches: huge datasets can be used to identify 
specific individuals for special treatment, e.g. during border checks or visa 
applications, as discussed above. A different approach, developed in 
                                                     
3 B. Schneier, “Beyond security theatre”, New Internationalist, No. 427, 2009, pp. 10-12. 
4 J.E. Mueller and M.G. Stewart, Chasing ghosts: The policing of terrorism, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2016; B. Schneier, Beyond fear: Thinking sensibly about security in an 
uncertain world, Berlin: Springer Science & Business Media, 2006. 
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commercial marketing, applies the strategy of social sorting (see Lyon).5 
Social sorting or customer relations management puts individuals into 
different categories of taste, purchasing power, credit scores, etc., based on 
mass data produced in consumer research. According to this categorisation, 
consumers receive differential treatment or targeted advertisement. In the 
realm of security, the equivalent would be the dragnet operation, using mass 
data to construe categories for social sorting along the lines of security 
threats. The problem here is that although massive datasets about a huge 
number of individuals may be available, it is difficult to define valid 
categorisations because the number of individuals who could reliably be 
qualified as security risks, since they for instance committed a terrorist 
attack, is extremely low, as noted by Brooks.6  
To limit the use of data-driven approaches in security, privacy and 
data protection, regulations have been introduced. The unconditional 
collection and storage of person-related data is limited by legal regulations, 
restricting the range of data to be collected, stored, exchanged and processed. 
However, recent developments in data science and algorithm-based 
machine learning have opened new venues for data-driven intelligence work 
not yet comprehensively addressed by data protection laws. As Kosinski et 
al.7 have demonstrated, private traits and personal information can be 
predicted from an analysis using trivial and publicly available data of a 
person from social media. In the age of electronic consumerism, citizens have 
been transformed into leaking data containers, and with the emergence of 
sophisticated algorithms new “weapons of math destruction” (as O’Neil 
puts it)8 are being applied as tools for the governance of different segments 
of the population. While these ‘weapons’ may not yet have developed their 
full potential, any policy addressing the use of data should consider the 
effects of lowering the threshold for linking different databases. 
                                                     
5 D. Lyon, Surveillance as social sorting: Privacy, risk, and digital discrimination, Hove: 
Psychology Press, 2003. 
6 R.A. Brooks, “Muslim ‘homegrown’ terrorism in the United States: How serious is the 
threat?”, International Security, Vol. 36, No. 2, 2011, pp. 7-47. 
7 M. Kosinski, S. Stillwell and T. Graepel, “Private traits and attributes are predictable 
from digital records of human behaviour”, Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences, Vol. 110, No. 15, 2013, pp. 5802-5805. 
8 C. O’Neil, Weapons of Math destruction: How big data increases, New York, NY: Crown 
Publishing Group, 2016. 
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Apart from conceptual, logical and legal concerns, the growth of a 
multi-agency security regime based on the low-threshold exchange among 
different data-collecting bodies may have detrimental effects stemming from 
intricate problems of inter-organisational coordination and communication 
emerging in such large social–cognitive ecosystems (see e.g. Grijpink).9 A 
simple approach of a linear growth in data collection within ever-wider legal 
limits producing more of the same does not automatically produce a linear 
increase in the performance of data-driven intelligence and security work. 
Finally, any policy option advertised to increase security and improve 
border management not only has to be weighed against the legal, financial, 
social and other costs it entails, but also has to stand comparison with 
alternative solutions, starting from alternative assumptions. This involves a 
critical view of existing programmes and strategies from an outside 
perspective, as Atran et al.10 write with a view of the situation in the US:  
The U.S. government (USG) has relied almost exclusively on the 
intelligence community, which monitors individuals and groups 
that threaten national security and specializes in clandestinely 
gathering and analysing pertinent information. Problems with data 
collection and interpretation have limited this effort to understand 
terrorist groups’ motivations, recruitment, and capabilities. The 
intelligence community initially had nearly all existing data on 
actual, possible, and potential terrorists; however, such information 
has not necessarily been constrained by scientifically testable 
theories and methods or systematically cross-examined for accuracy 
and completeness. The pressing need to protect people’s lives and 
assets justifies use of partial information, sometimes to good effect 
in capturing dangerous terrorists and preventing terrorist actions; 
but policy-makers tend to fit such information to prevailing 
paradigms in foreign policy, military doctrine, and criminal justice, 
each with serious drawbacks when applied to terrorism.  
 
                                                     
9 J.H.A.M Grijpink, “Chain Communication Systems”, Journal of Chain-computerisation, 
Vol. 5, No. 2, 2014. 
10 See S. Atran, R. Axelrod, R. Davis and B. Fischhoff, “Challenges in researching 
terrorism from the field”, Science, Vol. 355, No. 6323, 2017, p. 352. 
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10. CROSS-BORDER ACCESS TO ELECTRONIC 
EVIDENCE: POLICY AND LEGISLATIVE 
CHALLENGES 
KATALIN LIGETI AND GAVIN ROBINSON 
he intense growth of information and communications technology 
(ICT) in recent decades now means that almost any kind of routine, 
everyday activity – whether licit or illicit – leaves a digital trace. Access 
to the increasingly vast volumes of data thereby generated is becoming 
essential to law enforcement charged with the detection and investigation 
not only of cybercrimes, but also any offline criminal offence to which 
electronic evidence1 may pertain. The information that users generate by 
means of new ICT is, however, typically under the control of private 
companies. Without their cooperation, law enforcement authorities (LEAs)2 
would often simply be unable to detect, investigate and/or prosecute a large 
number of offences.3  
                                                     
1 Although the precise contours and limits of the notion of electronic evidence remain 
elusive, for the purpose of this contribution the term shall be used to mean any probative 
information stored or transmitted in digital form. Since EU law and ongoing policy 
debates at the EU level divide electronic data of relevance to law enforcement authorities’ 
activities into subscriber data (e.g. the individual behind a webmail account used to 
coordinate drug deals), metadata (e.g. WhatsApp call logs of suspected terrorist cells; 
geolocation of smartphones) and content data (e.g. threatening messages sent from one 
spouse to another on Facebook), this contribution will accordingly use these categories 
throughout. 
2 ‘LEAs’ is a term that, for the purposes of this contribution, refers to police and judicial 
authorities. 
3 Ranging from typical ‘target cybercrimes’ (e.g. hacking) and ‘content-related 
cybercrimes’ (e.g. child pornography) to fraud, organised crime, drug trafficking and 
terrorism, which are either committed by means of a computer or other electronic device, 
or otherwise leave electronic traces that could be used as evidence. 
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Cooperation between LEAs and companies providing information and 
communications services is, of course, nothing new. It can be voluntary, but 
very often it is based on rules laid down in national criminal procedures. In 
practice, there are often situations where obtaining electronic evidence 
necessitates transnational enforcement efforts; this is the case, for instance, 
where data is stored outside the investigating country or where the service 
provider on whose systems data is held is established in another jurisdiction. 
Whereas transnational investigations are traditionally governed by the 
applicable instruments on mutual legal assistance (MLA), within the EU 
there has been a shift since the late 1990s away from MLA towards the 
mutual recognition of judgments and judicial decisions, implying their free 
circulation within the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice.4 A prime recent 
example is the Directive on the European Investigation Order (EIO), a 
judicial decision issued by one Member State to have one or several specific 
investigative measure(s) carried out in another Member State to obtain, inter 
alia, electronic evidence.5  
Yet as the ink has been drying on national implementation of the EIO 
Directive, we have witnessed a further shift away from MLA in the shape of 
informal, so-called direct cooperation between LEAs seeking to obtain 
electronic evidence and the foreign service providers in (exclusive) control 
of it. Citing the doubtless lengthy and allegedly problematic nature of MLA 
mechanisms, LEAs are increasingly disregarding them in order to address 
requests for information directly to foreign service providers, in the process 
excising the role of the judicial authority where service providers are 
established or targets are habitually resident. In practice, this often entails 
the issuing of a domestic investigative measure by the LEA directly to the 
foreign service provider. Where granted – since doing so is in principle 
voluntary – such cooperation thus represents both the de facto 
extraterritorial reach of national investigative powers, and an extension of 
the ‘sword’ function of criminal law enforcement through private actors. 
What is especially novel in the current debate on electronic evidence, 
however, is that those same actors may choose to shield individuals from the 
reach of law enforcement, and challenge orders to hand over data in the 
                                                     
4 At the Tampere European Council, it was decided that mutual recognition should 
become the cornerstone of judicial cooperation in criminal matters. The principle of 
mutual recognition was then confirmed in The Hague and Stockholm programmes.  
5 Directive 2014/41/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 April 2014 
regarding the European Investigation Order in criminal matters, OJ L 130, 1.5.2014.  
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place of the target and data subject: their customer. Performing this shield 
function on behalf of customers (targets of LEA activity) may often feature 
prominently in the business model. Moreover, it can be regarded as an 
expression of the accessory or secondary obligation, under private law, to 
safeguard the counterparty’s legitimate interests;6 failure to comply with 
such secondary obligations may even result in damages.7 There might, thus, 
be a legal motive alongside the commercial one to refrain from voluntarily 
disclosing customer data. 
The overall picture is one of fragmentation and an acute lack of legal 
certainty for all stakeholders vis-à-vis the enforceability of such cross-border 
requests, the classification of service providers as domestic or foreign, the 
potential illegality (in some jurisdictions) of granting cooperation, 
differences in types of data it is possible to request, divergent definitions of 
those types of data, varying procedures for submitting requests, unreliable 
responses and unpredictable response times.8 It is against this background 
that the European Commission is currently exploring options for the 
formalisation of such ‘direct’ cooperation through EU legislation, following 
an exceedingly rare request from the Council – acknowledgment in and of 
itself that any national solutions are unlikely to be enforceable, workable and 
sufficient. To meet its stated goals, however, any common Union approach 
will have to confront a host of technical and practical complexities as well as 
legal and policy challenges posed by the direct involvement of private actors 
in the cross-border gathering of electronic evidence.  
This chapter focuses on the deficiencies of the existing European and 
international legal framework applicable to cross-border access to electronic 
evidence and offers a brief overview and critical discussion of competing 
instruments and mooted options for reform. 
                                                     
6 Under German law, e.g. such so-called Nebenpflichten are explicitly dealt with in section 
241, para. 2 of the Civil Code, Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch. Cf. G. Bachmann in F.-J. Säcker, R. 
Rixecker and H. Oetker (eds), “Münchener Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch”, 
in Vol. 2 of Schuldrecht – Allgemeiner Teil, 7th edition, Munich: CH Beck, 2016, §241, margin 
numbers 46 et seq. 
7 Ibid., margin number 61. 
8 See European Commission, Non-paper, “Progress Report following the Conclusions of 
the Council of the European Union on Improving Criminal Justice in Cyberspace”, 
(hereafter ‘Commission non-paper 1’), para. 1.2.1, accompanying Council of the 
European Union, 15072/1/16 REV, Brussels, 7 December 2016.  
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10.1 Disregard for mutual legal assistance: The emergence of 
informal cooperation between LEAs and foreign service 
providers 
In practice, informal cooperation between LEAs and foreign service 
providers has become the main channel for LEAs to obtain non-content data. 
Compliance with direct requests from law enforcement authorities of one 
country to a service provider headquartered in another country is in general 
voluntary; service providers usually do not have a legal obligation to 
provide data to foreign LEAs.9 Moreover, the national legislation in a 
majority of EU countries either does not cover or explicitly prohibits service 
providers established within their jurisdictions from responding to direct 
requests from foreign LEAs.10 Whereas all US-based service providers are 
able to provide non-content data directly to foreign law enforcement 
authorities under US law,11 within the EU only Ireland-based service 
providers may do so.12 The principal reason for the upsurge in informal 
cooperation in these countries is that they account for a large proportion of 
the total volume of requests (both informal and MLA) due to the fact that 
major service providers are headquartered there.13  
As the example of Ireland and the US indicates, the type of data 
solicited plays an important role in informal cooperation. In this context, 
responses to a recent Commission questionnaire revealed that the definitions 
of types of data vary significantly among Member States, with only a handful 
                                                     
9 Of the 24 Member States that responded to a questionnaire issued by the Commission 
services, 14 Member States considered compliance with direct requests sent from 
national authorities directly to a service provider in another country to be voluntary, 
while 7 Member States considered these requests mandatory; see Commission non-paper 
1, ibid., para. 1.2.1. 
10 Ibid., para. 1.2.1. 
11 See 18 U.S. Code Chapter 121 Section 2702 (‘Stored Communications Act’) on voluntary 
disclosure of customer communications or records. 
12 See section 8 of the Irish Data Protection Acts 1988 and 2003. See also A. Hogan, “The 
Interception of Communications in Ireland – Time for a Re-Think”, Data Protection 
Ireland, Vol. 7, No. 5, 2014, p. 9. 
13 See the non-paper of the Commission services of June 2017 on “Improving Cross-
border Access to Electronic Evidence: Findings from the Expert Process and Suggested 
Way Forward” (hereafter ‘Commission non-paper 2’), p. 3. 
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allowing the disclosure of content data and “other data”.14 A divergence in 
practices was also identified in relation to the procedures for making direct 
requests.15 There is no common approach among Member States as to the 
competent authority to initiate the process, the modalities of a request or the 
means to transmit the information.16 Again not only do the legal regimes or 
practices of Member States diverge, but also the responses of service 
providers vary (in time and extent), at times depending on the requesting 
country. LEAs also report that responses by service providers vary 
depending on where requests come from.17 For instance, Google responded 
recently to 75% of requests from Finland18 and 71% from the UK,19 but to 
none from Hungarian LEAs.20  
LEAs also reported problems in identifying and reaching the contact 
point of the relevant service provider, and even where this is achieved, 
matters are complicated further due to the lack of a common line among 
providers regarding the use of platforms, forms, required content of a 
request, language or communication channels.21 LEAs must therefore tailor 
their approach to each individual company, but complain of a lack of 
transparency on the providers’ side in relation to why a given request is 
granted or refused.22 Service providers, meanwhile, complain of difficulties 
in assessing the legitimacy and authenticity of requests since national 
provisions differ widely even among Member States,23 generating significant 
costs for providers.24 Also, where cooperation is voluntary, service providers 
create their own internal policies of handling requests or decide on a case-
                                                     
14 Commission non-paper 1 (op. cit.), para. 1.2.1. 
15 Ibid., para. 1.2.1. 
16 Ibid., para. 1.2.1. 
17 Ibid., para. 2.1.6. 
18 See Google, “Transparency Report” (https:// www.google.com/transparencyreport/ 
userdatarequests/FI/). 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Commission non-paper 1 (op. cit.), para. 2.1.4. 
22 Ibid., para. 1.2.1. 
23 Ibid., para. 2.1.5. 
24 Ibid. 
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by-case basis whether and how to cooperate.25 Service providers face 
conflicting interests: they have to protect their users’ privacy while being 
expected to cooperate with LEAs. They have, inter alia, data protection 
obligations towards their customers and thus may wish to release 
information about requests received (and cooperation granted) in their 
regular transparency reports – at the risk of compromising an investigation.26  
Closely linked to a lack of transparency and reliability, the 
Commission reported problems deriving from a lack of accountability. Not 
knowing which crimes are being investigated renders it difficult for service 
providers to be accountable to their users.27 US-based providers are also not 
accountable to LEAs for submitting no/incomplete/false information since 
there is no legal obligation under US law to submit any data.28 Furthermore, 
criminal procedure laws usually do not regulate direct cooperation across 
borders, which may not only lead to problems in terms of accountability or 
a lack thereof, but also to problems with the admissibility as evidence in a 
later criminal trial.29  
10.2 Towards formulating legal responses 
In the aftermath of the March 2016 terrorist attacks in Brussels and under 
pressure from LEAs, several Member States pushed the Council of the 
European Union to request that the Commission explore possibilities for a 
common EU approach to improving criminal justice in cyberspace.30 The 
Council set the Commission to work in three areas: enhancing cooperation 
with service providers, streamlining MLA (and mutual recognition) 
proceedings, and reviewing rules on enforcement jurisdiction in 
                                                     
25 Ibid., para. 2.1. 
26 Ibid., para. 2.1.1. 
27 Ibid., para. 2.1.3. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid. and para. 2.1.7. 
30 Council of the European Union, “Council Conclusions on improving criminal justice 
in cyberspace”, Press Office, Brussels, 9 June 2016 (https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/ 
sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/organized-crime-and-human-trafficking 
/council_conclusions_on_improving_criminal_justice_in_cyberspace_en.pdf) (hereafter 
‘Council Conclusions’). 
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cyberspace.31 Within a month, the Commission had launched an expert 
consultation process to explore possible solutions and work towards a 
common EU position, and in December 2016 a first progress report was 
provided to the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) Council32 detailing the 
Commission’s activities and describing the problems identified in each of the 
three areas. A second non-paper33 based on the results of the expert 
consultation process was presented at the JHA Council meeting in June 2017, 
with a greater emphasis on the way forward, through legislative action 
among others. The ministers gave the green light to the Commission to table 
a concrete legislative proposal, prompting an announcement by 
Commissioner Věra Jourová that one will be put forward in early 2018.34 On 
4 August 2017, an “Inception Impact Assessment” was published to inform 
stakeholders of the Commission’s work, to allow them to provide feedback 
on the intended initiative and to participate effectively in future consultation 
activities.35 A first public consultation on improving cross-border access to 
electronic evidence was launched on the same day.36 
In its recent non-papers, the Commission has outlined in the first place 
possible practical improvements within the existing rules, as regards 
cooperation between competent authorities on the one hand and between 
LEAs and service providers on the other.37 For instance, creating an 
electronic version of the EIO form and setting up a secure platform for the 
exchange of EIOs, requests and responses between competent authorities 
                                                     
31 Ibid., I-III. 
32 Commission non-paper 1 (op. cit.). 
33 Commission non-paper 2 (op. cit.), p. 2. 
34 See the statement by Commissioner Věra Jourová at the “Justice and Home Affairs 
Council, 3546th meeting: Joint press conference by Marlene Bonnici, Maltese Permanent 
Representative to the EU, and Vĕra Jourová, Member of the EC”, 2017 
(http://ec.europa.eu/avservices/video/player.cfm?ref=I139501&videolang=INT&start
time=347&devurl=http://ec.europa.eu/avservices/video/player/config.cfm).  
35 See European Commission, “Inception Impact Assessment”, Ref. Ares(2017)3896097, 
3.8.2017. 
36 See European Commission, Public consultation on improving cross-border access to 
electronic evidence in criminal matters, 2017 (https://ec.europa.eu/info/consultations/ 
public-consultation-improving-cross-border-access-electronic-evidence-criminal-
matters_en). 
37 Commission non-paper 2 (op. cit.), para. 3.1. 
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was considered.38 Concerning cooperation between Member States’ 
authorities and service providers within the existing framework, suggested 
improvements include the creation of a single point of contact on the law 
enforcement/judiciary side for law enforcement requests issued to service 
providers established abroad, the creation of a single point of entry on the 
service provider side for dealing with such requests, training on either side 
on providers’ different policies and procedures, standardisation and 
reduction of forms used by LEAs, streamlining of providers’ policies and the 
establishment of an online platform to provide comprehensive guidance to 
LEAs on current policies, forms, channels, and so on.39  
The Commission, however, acknowledges that the proposed practical 
solutions can only partly address the existing problems as “they cannot 
provide solutions for fragmented legal frameworks among Member 
States”.40 Hence, in its most recent non-paper from June 2017, the 
Commission reflects not only on practical measures within the existing 
framework, but also on regulatory approaches. To provide legal certainty for 
cross-border requests and reduce the level of complexity and fragmentation 
outlined above, one proposed regulatory solution is a legislative measure 
enabling LEAs to request (“production request”) or compel (“production 
order”) a third party, i.e. a service provider, in another Member State to 
disclose information about a user.41 Where the location of data, infrastructure 
or the relevant provider cannot be established or where there is a risk of 
losing data, “direct access” – often referred to as ‘legal hacking’ – might also 
be considered, in light of the fact that a number of Member States already 
provide for this measure in domestic law.42 In this case, common conditions 
and minimum safeguards should be defined as well as mitigating measures, 
such as notifications to possibly affected countries.43 The Commission has 
also been mandated to pursue work on facilitating access to electronic 
evidence in third countries, in particular the US44  
                                                     
38 Commission non-paper 1 (op. cit.), para. 3.1.1. 
39 Commission non-paper 2 (op. cit.), p. 2 et seq; in detail see also Commission non-paper 
1 (supra), para. 3.1.2. 
40 Commission non-paper 2 (supra), p. 4. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid., p. 5. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Commission non-paper 1 (op. cit.), para. 3.2. 
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With regard to a comprehensive, single EU instrument, a central 
question is whether to request or compel a service provider, whose main seat 
is in another Member State, to provide access to data. An EU instrument may 
establish a legal basis for authorities to act and service providers to respond 
voluntarily (production request), or provide for a mandatory production 
order with a sanctioning system to enforce the order in case of non-
compliance (subpoena).45 Both measures would mean that service providers 
can be addressed directly without the request or order having to go through 
a law enforcement or judicial intermediary in the other Member State. 
Obviously, the least intrusive option would be to rely on voluntary 
cooperation, but considering the dependence on cooperation of providers it 
would also be the least effective option if there is no strong incentive for 
providers to comply. 
As envisaged by the Commission, the production request and 
production order raise a number of complex legal questions. First of all, any 
future EU legislation would need to define the notion of electronic evidence, 
establish what kind of electronic evidence is covered and precisely 
circumscribe those entities to which a production order or production 
request may be addressed. Electronic evidence commonly refers to data of 
value to an investigation that is stored on, received or transmitted by an 
electronic device. As technology advances, the amount and types of data that 
can be found on electronic devices are constantly increasing. Various types 
of data exist that can be of value for an investigation: data that are visible to 
end users, such as subscriber data and content data; and data that are not 
readily visible to end users, such as metadata,46 which consist, inter alia, of 
information on file designation, creation and edit history data, location data 
or traffic data. In different EU legal instruments, definitions of certain types 
of data exist, e.g. the notion of “personal data” now has identical definitions 
under Art. 3 of the Directive on Police and Criminal Justice Authorities47 and 
                                                     
45 Commission non-paper 2 (op. cit.), p. 4. 
46 Some metadata, for instance file date and size, can easily be accessed by the end user, 
while other metadata is embedded in file locations requiring special tools or knowledge 
to be revealed. 
47 See Directive (EU) 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 
2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data 
by competent authorities for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection or 
prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, and on the free 
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the General Data Protection Regulation.48 The notions of “traffic data” and 
“location data” are defined in Art. 2 of the E-Privacy Directive. The Budapest 
Convention, in contrast, only provides technical definitions of the notions of 
“computer data” and “traffic data”.  
Considering that the E-Privacy Directive sets forth elaborated 
categories of data and abolishes the differentiation between data in transition 
and stored data, one may ask whether a new instrument should rely on these 
data categories or go beyond them. One may also ask whether a definition 
of subscriber data is necessary in this context. None of the directives, nor the 
General Data Protection Regulation, nor the Budapest Convention contains 
a definition of ‘subscriber data’. The information sought under the heading 
‘subscriber data’ is information similar to a reverse directory check – it is 
information that links an individual to an account. As there is no binding 
definition of subscriber data, the notion could also be read as covering all 
sorts of data that social networks and other services keep on their customers, 
which can be highly personal and is not traditionally thought of as 
communications data.49 Therefore, it is inevitable that the proposed 
instrument will have to define those data which constitute electronic 
evidence. Alongside the type of data, the volume of data to be accessed is 
also relevant for assessing the intensity of any interference with rights to data 
protection and respect for private and family life under the EU Charter 
Fundamental Rights.50 
The issue of which categories of data in relation to which a production 
request or production order may be issued is intertwined with the personal 
scope of the measure: in other words, which service providers ought to be 
covered. One approach would be to use an open-ended, relatively 
technologically-neutral definition, such as ‘digital service provider’. The 
flexibility offered by such an approach, however, comes with the risk of 
                                                     
movement of such data, and repealing Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA, OJ 
L 119, 4.5.2016, p. 89. 
48 A similar but not identical definition of ‘personal data’ can be found in Art. 2 of 
Directive 95/46/EC on Data Protection, to which Art. 2 of the E-Privacy Directive used 
to refer (Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 
2002 concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the 
electronic communications sector, OJ L 201, 31.7.2002, p. 37). 
49 See House of Lords/House of Commons, “Joint Committee on the Draft 
Communications Data Bill”, Report from Session 2012-2013, p. 47 et seq. 
50 Commission non-paper 2 (op. cit.), p. 6. 
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burdening service providers that are not priority targets for law 
enforcement, to the detriment of smaller enterprises. One way to temper this 
danger might be to provide for limits such as those in the recent German 
Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz (NetzDG),51 which foresees an obligation to 
disclose data within 48 hours only for social media providers with more than 
2 million registered users in Germany.52 Alternatively, rather than using an 
open definition, affected service providers could be categorised depending 
on the service they provide, similar to the technical distinctions made in 
terms of liability in the E-Commerce Directive53 or by including definitions 
capable of covering not only major ‘information society services’ such as 
Twitter and Facebook, but also providers of cloud services and digital 
marketplaces, for example.  
Considering that a single regime for cross-border access to evidence in 
general is already in place in the form of the EIO framework, the relationship 
between the EIO framework and any such production order for electronic 
evidence would also require clarification as a matter of priority. The same 
applies to the question of how the production order would relate to other 
legal instruments and agreements, such as MLA treaties and the Budapest 
Convention. The EIO Directive, for instance, foresees that where reference is 
made to MLA in relevant international instruments, such as the Budapest 
Convention, it should be understood that between the Member States bound 
by the Directive it takes precedence over those conventions.54 From a policy 
perspective, too, given the coexistence of the EIO framework and the 
envisaged production order, their interrelationship would have to be clearly 
articulated in order to ensure that the production order constitutes sufficient 
added value to justify a separate legislative effort. This might be achieved, 
by way of example, by limiting the production order to serious crime – 
meaning that the EIO would be the central weapon for LEAs requiring 
electronic evidence to investigate less serious offences. 
                                                     
51 Gesetz zur Verbesserung der Rechtsdurchsetzung in sozialen Netzwerken 
(Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz – NetzDG), BT-Drs. 18/13013. 
52 Refer to § 5(2), § 1(2) NetzDG. In addition, the law requires these providers to establish 
an authorised recipient in Germany for said requests (§ 5(1) NetzDG).  
53 Cf. Arts. 12-15 of Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular 
electronic commerce, in the internal market, OJ L 178, 17.7.2000. 
54 See Recital 35 of the EIO Directive. 
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In light of the Digital Rights Ireland and Tele2 Sverige judgments from 
the Court of Justice of the European Union, the proportionality of the 
envisaged proposal with the fundamental Charter rights to data protection 
(Art. 7) and respect for private and family life (Art. 8) will require adequate 
scope limitations and safeguards to be in place. In particular, a clause 
restricting the issuing of production orders to investigations of serious crime 
may prove necessary in order to ensure fundamental rights compliance – at 
least as regards content data. Prior authorisation by an independent judicial 
authority may also be required as a condition – again, at least for content 
data. Insofar as an issuing authority is concerned, should the option of direct 
issuing of a production order by the police be entertained, this may have to 
be limited to subscriber data, with orders to produce metadata and content 
data requiring the intervention of a judge. 
A more legal technical question relates to the nature of the proposed 
instrument. One has to ask whether production orders that supersede 
cooperation between LEAs by directly obliging service providers to supply 
electronic evidence still constitute judicial cooperation based on mutual 
recognition. The original concept of mutual recognition in EU law was 
supposed to ensure market access to the European single market for 
products that are not subject to EU harmonisation. The Tampere European 
Council decided in October 1999 that the principle should also become the 
cornerstone of judicial cooperation in both civil and criminal matters within 
the EU.55 Mutual recognition is founded on equivalence and trust between 
Member States. As regards a mandatory production order with 
extraterritorial effect, one has to ask whether this still constitutes an 
instrument of judicial cooperation even though no foreign authority is 
involved in its execution. 
The competence of the EU to adopt legally binding acts in the area of 
judicial cooperation in criminal matters is proclaimed in Art. 82 of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). Art. 82(1) sub-para. 1 
elevates mutual recognition to an overarching principle or leitmotiv, 
whereas Art. 82(1) sub-para. 2 contains an exhaustive list of legislative 
competences. Art. 82(1) clearly relates to measures on judicial cooperation, 
where this term stands for cooperation between judicial or equivalent 
authorities of the Member States. Yet as far as the term “cooperation” is 
concerned, Art. 82(1)(d) differentiates between “facilitating cooperation” 
                                                     
55 See the Presidency Conclusions of the Tampere European Council, 15 and 16 October 
1999, para. 33. 
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and “enforcement of decisions”. Along the logic of the mutual recognition 
instruments in the internal market, Art. 82(1)(d) empowers the EU legislator 
to adopt measures for the “enforcement of decisions” of one Member State 
that are then automatically valid in the entire EU. This logic would enable 
the EU legislator to bring the planned production order into the realm of 
judicial cooperation based on Art. 82 TFEU. 
Finally, an EU instrument would also have to provide for effective 
means for its enforcement – in particular when it comes to service providers 
based in third countries. The aforementioned German NetzDG requires, for 
instance, the establishment of an authorised recipient for disclosure requests 
in Germany and foresees fines for non-compliance with this obligation or the 
omission to respond to such a request (a maximum fine of €500,000).56 This 
enforcement mechanism obviates the need to rely on reciprocal responses. 
Reciprocal responses by third parties are a sensitive issue when it comes to 
fundamental rights, as third countries may not have equivalent fundamental 
rights standards in place. Considering that the addressees of production 
orders are regularly legal persons established in another country, fines and 
criminal penalties at the national level would obviously need to be 
applicable. In that regard, the issuing state would have to rely on the state 
where the order is executed for enforcement. If – in order to be enforceable – 
this procedure must be based on MLA, one may ask whether this contradicts 
the original intention behind the use of a cross-border production order.57  
10.3 Concluding remarks 
The drive to improve the speed and efficiency of transnational investigations 
necessitating access to electronic evidence has led to new practices marking 
a paradigm shift in cross-border judicial cooperation. Classic interstate 
cooperation is increasingly being replaced by a practice whereby domestic 
law enforcement directly engages with foreign service providers. Not only 
do these new developments require adequate legal rules, but their 
coexistence with traditional judicial cooperation also demands close 
assessment. The legal background to such an assessment is constituted by 
aspects of criminal law as well as public law (data protection and privacy) 
and even private law (secondary obligations to protect a counterparty’s 
legitimate interests). 
                                                     
56 See § 4(1) Nos. 7 and 8 and § 4(2) NetzDG. 
57 Commission non-paper 1 (op. cit.), para. 2.3.2. 
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11. CONSTITUTIONALISING THE SECURITY 
UNION  
SERGIO CARRERA AND VALSAMIS MITSILEGAS 
his collective volume has provided a multidisciplinary examination of 
the key issues, challenges and gaps associated with the EU’s security 
policy and the implementation of the Security Union, particularly in 
relation to common policies aimed at countering terrorism and crime. The 
various chapters have aimed at contributing to the European Commission’s 
“Comprehensive Assessment of EU Security Policy”. The Comprehensive 
Assessment, published on 26 July 2017, sought to review the Union’s action 
on internal security over the last 15 years.1 This chapter identifies and 
explores the main findings emerging from the analysis presented in the 
contributions comprising this book. Special attention is given to the 
constitutional issues and dilemmas facing the Security Union in relation to 
the EU standards enshrined in the Treaties, the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights and secondary law.  
Section 11.1 starts by contextualising the Security Union in light of the 
Lisbon Treaty and EU Better Regulation principles. Section 11.2 moves on to 
explore the necessity and effectiveness of two of the main EU policy 
priorities in addressing terrorism: information exchange and 
interoperability. Section 11.3 brings to the fore the effects and compatibility 
of EU security policies with the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, notably 
the fundamental right of privacy. It sheds similar light on efforts to counter 
violent radicalisation. Section 11.4 considers the relationship between the 
Security Union and the ‘justice dimension’, the relevance of a criminal 
justice-led approach when countering terrorism and crime, and the 
                                                     
1 The Comprehensive Assessment was published together with the “Ninth Progress 
Report towards an Effective and Genuine Security Union”. See European Commission, 
“Comprehensive Assessment of EU Security Policy”, Commission Staff Working 
Document, SWD(2017) 278 final, Brussels, 26.7.2017; and Commission Communication, 
“Ninth Progress Report towards an Effective and Genuine Security Union”, COM(2017) 
407 final, Brussels, 26.7.2017.  
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importance of upholding the rule of law for the principle of mutual 
recognition in criminal matters. Section 11.5 concludes by presenting a way 
forward towards ‘constitutionalising’ the Security Union. 
11.1 ‘Lisbonisation’ and Better Regulation  
During the last 15 years the EU has developed a dynamic legal and policy 
framework on issues related to countering terrorism and cross-border 
serious crime. Curtin’s chapter highlights that the EU Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice (AFSJ) has witnessed significant policy developments 
since the 1990s, and has gradually moved to the top of the Union’s political 
agenda. This has been despite the fact that ‘internal security’ has 
traditionally been conceived as an exclusive competence of the Member 
States.2 
The Union’s competence on security policies has experienced a 
widening in reach and scope, especially since the entry into force of the 
Lisbon Treaty in 2009. The Lisbon Treaty brought judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters and police under Title V, “Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice” and to shared legal competence between the Union and the Member 
States. Chapter 4 of the TFEU (Arts. 82-86) lays down the legal basis for 
judicial cooperation in criminal matters, which shall be based on, and driven 
by, the principle of mutual recognition of judgments and judicial decisions. 
Chapter 5 TFEU offers the normative foundations of EU measures 
establishing police cooperation among the Member States’ competent 
authorities, including “police, customs and other specialised law 
enforcement services in relation to the prevention, detection and 
investigation of criminal offences”. 
The Lisbonisation of EU policies on criminal justice and policing meant 
for the first time the expansion of the ‘ordinary legislative procedure’ to these 
fields. The application of the Community method of cooperation injected 
enhanced democratic scrutiny into EU security cooperation. The European 
Parliament was formally granted the role of co-legislator in the adoption of 
                                                     
2 Art. 72 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) puts it thus: 
“This Title shall not affect the exercise of the responsibilities incumbent upon Member 
States with regard to the maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding of internal 
security.” Refer also to Art. 73 of the TFEU. 
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secondary legislation and the power to approve international agreements on 
security matters.3 
Protocol 36 of the EU Treaties nevertheless stipulated transitional 
provisions limiting the powers of the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU) and the Commission. For a period of five years from the entry into 
force of the Lisbon Treaty (December 2009), the Commission was not able to 
fully exercise its role as ‘guardian of the Treaties’ and start infringement 
proceedings against Member States in breach of their obligations to 
implement EU criminal justice and policing laws. The CJEU had no full 
jurisdiction to review and answer questions from the Member States’ 
national courts on the interpretation of these policies, except if they had 
accepted such jurisdiction optionally. 
The transitional arrangements, however, came to an end in December 
2014.4 This meant the effective shift from ‘intergovernmentalism’ – which 
used to characterise European cooperation in these areas5 – to 
‘supranationalism’ in EU third-pillar law and the assumption of the full 
powers of European institutions in the field. The expectations behind the 
Lisbonisation in these sensitive policy areas related mainly to enhanced EU 
legal and judicial accountability and the monitoring of trust in the EU AFSJ.  
The widening of the Commission’s powers to enforce EU criminal 
justice and police law has been a positive step forward to ensure a more 
consistent and uniform application of EU law in this area, and presents great 
potential to address current implementation gaps in EU security instruments 
and tools at the national level. 
                                                     
3 S. Carrera, N. Hernanz and J. Parkin, “The ‘Lisbonisation’ of the European Parliament 
– Assessing progress, shortcomings, and challenges for democratic accountability in the 
area of freedom, security and justice”, Working Paper No. 58, CEPS Liberty and Security 
in Europe Series, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, 2013, pp. 6-7. 
4 S. Carrera, V. Mitsilegas and K. Eisele, “Who Monitors Trust in the European Justice 
Area? The End of the Transitional Period for the Measures under Police and Judicial 
Cooperation in Criminal Matters Adopted before the Lisbon Treaty”, Study for the 
European Parliament, DG IPOL (Internal Policies), Brussels, 2014. 
5 See S. Carrera and E. Guild, “No Constitutional Treaty? Implications for the Area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice”, in T. Balzacq and S. Carrera (eds), Security versus 
Freedom? A Challenge for Europe’s Future, Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2006, pp. 223-
239. See also S. Carrera, E. Guild and T. Balzacq, “The Changing Dynamics of Security in 
an Enlarged European Union”, in S. Carrera, D. Bigo, E. Guild and R. Walker, Europe’s 
21st Century Challenge: Delivering Liberty, Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2010, pp. 31-48. 
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From a Lisbon Treaty perspective, ‘more EU’ has formally meant 
putting the individual, the democratic rule of law and fundamental rights at 
the centre of EU action in AFSJ policies. The legally binding nature of the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights, which now has the same legal value as the 
Treaties, has positioned and formally enshrined fundamental rights at the 
heart of the European justice area. Privacy and the rights of the defence are 
now inextricably linked to the effective and trust-based supranational 
cooperation on security and criminal justice. The fundamental rights of 
suspects in criminal proceedings6 are crucial ingredients necessary to 
facilitate mutual recognition of judgments and judicial decisions. 
Still, the Lisbonisation of EU policies on criminal justice and police has 
not always been able to catch up with the ways in which decision-shaping 
and decision-making processes have taken place in security measures. It is 
far from clear how the pre-Lisbon Treaty ways of setting priorities and 
adopting decisions have actually and meaningfully changed in practice. 
The set-up of a Security Union Task Force,7 and its goal to bring 
together all the relevant Commission services with direct or indirect 
portfolios on security, is a welcome step in ensuring a more consistent EU 
policy approach in the domain of security. Commissioner King’s initiative of 
launching a “Comprehensive Assessment of EU Security Policy” 
represented a further advance in that direction and provided momentum to 
review the EU acquis in these domains as well as to identify gaps requiring 
further action. The assessment concluded with an “overall positive 
appreciation of EU action in this area”. The Commission’s assessment 
outlines some important findings related to the relevance and general value 
(as perceived by selected stakeholders) of the EU’s intervention in the field 
of security cooperation.  
                                                     
6 Chapter VI of the EU Charter (justice) provides for the rights to an effective remedy and 
fair trial, the presumption of innocence and rights of the defence as well as the principles 
of legality and proportionality of criminal offences and penalties, and the ne bis in idem 
principle. 
7 European Commission, “President Juncker consults the European Parliament on Sir 
Julian King as Commissioner for the Security Union”, Press Release IP 16/2707, Brussels, 
2.8.2016. 
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The assessment presents some limitations in providing an in-depth 
evaluation or ‘fitness check’8 – in line with the Better Regulation guidelines 
– of existing Union security policies, instruments and agencies.9 Such an 
evaluation exercise would require a more detailed and qualitative 
assessment (instrument by instrument) of their effectiveness (how successful 
EU action has been in achieving or progressing towards its objectives), 
efficiency (are the costs and benefits of EU action justified and proportionate) 
and coherence (how well or not different actions work together). 
De Londras underlines in chapter 4 of this volume that EU counter-
terrorism policies have grown and mushroomed usually following terrorist 
attacks and threats, particularly since 2001. She argues that they have not 
always done so based on a careful assessment – drawing from the best and 
independent academic/scientific knowledge from the social sciences and 
humanities and from civil society inputs – of their actual need and 
effectiveness. The EU Better Regulation guidelines10 call for “a rigorous 
evidence base to inform decision-making”, in order to “inform political 
choices with evidence – not the other way around”.11 Indeed, the Inter-
Institutional Agreement on better law-making of April 2016 stipulates the 
need for high-quality legislation and well-informed policy-making, which 
generally include carrying out an impact assessment,12 public and 
                                                     
8 See “Fitness checks” (http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/evaluation/docs/fitness_ 
checks_2012_en.pdf). 
9 Refer to European Commission, “Better Regulation Toolbox” (http://ec.europa.eu/ 
smart-regulation/guidelines/docs/br_toolbox_en.pdf). 
10 See the European Commission’s webpage on “Better Regulation: Why and How”. See 
also European Commission, “Better Regulation Guidelines”, Staff Working Document, 
SWD(2015) 111 final, Strasbourg, 19.5.2015. 
11 European Commission, “Better Regulation Toolbox” (op. cit.). 
12 Refer to the Inter-Institutional Agreement between the European Parliament, the 
Council of the European Union and the European Commission on Better Law Making, 
13 April 2016 (OJ L 123/1, 12.5.2016), point 12:  
Impact assessments should cover the existence, scale and consequences of a 
problem and the question whether or not Union action is needed. They should 
map out alternative solutions and, where possible, potential short and long-
term costs and benefits, assessing the economic, environmental and social 
impacts in an integrated and balanced way and using both qualitative and 
quantitative analyses. The principles of subsidiarity and proportionality should 
be fully respected, as should fundamental rights … Impact assessments should 
be based on accurate, objective and complete information and should be 
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stakeholder consultation/feedback, and an ex post evaluation of existing 
legislation.13  
This book illustrates how in a post-Lisbon Treaty landscape ‘better 
policy-making’ should remain an ongoing and consistent policy objective. 
Several chapters bring to the fore examples where EU security measures 
have been adopted without a robust examination of their effectiveness, 
efficiency and coherence, as well as a full compatibility test with EU standards 
and fundamental rights.  
Chapters 4 and 7 by de Londras and Brouwer respectively, for instance, 
show how some EU security legislation has been passed without a proper ex 
ante impact assessment and ‘added value’ examination. In other cases, EU 
security measures have been adopted in expedited ways and later on have 
been struck down or invalidated by the Court of Justice in Luxembourg 
because of their incompatibility with the EU principles and fundamental 
rights envisaged in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.  
In chapter 4, de Londras highlights that the mere existence of security 
measures in the EU anti-terrorism and crime acquis seems to predetermine 
or presume their effectiveness and that they are ‘fit for purpose’. A truly 
comprehensive evaluation of EU security policies, in her view, would call for 
analysing whether the set of laws and policies under review actually ‘work’ 
in practice in light of their objectives. Such a critical exercise would need to 
go hand-in-hand with an effectiveness assessment, consisting of checking 
whether the policies actually achieve the purported public goals (both meta-
objectives and specific objectives) for which they were designed. It should 
also involve the Commission more vigorously using the powers it has had 
since 2014 to ensure the consistency of EU policy in these fields in Member 
States’ implementation of the acquis. 
                                                     
proportionate as regards their scope and focus … The Commission’s 
Regulatory Scrutiny Board will carry out an objective quality check of its impact 
assessments. 
13 Following point 22 of the Agreement, “[i]n the context of the legislative cycle, 
evaluations of existing legislation and policy, based on efficiency, effectiveness, 
relevance, coherence and value added, should provide the basis for impact assessments 
of options for further action”. 
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11.2 Information sharing and interoperability  
The exchange of information among national law enforcement authorities 
has constituted a long-standing priority in EU counter-terrorism policies. 
Curtin points out in chapter 6 that information sharing has become a central 
tool in EU internal and external security policy. Over the last two decades, 
the EU has developed a plethora of information systems and databases, such 
as the Schengen Information System (SIS II), the Visa Information System 
(VIS), Eurodac (the European Automated Fingerprint Identification System) 
and the Europol Information System.14 Figure 1 provides a schematic 
overview of the present EU information systems and databases covering 
border management and law enforcement. 
Figure 1. EU information systems (border management and law enforcement) 
 
                                                     
14 S. Carrera, D. Bigo, B. Hayes, N. Hernanz and J. Jeandesboz, “Justice and Home Affairs 
Databases and a Smart Borders System at EU External Borders: An Evaluation of Current 
and Forthcoming Proposals”, Study for the European Parliament, DG IPOL, Brussels, 
2012. For an updated overview of EU information systems, refer to Council of the 
European Union, “Manual on Law Enforcement Information Exchange”, 6261/17, 
Brussels, 4.7.2017. 
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Note: API refers advance passenger information, ECRIS to European Criminal Records 
Information System, PNR to passenger name record and SLTD to Interpol’s stolen and lost 
travel documents.  
Source: European Commission, Communication, “Stronger and Smarter Information Systems 
for Borders and Security”, COM(2016) 205, Brussels, 6.4.2016, p. 6. 
The Security Union seems to be inspired by the goal of ‘maximisation’ and 
further ‘centralisation’ of information sharing across current EU information 
systems and various law enforcement authorities. According to the 
Commission’s Communication on “Delivering on the European Agenda on 
Security to fight against terrorism and pave the way towards an effective and 
genuine Security Union” of April 2016, overcoming the fragmentation of 
information sharing seems to be the most fundamental goal of the Security 
Union:  
In a Security Union, a police officer in one Member State should 
have the same reflex to share relevant information with colleagues 
over the border, as he would do with fellow officers within his 
country. This requires a step change in two respects. At European 
level, we need to urgently address the remaining gaps, 
fragmentation and operational limitations of the information 
exchange tools in place, to make sure that structures for cooperation 
are as effective as possible, and to make sure that European 
legislation to tackle terrorist criminals and their activities is up to 
date and robust. This is necessary to create an environment of confidence 
among national authorities and the legal and practical tools that allow 
them to work together to address common challenges. The full added 
value of an effective Security Union depends crucially on the use 
that is made of these tools and structures to close any future 
operational loopholes and police intelligence gaps. That requires a 
culture change, at the level of Member States, for their law 
enforcement authorities to acquire the habit of systematic 
cooperation and information sharing, right down to the last 
policeman. A sense of common responsibility, and the will and 
capacity to turn that into action, are essential if we are to overcome 
the fragmentation which terrorists and criminals are so effective at 
exploiting. (Emphasis added)15 
                                                     
15 European Commission, Communication, “Delivering on the European Agenda on 
Security to fight against terrorism and pave the way towards an effective and genuine 
Security Union”, COM(2016) 230, Brussels, 20.4.2016.  
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The Commission’s Comprehensive Assessment identified “shortcomings” 
regarding EU information systems, including “(a) sub-optimal 
functionalities of existing information systems, (b) gaps in the EU’s 
architecture of data management, (c) a complex landscape of differently 
governed information systems, and (d) a fragmented architecture of data 
management for border control and security”.16 The “solution” for 
addressing these deficits in the Commission’s opinion is the interoperability 
of information systems “for security, border and migration management by 
2020 to ensure that border guards, law enforcement officers including 
customs officials, immigration officials and judicial authorities have the 
necessary information at their disposal”.17  
The way in which the Security Union aims to be genuine and effective 
is to put special emphasis on the full use of existing databases or information 
systems, chiefly the interoperability of databases. Interoperability, however, 
is far from new as a concept in EU policy documents,18 as exemplified by the 
2004 European Council Declaration on Combating Terrorism following the 
Madrid terrorist attacks:  
The European Council calls on the Commission to submit proposals 
for enhanced interoperability between European databases and to 
explore the creation of synergies between existing and future 
information systems (SIS II, VIS and EURODAC) in order to exploit 
their added value within their respective legal and technical 
frameworks in the prevention and fight against terrorism.  
In its 2016 Communication on “Stronger and Smarter Information Systems 
for Borders and Security”,19 the Commission defined interoperability as “the 
ability of information systems to exchange data and to enable the sharing of 
                                                     
16 European Commission, Comprehensive Assessment, SWD(2017) 278 final, 2017 (op. 
cit.), p. 80. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Council of the European Union, “Additional Measures to combat terrorism – Proposals 
by the German delegation”, 13176/01, 24.10.2001. The document stated that “the Council 
instructs the Article 36 Committee to submit immediate proposals on: interconnection of 
data by making on-line access authorisation to the databases of the SIS available to 
Europol, national public prosecutor’s offices, immigration and asylum authorities; 
enabling Europe-wide computerised profile searches to be conducted”. 
19 European Commission, Communication, “Stronger and Smarter Information Systems 
for Borders and Security”, COM(2016) 205 final, Brussels, 6.4.2016, p. 14. 
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information”.20 It identified four main dimensions under the notion of 
interoperability:  
 a single search interface to query several information systems 
simultaneously and to produce combined results on one 
single screen;  
 the interconnectivity of information systems where data 
registered in one system will automatically be consulted by 
another system;  
 the establishment of a shared biometric matching service in 
support of various information systems;  
 a common repository of data for different information 
systems (core module).21 
The interoperability agenda has subsequently been reconfirmed by various 
EU official documents. The joint statement by EU ministers for justice and 
home affairs and representatives of EU institutions on the terrorist attacks in 
Brussels on 22 March 201622 stated the need to  
increase as a matter of urgency the systematic feeding, consistent 
use and interoperability of European and international databases in 
the fields of security, travel and migration by making full use of 
technological developments and including privacy safeguards from 
the outset. This is particularly relevant for reliable identity 
verification. 
The priority given to interoperability was reiterated in a recent report23 of 
May 2017 by the High-Level Expert Group on Information Systems and 
Interoperability set up by the Commission, whose actual membership has 
                                                     
20 Refer also to European Commission, European Interoperability Framework for Pan-
European e-government services, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the 
European Union, 2004 (http://ec.europa.eu/idabc/servlets/Docd552.pdf). 
21 Ibid. 
22 Council of the European Union, Joint statement of EU Ministers for Justice and Home 
Affairs and representatives of EU institutions on the terrorist attacks in Brussels on 22 
March 2016, 7371/16, Brussels, 24.3.2016. 
23 See the High-Level Expert Group on Information Systems and Interoperability, “Final 
report”, European Commission, DG for Migration and Home Affairs, May 2017 
(http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regexpert/index.cfm?do=groupDetail. 
groupDetailDoc&id=32600&no=1).  
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not been publicly disclosed.24 The core task of the group was to “address the 
legal, technical and operational aspects of various options to achieve 
interoperability of information systems”. The report called for more 
interoperability of existing EU information systems and recommended that 
the EU mainly consider the option of a centralised “single search interface” 
(SSI), as represented in Figure 2.25 
Figure 2. Single search interface 
 
Note: EES refers to entry–exit system, and SLTD refers to Interpol’s stolen and lost travel 
documents. 
Source: European Commission, Communication, “Stronger and Smarter Information Systems 
for Borders and Security”, COM(2016) 205, Brussels, 6.4.2016, p. 16. 
                                                     
24 See European Commission’s Register of Commission Expert Groups and Other 
Entities, High-Level Expert Group on Information Systems and Interoperability 
(http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regexpert/index.cfm?do=groupDetail.group 
Detail&groupID=3435). 
25 The group drew this conclusion in its report (p. 27):  
An important finding was that the second option (interconnectivity of 
systems) should only be considered on a case-by-case basis, while 
evaluating if certain data from one system needs to be systematically and 
automatically reused to be entered into another system. Consider the 
example with two systems, A and B, that can be consulted via a single-
search interface. The interconnectivity of system B with system A only 
makes sense if system A systematically and automatically needs to store 
and process data from system B. If no data reuse is necessary or if such 
reuse requires a human (legal) decision, the interconnection is without 
interest: the single-search interface is a better and sufficient option.  
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As illustrated in Figure 3, the interface or functionality would aim at 
facilitating the possibility to “query several information systems 
simultaneously, and to produce combined results on one single screen for 
border guards and police officers”, by setting up a platform offering the 
ability to consult all relevant EU information systems with one 
query/procedure.26 Still, the report expressly states that “the potential 
practical and operational challenges for Member States and relevant 
agencies to fully exploit the benefits of such a centralised SSI would need to 
be further explored”.27 
Figure 3. Conceptual overview of the European search portal 
 
Note: EES refers to the entry–exit system, ECRIS TCN to the 
European Criminal Records Information System for third-country 
nationals, ETIAS to the European travel information and 
                                                     
26 Ibid., p. 15. According the report, the SSI would not connect with national databases, 
and “an assessment of such a European search portal would be undertaken, but it would 
be expected to require relatively minor technical changes on the national side”, p. 28. 
27 Ibid., p. 29. 
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authorisation system, STESTA to the Secured Trans European 
Services for Telematics between Administrations, and UMF to 
Universal Message Format. 
Source: High-Level Expert Group, on Information Systems and 
Interoperability, “Final Report”, May 2017, p. 29. 
The High-Level Expert Group recommended the establishment of a shared, 
biometric matching system for all the centralised databases that would 
include both fingerprints and facial images, and would match biometric data 
from so-called ‘parent systems’ like the SIS, VIS, Eurodac, etc.28 The group 
took no account of the data protection implications of such a proposal and 
the implementation challenges that it would entail. The report also 
recommended the setting-up of a “common identity repository” of 
alphanumeric identity data “that would allow for a complete view of all 
claimed biographic identities used by a person” and single identifications.29 
The report provides no evidence substantiating the usefulness or the 
potential negative impacts of interoperability or the legal and technical 
questions intimately related to its practical implementation. It has provided 
no evidence that the gaps resulting from the existence of compartmentalised 
EU information systems represent a security threat, nor on what these gaps 
actually are. The High-Level Expert Group report does not either explain the 
necessity and proportionality of the proposed SSI, shared biometric system 
and common identity repository.  
Kreissl underlines in chapter 9 of this volume that the equation of more 
data equals more security ignores the conceptual and practical challenges 
inherent in data analysis. The Commission’s Comprehensive Assessment 
has rightly underlined the need to improve the quality of data going into EU 
databases. This indeed remains a key challenge in cross-border cooperation 
on law enforcement. The technical discussions that have taken place in the 
scope of the High-Level Expert Group should now be coupled with a 
                                                     
28 The report (p. 31) explains it as follows:  
A person who is the subject of a check can be registered in several systems 
simultaneously – potentially under different identities – given the specific 
purpose of each system. Public authorities should be able to obtain reliable and 
up-to-date information about the status of such persons on the basis of possible 
matches from all relevant EU systems. 
29 Ibid., p. 32. 
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detailed examination of the legal implications and questions raised by the 
various ideas being recommended.30  
Each EU information system relies on different national ministries and 
domestic coordinating authorities. It is often the case that these national 
authorities differ substantially from one another depending on the EU 
database at stake, and that designated domestic actors (which are often a 
single point of contact or which correspond with one or more than one 
central, national access point) have different access rights depending on their 
domestic responsibilities and the kind of information on each EU 
information system.  
This book calls for a realistic discussion about the scope and actual 
reach of the principle of interoperability. The questions of ‘who’ has access 
to what information and under whose control and oversight often reflect the 
organisational and administrative structures fulfilling Member States’ 
constitutional or legal national systems. Information systems dealing with 
migration and asylum matters are usually in the hands of or ‘owned’ by 
domestic authorities that have central responsibility for issuing visas or 
those in charge of asylum, and not the police.31 When and if national law 
enforcement authorities have certain access to these databases for the 
purpose of countering terrorism and crime, access rights are subject to 
detailed and well-regulated requirements and in well-defined cases. The 
picture becomes even more complex in those Member States that have a 
decentralised division of competences regarding migration and policing.  
Furthermore, the High-Level Expert Group refers to the proposal for 
establishing a European travel information and authorisation system 
(ETIAS) as already putting the concept of a common identity repository into 
practice, and how this system would share a common repository of personal 
data of third-country nationals with the proposed entry–exit system, which 
is currently under inter-institutional negotiations. Yet previous research has 
demonstrated that the European Commission’s 2016 proposal on ETIAS 
                                                     
30 S. Alegre, J. Jeandesboz and N. Vavoula, “European Travel Information and 
Authorisation System (ETIAS): Border management, fundamental rights and data 
protection”, European Parliament Study, DG IPOL, Brussels, 2017. 
31 See for instance the “List of competent authorities the duly authorised staff of which 
shall have access to enter, amend, delete or consult data in the Visa Information System 
(VIS)” (2016/C 187/04), OJ L 187/4, 26.5.2016. 
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lacked any proper impact assessment justifying its necessity, effectiveness, 
fundamental rights compliance or added value.32 
In addition to the legality check of the specific ways in which 
interoperability will take shape, it is important to underline that not all EU 
institutions and Member States in fact agree on exactly what interoperability 
actually means or how widely the net should be cast. What is clear is that the 
concept would entail a major widening of the group of actors with rights of 
access to EU information systems.  
Therefore, a broad notion of ‘interoperability’ would constitute a far-
reaching transformation of the ways in which centralised EU information 
systems work and the ownership of the data stored in each of them. Curtin 
explains in chapter 6 of this volume that the notion of interoperability is a 
more general and less passive term than the principle of availability formerly 
proposed at the EU level, which implied full availability and 
interconnections between systems and actors.33 It would be important to 
examine the impact and costs of ‘non-interoperability’ or a narrow notion and 
scope of interoperability in the AFSJ, and to explore other options for 
addressing the operational challenges in the current use of EU databases. 
Mitsilegas points out in chapter 1 that the cross-sectoral approach 
called for by the European Agenda on Security is based on an axiom of 
maximum collection and exchange of data across EU databases, irrespective 
of their main purpose or rationale. Widening access to sensitive information 
beyond the actors with specific and clearly defined expertise and powers can 
be detrimental to effective cooperation and fundamental rights.  
Experience has shown that trust works best among a limited number 
of actors with well-defined roles and who share competences and similar 
objectives. The increasing reliance on and calls for interoperability of existing 
electronic information databases might not always be the most effective way 
of countering terrorism and crime. Ownership of data seems to be an issue 
of critical importance in creating confidence in EU information systems. The 
wider the interoperability and the circle of actors with access to databases, 
                                                     
32 See Alegre, Jeandesboz and Vavoula (2017), op. cit.  
33 The former principle of availability implied an obligation for the Member States to give 
access to or provide certain types of information available to their authorities to 
equivalent authorities of other Member States. It would hinder the national authorities 
concerned from saying no to the request and from working under the agreement about 
‘what information is’, how to handle it and its uses (http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ 
RegData/etudes/note/join/2006/378272/IPOL-LIBE_NT(2006)378272_EN.pdf).  
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the more reluctant some actors may become to input sensitive information 
into a particular EU information system.  
The priority given to ever-wider access to databases may in turn have 
a deleterious effect on the quality of the data that actors are willing to share 
with others in the EU. Counter-terrorism magistrates may be able to share 
information without too much difficulty across borders. But if they know 
that the data that they share with their counterparts in another Member State 
may also become available to other actors, such as border and coast guards 
or police, this may no longer be the case. Furthermore, sensitive information 
may end up in the hands of national authorities with no experience in 
specific areas or pose risks to vulnerable categories of individuals, such as 
asylum seekers.  
Interoperability reinvigorates a ‘preventive justice’ approach, as it 
effectively means the interlinkage and blurring between migration 
management tools and those designed for the purposes of fighting terrorism 
and crime. Increasing linkages between law enforcement databases with 
those covering migration and asylum should not nurture the stigmatisation 
and discrimination of third-country nationals and asylum seekers in the EU. 
The use of information stored in EU data systems such as Eurodac leads to 
an automatic veil of suspicion over people seeking international protection 
in the EU, which has been said to have negative legal and societal 
consequences.34 Kreissl reminds us in chapter 9 of this book that the 
migration–security nexus, which is too easily taken for granted in some 
policy discussions and extreme-right populist agendas, “should be 
disentangled to better understand and more effectively address the 
challenges of data-driven intelligence strategies … and approaches aimed at 
governing mobility and identity”. 
11.3 Fundamental rights and societal impacts  
The Human Rights Commissioner of the Council of Europe has declared that 
“laws and policies that are human rights compliant preserve the values the 
                                                     
34 Refer for instance to the Note prepared by the Meijers Committee on “The amended 
proposal for the Eurodac Regulation (COM(2009) 342) and the Decision on requesting 
comparisons with Eurodac data by Member States’ law enforcement authorities and 
Europol for law enforcement purposes (COM(2009) 344, 10.9.2009), CM0910, Utrecht, 30 
December 2009. 
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terrorists are trying to destroy, weaken the pull of radicalisation, and 
strengthen the public’s confidence in the rule of law and democratic 
institutions”.35 A majority of the contributions to this book have called upon 
the EU to place the fundamental principles and values enshrined in the 
Treaties at the heart of EU security policy, beyond the usual formalistic 
statements that can often be found in EU official documents concerning 
fundamental rights compliance. Chapter 3 by Bárd highlights that the 
premise of proponents of a preventive justice model for EU security 
cooperation is that security and human rights are competing areas that might 
mutually exclude one another.  
EU counter-terrorism policies tend to start from an understanding of 
security that frames EU constitutional principles – democracy, rule of law 
and fundamental rights – as obstacles to effective counter-terrorism and law 
enforcement policies. Liberty and security then become competing values 
that are to be ‘balanced’ against one another. The European Commission’s 
Comprehensive Assessment states: 
In a European Union founded on respect for human dignity, 
freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and human rights, 
protecting and fostering citizens’ security and complying with 
fundamental rights are complementary and mutually reinforcing. 
(Emphasis added) 
This is a welcome statement. The challenge remains how to systematically 
and effectively operationalise it in practice. In ‘times of crisis’ or in the wake 
of terrorist attacks, as de Londras well explains, the standards that were 
considered to be ‘exceptional’ when the security law or policy was first 
introduced later on become normalised and the new way of doing things. 
This way of working in security policy-making may lead to ‘downward’ 
renegotiations of existing standards and fundamental rights protection, 
which challenges national and EU constitutional principles. 
In its above-mentioned 2016 Communication on a “Stronger and 
Smarter Information System for Borders and Security”, the Commission 
identified the principle of purpose limitation as one of the main causes of the 
current fragmentation of the EU’s architecture on data management for 
border control and internal security:   
                                                     
35 See the Commissioner for Human Rights, “National human rights structures: 
Protecting human rights while countering terrorism”, Human Rights Comment, Council 
of Europe, Strasbourg, 6 December 2016.  
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With the new comprehensive framework for the protection of 
personal data in the EU in place and significant developments in 
technology and IT security, the principle of purpose limitation can 
be more easily implemented at the level of access and use to data 
stored, in full compliance with the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
and with recent European Court of Justice’s jurisprudence. 
Safeguards such as compartmentalising data within one system and 
specific access and use rules for each category of data and user 
should ensure the necessary purpose limitation in integrated 
solutions for data management.36 
It is not entirely clear how the ‘unification’ laying behind the principle of 
interoperability will be compatible with CJEU and EU privacy standards. In 
fact, in a previous Communication providing an “Overview of information 
management in the area of freedom, security and justice”,37 the Commission 
rightly stated that  
[p]urpose limitation is a key consideration for most of the 
instruments covered in this communication. A single, overarching 
EU information system with multiple purposes would deliver the 
highest degree of information sharing. Creating such a system 
would, however, constitute a gross and illegitimate restriction of 
individuals’ right to privacy and data protection and pose huge 
challenges in terms of development and operation. In practice, policies in 
the area of freedom, security and justice have developed in an 
incremental manner, yielding a number of information systems and 
instruments of varying size, scope and purpose. The 
compartmentalised structure of information management that has 
emerged over recent decades is more conducive to safeguarding 
citizens’ right to privacy than any centralised alternative. (Emphasis 
added) 
This tension was reiterated in the European Commission’s “Seventh 
Progress Report towards an Effective and Genuine Security Union” of 16 
May 2017,38 which underlined that a key task in moving forward in 
discussions related to the interoperability of EU information systems is to 
                                                     
36 See European Commission, COM(2016) 205, 2016 (op. cit.), p. 4. 
37 European Commission, Communication, “Overview of information management in 
the area of freedom, security and justice”, COM(2010) 385 final, Brussels, 20.7.2010. 
38 European Commission, “Seventh Progress Report towards an Effective and Genuine 
Security Union”, COM(2017) 261 final, Strasbourg, 16 May 2017.  
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devise “the necessary strict rules on access and use without affecting the 
existing purpose limitation”.  
In addition to statements in the Commission’s Comprehensive 
Assessment that interoperability will comply with fundamental rights, a 
crucial challenge remains on how to effectively implement it in practice. 
How would interoperable information systems respect their specific data 
protection provisions and rules on access by competent authorities, separate 
purpose limitation rules for each category of data and dedicated data 
retention norms?  
The fundamental rights to privacy and data protection enshrined in 
Arts 7 and 8 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights fully apply in respect 
of EU security policies and information systems designed to counter crime 
and terrorism. The principle of purpose limitation is a main component of 
EU data protection law.39 Brouwer highlights in chapter 7 that this principle 
includes “the ban on ‘aimless data collection’ and the obligation of purpose 
specification”. The need to transparently lay down norms according to 
which information will be stored and shared and for what purposes plays a 
fundamental role under this principle. The way in which the Security Union 
agenda frames ‘compartmentalisation’ as a problem for effective security 
policies stands in a difficult relationship with this very principle, which lays 
at the foundations of EU privacy law and has direct effect, and thus could be 
directly enforceable by potentially affected individuals.  
                                                     
39 See Art. 5.1 of the General Data Protection Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of 27 April 2016, 
which states that personal data shall be  
(b) collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and not further 
processed in a manner that is incompatible with those purposes; further 
processing for archiving purposes in the public interest, scientific or historical 
research purposes or statistical purposes shall, in accordance with Article 89(1), 
not be considered to be incompatible with the initial purposes (‘purpose 
limitation’).  
See also para. 26 of the Preamble and also Art. 4(2)(a) of Directive (EU) 2016/680 of the 
European Parliament of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons 
with regard to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes 
of the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the 
execution of criminal penalties, and on the free movement of such data, and repealing 
Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA, OJ L 119/89, 4.5.2016. On the purpose 
limitation principle, see E. Brouwer, “Legality and Data Protection Law: The Forgotten 
Purpose of Purpose Limitation”, in L.F.M. Besselink, F. Pennings and S. Prechal (eds), 
The Eclipse of the Legality Principle in the European Union, The Hague: Kluwer, 2011. 
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The CJEU has played a major role in upholding EU rule of law 
principles in security policies. In a series of landmark judgments, the 
Luxembourg Court confirmed the importance of the rights to privacy and 
data protection, and maintained the unlawfulness of pre-emptive 
generalised or large-scale surveillance. Chapter 8 in this book by González 
Fuster argues that the European Commission’s Comprehensive Assessment 
too easily draws the conclusion that everything is globally fine when it 
comes to the fundamental rights compliance of EU security measures. She 
holds that the compliance of EU actions in this regard should be better 
guaranteed to prevent the CJEU from intervening and invalidating EU legal 
instruments and international agreements, owing to their shortcomings.  
The CJEU’s rejection of generalised surveillance should be taken fully 
into account by the other Union institutions in developing a trust-based and 
rights-compliant Security Union. In times of upheaval, it is the judiciary that 
has reminded us of the importance of fundamental rights guarantees and 
‘better regulation’ in the process of constitutionalising the Security Union, 
and of setting limits to an uncritical move towards prevention and 
insecurity.  
The CJEU for instance has clarified, in such landmark rulings as Digital 
Rights Ireland, Schrems or Tele2, that generalised, large-scale and unlimited 
surveillance is contrary to EU privacy and data protection rights, and 
constitutes a disproportionate response in any democratic society.40 The 
Luxembourg Court has equally underlined the need to show, for any data 
access and sharing, a link with specific, reasonable and individualised 
suspicion. These are clear warnings against temptations inherent to 
preventive justice approaches in the Security Union agenda. They confirm 
that any interference with the right to privacy must be strictly necessary. 
Moreover, González Fuster reminds us that “the general and indiscriminate 
retention of everybody’s data is incompatible with EU law”. 
Cases of large-scale collection and transfer of data between EU and 
third countries pose equally open questions in light of these same judge-
                                                     
40 See V. Mitsilegas, “Surveillance and Digital Privacy in the Transatlantic ‘War on 
Terror’: The Case for a Global Privacy Regime”, Legal Studies Research Paper No. 
251/2017, Queen Mary University of London, 2017; and S. Carrera and E. Guild, “Safe 
harbour or into the storm? EU–US data transfers after the Schrems judgment”, CEPS 
Paper in Liberty and Security in Europe, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, 
2015.  
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made standards. Brouwer’s chapter clarifies how international agreements 
on the transfer of personal data between the EU and third states must offer 
clear rules on scope and content, be transparent, comply with the purpose 
limitation principle, be subject to independent control and guarantee 
effective remedies to individuals. These conditions are essential for assessing 
their legality in light of EU law.  
This view has been confirmed in the recent Opinion by the CJEU on 
the EU–Canada Agreement on Passenger Name Records (PNR),41 which 
struck down the validity of the Agreement because of its incompatibility 
with the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and EU data protection law. In 
this same Opinion, the Court also laid down a set of benchmarks for 
assessing the legality of current and future security measures, particularly 
the transfer of passengers’ data in the scope of international agreements. 
These EU legal standards include, among others, the provision of sufficient 
guarantees of the integrity of individuals’ personal data and their ability to 
seek effective remedies against the risk of abuse in third countries. They also 
require that access to and processing of electronic data are necessary 
(proportionate) and non-discriminatory, and that clear and precise rules 
specify the conditions justifying the interference with privacy, subject to a 
review carried out either by a court or an independent administrative body. 
The Court of Justice has also brought the Lisbonisation of EU security 
policy to the fore by reminding the EU legislator about the right legal basis 
in the Treaties, under the headings of police cooperation along with data 
protection, and not public security and the activities of the state in areas of 
criminal law. The Opinion stated that the choice of the legal basis “must be 
founded on objective criteria amenable to judicial review, and those objective 
criteria include the purpose and the content of the act at issue”. In this 
regard, the CJEU held that the purpose of the agreement envisaged is to 
combat terrorism and serious transnational crime “while safeguarding the 
right to respect for privacy and the right to protection of personal data”, 
which it interpreted as the need to reconcile the two objectives, as they 
constitute two essential components of the Agreement.  
The Court’s Opinion clarified that it was clear from the content of the 
Agreement that the transfer and processing of data would be authorised 
“only if the data in question benefits from an adequate level of protection”. 
In light of this Opinion, countering terrorism and crime with respect for the 
                                                     
41 See Opinion 1/15 of the Court (Grand Chamber) on the EU–Canada PNR Agreement, 
26 July 2017. 
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rights of privacy and data protection are in this way inseparable and must 
be pursued simultaneously. On these grounds, the Court concluded that the 
correct legal basis for a PNR agreement between the EU and Canada should 
be Art. 87(2)(a) TFEU (police cooperation) in conjunction with Art. 16(2) 
TFEU (protection of personal data). 
It is important to note here the relevance of this finding from the 
perspective of the Lisbonisation of police cooperation since 2009. Indeed, 
during the proceedings of the case, the European Commission argued before 
the Court that on the basis of the CJEU 2006 judgment, Parliament v Council 
and Commission (C-317/04 and C-318/04), which invalidated Council 
Decision 2004/496/EC of 17 May 2004 on the conclusion of an Agreement 
between the European Community and the United States of America,42 the 
purpose and content of the Agreement with Canada were “public security 
and the activities of the Member States in areas of criminal law”. In the view 
of the Court, the Commission was taking “out of context” the findings in that 
case, “which, it must be recalled, was delivered well before the adoption of 
the Treaty of Lisbon”.43 
The Court has thus sent a clear message to EU institutions and Member 
States that exchange and sharing of information for the purposes of fighting 
terrorism and crime – including in frameworks for international cooperation 
– fall under shared EU-Member States competence and are subject to EU 
judicial scrutiny in a post-Lisbon Treaty landscape. Measures framing 
international cooperation on the transfer and processing of data for the 
purposes of countering crime and terrorism must go hand-in-hand with 
privacy. Moreover, they must no longer fall under the notion of ‘public 
security’ and the exclusive competence of EU Member States on matters of 
policing (as they did prior to the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty), as 
they are now a shared competence between Member States and the EU.  
The Court also clearly differentiated in this Opinion between policing 
measures adopted for the purposes of prevention, detection and 
investigation of criminal offences – which may include the collection, 
storage, processing, analysis and exchange of relevant information – and 
                                                     
42 See E. Guild and E. Brouwer, “The Political Life of Data: The ECJ Decision on the PNR 
Agreement between the EU and the US”, CEPS Policy Brief No. 109, Centre for European 
Policy Studies, Brussels, July 2006; refer also to Parliament v Council and Commission 
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43 See para. 84 of Opinion 1/15, op. cit. 
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those covering judicial cooperation in criminal matters as envisaged in Art. 
82(1)(d) TFEU. Lastly, the Court’s Opinion means not only the need to open 
new negotiations with Canada with the aim of concluding a new 
agreement,44 but also the automatic annulment of similar PNR agreements 
that the EU currently has with the US and Australia.45 It furthermore casts a 
shadow over the legality of the EU’s PNR Directive.46 
In chapter 6, Curtin quotes Tuori’s47 critique of the normative concerns 
pertaining to the EU’s security constitution, which mainly relates to treating 
individuals as “passive recipients of collective security goods rather than 
active citizens and bearers of rights”. Curtin argues that despite the fact that 
EU information exchange initiatives and tools profoundly affect people’s 
privacy, there is very little that affected individuals can actually do to 
challenge these processes and reclaim the ownership of their data. 
Furthermore, as Curtin’s chapter highlights, the central issues remain 
regarding how to make information gathering, mining and interoperable 
sharing of data (which often remain “invisible”) transparent, and “how we 
make informal, unseen and multijurisdictional arrangements accountable”. 
Furthermore, careful consideration should be paid to the wider societal 
effects of certain EU security policies. Identifying, detecting and addressing 
the underlying factors that lead individuals to commit extreme forms of 
violence are prominent themes in EU counter-terrorism policies. The concept 
of ‘radicalisation’ hides extremely complex and dynamic phenomena. An 
                                                     
44 European Commission, Recommendation for a Council Decision authorising the 
opening of negotiations on an Agreement between the European Union and Canada for 
the transfer and use of Passenger Name Record (PNR) data to prevent and combat 
terrorism and other serious transnational crime, COM(2017) 605 final, Brussels, 
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45 See the Agreement between the European Union and Australia on the processing and 
transfer of Passenger Name Record (PNR) data by air carriers to the Australian Customs 
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2015, p. 317. 
136  CARRERA AND MITSILEGAS 
‘easy policy fix’ simply does not exist. As the European Parliament 
Resolution on the prevention of radicalisation and recruitment of European 
citizens by terrorist organisations of November 2015 rightly acknowledged, 
radicalisation calls for a careful examination of the various global, 
sociological and political factors, and needs to be understood on a case-by-
case basis, against the background and interactions of the individuals 
concerned.  
These are all factors deserving careful consideration in the design and 
implementation of public policies addressing terrorism in the EU. Counter-
radicalisation policies in the EU have so far included ‘hard’ counter-
terrorism responses, such as the adoption of new laws in various Member 
States allowing for pre-emptive judicial powers, deprivation of nationality 
and stop-and-search activities.48  
As examined in chapter 5 by Davila Gordillo and Ragazzi, they have 
also included ‘softer measures’. Among these are the setting-up of the 
Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) and the focus it has given to 
supporting the involvement of local service providers, in sectors such as 
health and education, in preventing terrorism through the involvement of 
“front-line practitioners” and communities. Chapter 5 explains how counter-
radicalisation policies frame communities as both the objects and the subjects 
of security practices. They both work through suspicion but also through 
trust relations. The impact of these policies on societal mistrust cannot be 
underestimated.49 While softer in nature, these initiatives have been shown 
to have important societal implications and often negative repercussions that 
are counterproductive in meeting their intended goals.  
Counter-radicalisation policies call for a large degree of caution, 
particularly regarding their adequacy for diagnosing the phenomenon and 
their actual consequences and wider societal impacts in the communities 
concerned. If not carefully designed and implemented, counter-
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V. Mitsilegas, EU Criminal Law after Lisbon, Hart Studies in Criminal Law, Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2016. 
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radicalisation efforts involving a broad range of social actors – e.g. social 
workers, schoolteachers and health professionals – may in fact be 
detrimental to their objectives. Davila Gordillo and Ragazzi argue that these 
policies controversially give front-line practitioners the task of “propagating 
the state-sanctioned narrative of radicalisation, with the concomitant 
exclusion of alternative voices”. Special attention should also be paid to 
ensuring that counter-radicalisation policies do not result in denigrating the 
value of diversity and pluralism in political debates.50  
As highlighted in the Commission’s Comprehensive Assessment, the 
Commission should foster more coordination and synergies between law 
enforcement approaches to countering radicalisation and other EU policies 
aimed at fostering social inclusion, tackling inequalities, and preventing 
marginalisation and the stigmatisation of certain communities. 
11.4 EU criminal justice standards: Mutual recognition and the 
rule of law 
The challenges and risks posed by current EU counter-terrorism and crime 
policies to fundamental rights are not exclusively confined to privacy. 
Preventive justice policies, as described in chapter 1 of this book, also give 
rise to profound dilemmas in ‘justice-related’ fundamental rights, which are 
of central relevance to safeguarding the rights of suspects in criminal 
investigations and proceedings. These include, chiefly, the right to a legal 
defence and fair trial guarantees for suspects in criminal investigations and 
proceedings, the presumption of innocence and the principle of legality of 
criminal offences and sanctions enshrined in Arts 47-50 of the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights.  
As Ligeti and Robinson show in chapter 10, ‘big data’ practices and 
electronic communications held by IT companies are increasingly in demand 
by pre-emptive counter-terrorism policies.51 Calls for direct access to or ‘legal 
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hacking’ of electronic data stored by the private sector lead to an acute legal 
uncertainty and exposes companies to conflicting demands, which may 
expose them to legal liabilities and mistrust by their clients regarding 
privacy. 
Mitsilegas clarifies in chapter 1 that the European Commission non-
papers on “Improving cross-border access to electronic evidence” of May 
2017,52 and the three scenarios outlined concerning cross-border access to 
electronic evidence, challenge key principles of judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters, bypassing EU legal standards like those laid down in the 
European Investigation Order (EIO). There is also a reframing of issues from 
‘criminal justice’ to ‘cybercrime’, which puts police efficiency, demands and 
priorities first and relegates individuals’ safeguards and criminal justice 
guarantees to second place. 
The various options presently being discussed by the European 
Commission to request and even oblige IT companies to give access to their 
customers’ data in the scope of criminal investigations raise very profound 
legal and rule of law issues in the EU legal system and some Member States’ 
constitutional regimes. The idea of developing an EU production order that 
would compel a service provider in another EU Member State to provide 
information about a user would stand at odds with the model elaborated in 
the EIO. In chapter 10, Ligeti and Robinson rightly call for the need to clarify, 
as a matter of priority, the relationship between the EIO and any such 
production order. It is in our view central that the EU should stop talking 
about ‘electronic evidence’ when what is being discussed is actually 
‘electronic information’, which may be useful for criminal investigations but 
which has certainly not yet been validated as proper ‘evidence’ by an 
independent, rule of law court.  
Moreover, the Directorate-General for Justice and Consumers of the 
European Commission should be cautious when discussing the idea of a 
production order. Its very nature takes us far beyond judicial cooperation in 
the domain of criminal matters towards those of policing and internal 
security. The goal of forcing the private sector to provide access to electronic 
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52 European Commission, Non-Paper, “Improving cross-border access to electronic 
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data gives no service to facilitating mutual recognition of judgments and 
judicial decisions in the EU. It also directly alienates the involvement of and 
the critical role played by judicial authorities in criminal justice proceedings 
and in ensuring the rule of law in the adjudication of justice. For any future 
production order to find a sound legal foundation in the Treaties, its legal 
basis could not possibly be Art. 82(1)(d) TFEU, but rather Art. 87(2) TFEU 
(on police cooperation). 
As Brouwer explains in chapter 7, “there is no such principle of ‘blind 
trust’”, and mutual trust also concerns the reliability and accuracy of the 
information shared and the lawfulness of the processing. Calls for ‘big data’ 
and more information overlook the questions of the actual nature and 
quality of that information, and the extent to which it will be admissible as 
electronic evidence in criminal proceedings before an independent tribunal. 
Criminal justice and police investigations require data that are considered 
‘admissible’ by an independent judge.53 In contrast, data qualified as 
‘intelligence’ include any kind of information irrespective of its reliability, 
origins and quality, or compliance with admissibility and jurisdictional 
rules.54 
This book has also provided evidence that the EU criminal justice area 
remains incomplete and subject to a number of gaps. Weyembergh’s 
contribution in chapter 2 illustrates the need for more consistency and 
complementarity among EU (criminal justice) instruments on mutual 
recognition. This could help to address the issues of ‘overuse’ of the 
European Arrest Warrant for prosecutorial purposes as well as the overuse 
of pre-trial detention. Furthermore, mutual recognition does not yet cover 
the whole judicial cooperation realm, such as the transfer of proceedings or 
disqualification decisions. 
Weyembergh also recalls in chapter 2 the need to better ensure a closer 
relationship with and application of EU law standards laid down in criminal 
justice instruments on mutual recognition, such as the EIO, and in cross-
border investigations and operational activities coordinated by EU agencies, 
such as joint investigation teams (JITs). JITs consist of judges, prosecutors 
                                                     
53 D. Bigo, S. Carrera, N. Hernanz and A. Scherrer, “The Use of Intelligence Information, 
the National Security or State Secrets Rule and Secret Evidence in National Legislation 
and Its Interpretation by Courts”, Study for the European Parliament, DG IPOL, Brussels, 
2014. 
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and law enforcement authorities who are brought together for a fixed period 
for the purpose of conducting criminal investigations in one or several 
Member States. She additionally underlines the need to optimise recourse to 
and the relationships between the various instruments composing the EU 
criminal justice toolbox. This corresponds with calls in previous research to 
ensure the compatibility and consistency between the JITs and the EIO 
benchmarks when exchanging information for the purposes of fighting 
criminal activities in the EU.55 
The independence of the judiciary and full compliance with the 
fundamental rights of suspects in criminal proceedings represent the sine 
qua non for the EU principle of mutual recognition to operate and – more 
importantly – to survive. Bárd’s chapter points out that when fundamental 
rights and the principle of separation of powers are systematically and 
routinely violated, these abuses have the potential to be ‘exported’ to other 
Member States belonging to the EU’s AFSJ. Rule of law backsliding will also 
undermine the mutual trust laying at the basis of European cooperation and 
hamper the exercise of the rights of individuals EU-wide. When the courts 
are no longer independent, or when detention conditions are not human 
rights-compliant, criminal justice decisions and requests will be legitimately 
contested and mistrusted by other Member States. 
11.5 Conclusions 
This book has brought to light some of the most important open questions 
and challenges that the evolution of the European security strategy and a 
Security Union relying increasingly on a paradigm of ‘preventive justice’ 
poses for the rule of law, the protection of fundamental rights and citizenship 
in Europe. The management of Union security responses has taken the form 
of regular reports on the Security Union, combined – also in response to 
repeated terrorist incidents in major European cities – with separate 
communications by the European Council and the Commission.  
The 2017 European Commission “Comprehensive Assessment of EU 
Security Policy” has constituted a welcomed step in the need to review the 
EU acquis in these domains as well as to identify gaps requiring further 
policy action. This book has called for ensuring that EU security policies are 
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firmly embedded in the EU Lisbon Treaty and Better Regulation 
commitments. Prior to the Security Union resulting in yet more EU law in 
the field, detailed and serious thought should be given to three matters:  
1) the efficiency and effectiveness of the existing – and already quite 
extensive – Union legal framework on security, and of newly proposed 
initiatives; 
2) the compatibility of each Union security instrument with the EU 
Treaties and other parallel EU policies; and  
3) key EU values, including fundamental rights and the rule of law. 
The chapters making up this book have recalled and stressed the value of 
conducting ex ante evaluations or impact assessments (or both) in an attempt 
to ensure a high level of expertise and objectivity in such a sensitive policy 
domain. As Weyembergh reminds us, “if the EU intervention in the field 
lacks credible justification, then it will face a real problem of legitimacy”. 
This is critically important in light of the fact that ex ante impact assessment 
enables the gathering of civil society inputs on the repercussions of the 
proposed measures, as well as social sciences and humanities research on the 
societal and fundamental rights effects. 
Bárd reminds us in chapter 3 of this volume that the actual question on 
which any ‘comprehensive’ assessment of EU security policy should be 
solidly anchored is the rationality and the development of legal means to 
prevent abuses called into life by risks of hysteria and illiberalism. She 
concludes that establishing an ex ante mechanism of the EU rule of law 
(which would involve the monitoring of fundamental rights) based on 
objectivity, scientific rigour and a sound methodology is therefore inevitable. 
Chapter 8 by González Fuster equally underlines the importance of security 
measures being supported by strict consideration of the need for each data 
processing operation, which would require an ex ante evaluation of their 
necessity and the existence of other less invasive options. In her view, EU 
security measures should comply with EU rule of law and fundamental 
rights standards “from the very start, by design and by default”. Similarly, 
in chapter 7 Brouwer stresses the need to base the negotiation of agreements 
with third countries allowing data transfers on evidence substantiating their 
necessity and proportionality. 
Overreacting on security and disregarding fundamental rights in the 
process poses a direct challenge to the very values and founding principles 
upon which the Union is based, values that the Union is constitutionally 
bound to uphold and promote in its external action, especially since the entry 
into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009. With the Security Union based 
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increasingly upon operational cooperation, interoperability and the 
generalised collection and exchange of data under a model of pre-emptive 
surveillance, the risks entailed for fundamental rights and also for essential 
bonds of trust and citizenship across the Union are acute. 
The underlying assumption is that more and systemic information 
exchange/sharing will lead to more confidence among national authorities 
to address common challenges. The various chapter contributions have 
illustrated how ‘more information’ (exceeding purpose limitation and actor–
field specialisation or competence) does not always necessarily mean ‘more 
Union’ and ‘more trust’ in EU security cooperation. An ‘Information Union’ 
may lead to ‘less Union’ and ‘more mistrust’ among practitioners on EU 
information tools.  
A Security Union based on a wide notion of interoperability will face 
important challenges from the perspective of the EU’s rule of law system of 
checks and balances, and the division of responsibilities that have been 
designed in the national constitutional systems of Member States and which 
have slowly been reflected and developed in the EU Treaties since Lisbon so 
as to guide Union activities in these fields. A certain degree of 
‘fragmentation’ – understood as the diversity/plurality of ‘who is doing 
what’ and with ‘which data for what purpose’ at the domestic and 
supranational levels in countering terrorism and crime – is also an inherent 
consequence of the division of competences at the Member State and EU 
levels in different policy domains. 
As Bigo56 convincingly put it, “this inherent problem in the 
problematization of this norm is that of delegitimation of all segmentation of 
information. Still, democracy lives within its own limits, frontiers of penal 
law, oppositions and necessary counter-powers for the power of the police 
in the sense of an institution or of a network of institutions.” The blurring 
division of responsibilities and competences/expertise among different 
national security actors, which underlies calls for more interoperability and 
purposeless information exchange, will inevitably lead to an increasing lack of 
confidence. It undermines the principle of property or ownership of 
information, which is by nature de-compartmentalised, and tends to forget 
that under EU data protection law the individual is the ultimate holder or 
‘owner’ of his or her data. 
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A key lesson emerging from this book is that the EU needs to be 
realistic and honest about what it can actually deliver in the field of security, 
and what it can really expect from Member States in this policy domain. 
Current and future policy attempts to address gaps and dilemmas must take 
place under the democratic rule of law and fundamental rights standards of 
the Lisbon Treaty, and EU Better Regulation principles. This is what will 
make the Security Union genuine with respect to its founding constitutional 
values and principles and to its citizens.57 
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
AFSJ Area of Freedom, Security and Justice 
CCTV Closed-circuit television camera 
CISA Convention on Implementing the Schengen Agreement 
COSI Standing Committee on Operational Cooperation on 
Internal Security 
CJEU Court of Justice of the European Union 
EAW European Arrest Warrant 
ECHR European Convention on Human Rights 
ECtHR European Court of Human Rights 
EIO European Investigation Order  
EPPO European Public Prosecutor’s Office 
ESO European Supervision Order 
ETIAS European travel information and authorisation system 
eu-LISA European Agency for the Operational Management of 
large-scale IT systems in the Area of Freedom, Security 
and Justice 
Eurodac European Automated Fingerprint Identification System 
FATF Financial Action Task Force  
GFCC German Federal Constitutional Court 
GDPR General Data Protection Regulation ((EU) 2016/679) 
JHA Justice and home affairs 
JIT Joint investigation team 
LEA Law enforcement authority 
MLA Mutual legal assistance 
NGO Non-governmental organisation 
OLAF European Anti-Fraud Office 
PNR Passenger name record 
RAN Radicalisation Awareness Network 
SIS Schengen Information System 
SSI Single search interface  
TEU Treaty on European Union 
TESAT EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 
TFEU Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
TFTP Terrorist Financing Tracking Program 
VIS Visa Information System 
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 Michal Nespor (EU Agency for Fundamental Rights – FRA) 
 
 Open Discussion 
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This book provides a multidisciplinary examination of the critical issues and 
challenges associated with the EU’s initiative to build a Security Union, particularly 
in relation to common policies adopted at the Member State level aimed at 
countering terrorism and crime. It delves into EU efforts to support cross-border 
investigations, the exchange of information and international cooperation, taking 
stock of the effects on freedom and privacy. 
The various contributions offer key research findings, which contributed to the 
European Commission’s 2017 Comprehensive Assessment of EU Security 
Policy. They identify and explore the main constitutional dilemmas facing the 
Security Union concerning EU standards enshrined in the Lisbon Treaty and the 
commitments undertaken in the context of the EU Better Regulation agenda. 
Hence, this timely examination of EU security policies sheds light on their 
effectiveness, proportionality, fundamental rights and societal implications. 
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